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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the ethical and ontological significance of Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1: 
The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Recent scholarship tends to read 
these texts for their contributions to film and media studies. This work develops a different 
focus by seeking to integrate Deleuze’s encounter with cinema into his philosophical 
project as a whole. I argue that the philosophical significance of the two volumes of 
Cinema comes into view when these texts are situated at the intersection of the 
interconnected themes of ethics and ontology in Deleuze’s thought. To demonstrate this 
unique contribution, I develop a reading of Deleuze’s project which focuses on the 
importance of his critical engagement with Spinoza and Bergson to his own ethics and 
ontology. Deleuze’s engagement with Spinoza may be fruitfully understood as the 
formulation of a problem that emerges at the point of convergence between ethics and 
ontology, a problem that Deleuze calls ethology. Through this concept, Deleuze argues 
that the characterisation and evaluation of the modes of an individual’s life can only be 
done from the point of view of a pure ontology. It is in the shadow of this question that 
Deleuze reworks the Spinozist concern with the ratio of active to passive affections and 
affects in an effort to find an ontologically robust and ethically sensitive way to consider the 
fluctuations and modifications to this ratio in the renewal of our understanding and 
unconscious processes of sense making. By bringing together the concept of the wound 
formulated in his work of the 1960s and the concept of the sensory-motor schema and its 
collapse articulated in the two volumes of Cinema, I argue that Deleuze suggests that an 
individual’s experience of her wounds and scars makes possible an increase in her active 
affections by confronting her with a renewed idea of her relational embeddedness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A living being is not only defined genetically, by the dynamisms which determine its internal milieu, but 
also ecologically, by the external movements which preside over its distribution within an extensity.
1
 
 
In this brief comment in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze presents us with the hypothesis 
that serves as the backbone of his philosophy: to develop a meaningful account of a living being, we 
must not restrict ourselves to the genetic structures that are internal to a being. Since the conditions 
of a being’s genesis are not limited to the capacities that inhere in it, we must also attend to the 
processes and relationships—the “kinetics of population”2—that constitute a being’s milieu. 
Articulating the metaphysical logic and ethical consequences of this ecological conception of beings 
is the guiding concern of this thesis. My aim is to examine the way in which Deleuze’s ecological 
approach to the study of beings presupposes an ontology, an account of the nature of the relational 
whole which is any being’s constitutive milieu, and gives rise to an ethics, that is, an account of the 
modes of existence and the relations that sees an enhancement to, and transformation of, an 
individual’s capacities through her relationship with—how she makes sense of—the ongoing 
modifications to her embodiment. What is particularly striking about this question of an 
individual’s relationship with her capacities is the potential for the states of her embodiment to 
affect how she understands her nature as a relational being, that is, how she understands herself 
from an ecological point of view. On that basis, I argue that Deleuze’s philosophical project is best 
characterised as the creative combination of ontology and ethics, that is, as ethology. 
The first point to note about Deleuze’s ecological conception of living beings is that it is 
fundamentally opposed to methodological individualism of any kind. An individual, for Deleuze is 
never self-contained and isolated, never distinct from her environment. On the contrary, the 
individual is embedded in a milieu that is implied in everything she does, in every facet of her mode 
of life. When Deleuze argues that her milieu is implied in her life, it is because her actions are 
determined by the affects through which she internalises her relationships with the world. 
Moreover, because these affects determine her actions, the relationships she has with her milieu 
subsist in her every action. Of course, her environment also contains other subjects undergoing the 
same types of affective transformations and determinations. Thus, for Deleuze, to emphasise the 
                                                          
1
 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 216. 
2
 Ibid., 216.  
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importance of ecological conditions in the definition of a being is to emphasise the affective 
entanglements of the myriad lives that interact in the ongoing transformation of an impersonal life.  
A focus on relations as primary, on life as an interaction of forces and relations, entails both 
anti-essentialism and anti-humanism. Even if life expresses itself through particular lives, it is not 
reducible to these particular lives. Thus, when Deleuze engages with the human, he does so by 
reducing consciousness to being a symptom of the interplay of affective forces at work in and on 
the body. And what fascinates Deleuze about the body, about our necessary embodiment, is that the 
body can never really be domesticated to the whims and desires of the human. Rather, the body is, 
as Elizabeth Kuhn puts it, “the material with which the force of life is compatible” because it is 
characterised by its becoming and transformation.
3
 The body has a fascinating and difficult status 
within Deleuze’s work. As Joe Hughes puts it, “[e]ven in those texts in which the body plays a 
prominent role, it is very quickly transcended. … The theory of the body in Deleuze’s work is thus 
a problematic site. It is not clear what kind of work the concept is supposed to do within Deleuze’s 
corpus, and it is not immediately clear what kind of work we can do with it.”4 I approach the body 
as the site of the interplay of ecological forces. That is, the body is not an overall structure 
interacting with an environment. It is, rather, a “relatively closed system”5 that expresses a set of 
affective relations under a particular set of conditions. I argue that Deleuze does not conceive 
bodies as mere extended objects; instead they are the correlation of an idea and a sensible 
expression of that idea in an empirical situation that arranges extended parts according to a degree 
of power. It is not the body as a particular state or being that interests Deleuze, it is the process 
through which a set of relations is expressed in something actual, something sensible. In this sense, 
Deleuze is more interested in embodiment as an affective process, than he is in bodies as objects. 
I want to emphasise how rapidly Deleuze’s concern with life’s ecological conditions comes to 
challenge what counts as a life. Levi Bryant offers a concise description of the anti-humanism 
suggested by Deleuze’s ecological concerns when he writes that “the human and its relation to the 
world can no longer be treated as a privileged starting point for philosophical investigation. Humans 
are among beings, rather than a privileged point around which being is organized.”6 Deleuze’s 
ontological project, insofar as it responds to the problem of ecological conditions, does not begin 
from the point of view of human beings who are thrown into the world; it must begin, rather, from 
                                                          
3
 Elizabeth Kuhn, “Toward an Anti-Humanism of Life: The Modernism of Nietzsche, Hulme and Yeats,” Journal of 
Modern Literature 34, no. 4 (2011): 6. 
4
 Joe Hughes, “Pity the Meat?: Deleuze and the Body,” introduction to Deleuze and the Body, eds. Laura Guillaume and 
Joe Hughes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 2. 
5
 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 12. 
6
 Levi R. Bryant, “A Logic of Multiplicities: Deleuze, Immanence, and Onticology,” Analecta Hermeneutica 0.3 
(2011): 4. 
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the point of view of the relations that constitute the human as one being among many. This does not 
entail rejecting questions about the value and richness of human life. In his Onto-Ethologies, Brett 
Buchanan considers the extent to which such a rejection of humanism leads to reformulating these 
questions about human life: 
While we emerge from the critiques of our humanist tradition, an increasing focus is being paid to how 
and where we find ourselves within nature and the world at large. “What does it mean to be human?” 
becomes a question of life and the living being. Attention to the status of human beings need not 
disappear, of course, but it does become framed by a broader emphasis on nature and life. What are the 
relations within nature? And how do we assess these ontological relations?
7
 
So, with respect to the question of the relationships between living beings and their 
environment, we cannot begin from the privileged point of view of a human life and then move out 
into its environment in order to ask how it makes sense of the world to which it relates. Instead, the 
question becomes an ontological one: how is an individual a function of its environment?
8
 In this 
case, function can be read in its mathematical sense. An individual is the event wherein sets, or, as 
Deleuze would put it, ensembles of relations, are associated with each other such that the members 
of the sets are determined and transformed. Given that Deleuze’s ontology is an immanent one, the 
logic of this association is determined reciprocally with the ongoing relations that the individual has 
with her environment so that the output produced is genuinely novel. In this context, we face the 
sort of questions Buchanan raises insofar as we can ask after the status of a human life only from 
the point of view of its ongoing relations with its environment.  
An appraisal of the nature of the individual and its relations with others in its environment is 
not merely ontological, it also concerns the individual’s ways of being and relating. That is, it also 
concerns ethics. This creative combination of ethics and ontology is signalled in Deleuze’s adoption 
of the term “ethology” to describe his approach to ethics. For Deleuze, an ethological project is not 
only concerned with the ontological question of the sense in which the individual is a function of its 
environment. It also engages the inevitable correlation of the ontological question with traditional 
ethical questions about the conditions and consequences of the individual’s mode of life: 
When one speaks of an ethology in connection with animals, or in connection with man, what is it a 
matter of? Ethology in the most rudimentary sense is a practical science, of what? A practical science of 
                                                          
7
 Brett Buchanan, Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 4. 
8
 See Cinema 1, 62: “There is firstly a system in which each image varies for itself, and all the images act and react as a 
function of each other.”  
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the manners of being. The manner of being is precisely the state of beings, of what exists, from the point 
of view of a pure ontology.
9
 
Deleuze’s shift from ecology to ethology makes a new series of problems accessible insofar 
as ethology deploys ontology to ask practical questions about the manner and comportment of 
individual lives or modes of existence. It is this intersection of ontology and ethics in Deleuze’s 
practical philosophy that this thesis seeks to address and explore. While it does not seem prima 
facie problematic to suggest that an individual has some capacity for comprehending or 
understanding her place in a particular milieu, the nature and effects of an individual’s production 
of sense and meaning is a complicated issue. Insofar as being is a question of meaning, rather than 
essence, Deleuze sees the production of meaning as the fundamental ontological question.
10
 
Consequently, I am interested in the ways that an individual’s understanding of its relationality 
interacts with the transformation of its capacity to participate in its environment. An individual is 
embedded in its environment to the extent that its existence presupposes a relationality that 
constitutes and directs its becoming. At the same time, that her existence is always grounded in 
series of relations means that the individual is necessarily exposed, necessarily vulnerable to injury 
or destruction. I suggest that this embodied vulnerability is, for Deleuze, a condition for 
transforming her understanding of the milieu of which she is a part and thereby transforming her 
capacities for different types of relations. Indeed, this thesis is interested in the Cinema books 
because it is in these texts that Deleuze engages most directly, most concretely with a problem that 
haunts his entire project: how do our wounds, the breakdowns in the sense we make of our 
embodiment, influence the transformation of our capacities?  
In the two volumes of his Cinema project, Deleuze adopts a concept from Henri Bergson to 
name and concretely formulate the logic of how the affective continuity of the world is 
differentiated into particular beings: the sensory-motor schema. I suggest that the significance of 
this concept is two-fold. First, it names the process through which actual individuals come into 
being. Once it is named, Deleuze deploys this concept to do something that he had not successfully 
done in any previous work—offer a concrete way to think about the individual as a function of its 
environment, from the individual’s point of view. Second, Deleuze uses this concept to elaborate a 
problem that had appeared previously but always remained subterranean: the wound. The concept of 
the wound appears in Deleuze’s texts as a way to engage with the ethical problem of how we relate 
to the significance of what happens to us. Cinema’s sensory-motor schema enables us to understand 
                                                          
9
 Gilles Deleuze, “Sur Spinoza,” 21/12/1980. Transcripts of Deleuze’s lectures are freely available in numerous 
languages online at www.webdeleuze.com 
10
 François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011), 119; 130. 
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concretely the logic of embodiment as well as the conditions and consequence of the breakdowns of 
this logic. It is in the sense of the breakdown of this logic that the sensory-motor schema allows 
Deleuze to qualify what he means by wound and argue that experiences which disrupt the logic of 
our embodiment by shattering the efficacy of our habits, and thereby empower and transform our 
modes of life. In this way, this thesis offers a reappraisal of the significance of the Cinema books, 
by demonstrating their unique contribution to Deleuze’s ethological project. 
 To this end, I approach Deleuze’s œuvre with a view to the continuity of a very particular 
problem: the constitution of individuals and subjects as functions of a world defined by its affective 
continuity. This problem appears as early as Deleuze’s first published book, Empiricism and 
Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, where he describes the genesis of 
subjects on a plane of immanence. That is, he describes the actual world as a plane of relations—the 
ecological problem described above—and suggests that the subject must be accounted for as an 
immanent expression of this relational plane. By the time he published the two volumes of his 
Cinema project some three decades later, Deleuze had arrived at an ontological picture wherein 
subjectivity is determined by unconscious processes of sense-making, and the actions that follow 
from these processes are expressions of the becoming of the plane of immanence. Cinema’s 
sensory-motor schema is an immanent logic that determines action to the extent that it is an empty, 
formal schema that derives its content from particular experience. Indeed, as I argue in chapter four, 
it is only through experience that this schema is able to determine action. The sensory-motor 
schema does not merely receive a name in these books, Cinema also explores the conditions and 
consequences of its collapse. Inspired by the films of Italian Neo-Realism and the French New 
Wave, Deleuze argues that WWII changed how cinema was able to think about the role of the 
subject. Characters were no longer conceived as subjects of action capable of interpreting their 
world and acting to transform it. However, far from stranding viewers in this broken world, modern 
cinema, Deleuze argues, develops a new conception of the determination of action. The sensory-
motor links break down because characters’ perceptions no longer lead to a sensible image of their 
world. Instead they are presented with a new idea of the world, an idea that confronts them with the 
relational becoming of the world and their frailty within it. Thus confronted, the sense-making 
processes and habits that ground the determination of action no longer work and so characters 
cannot act because they literally cannot make sense of the world. Once the characters cease to act 
and begin to see, their lives come to express the forging of new connections and new relationships 
in the becoming of the world. This is not to say that Deleuze privileges sight over other senses; 
rather, he emphasises the way that disruptions to sensory-motor links renew the standing that 
characters have as the centre of sensory images. To explore this, he turns to Federico Fellini whose 
17 
 
early films concern wanderers, characters who survey their world without acting upon it. Deleuze 
sees in these films a relaxation of the sensory-motor links and the creation of purely optical and 
auditory situations for his characters. Over time, however, Fellini’s films “became increasingly 
concerned with entering into a new element” and exploring new possibilities.11 Fellini’s 
masterpiece, 8½, is a joyous tribute to the sensuality and struggles of the creative process and yet its 
creativity is grounded in new ways of making sense of things: there are memories of childhood, 
nightmares, distractions, dreams, fantasies, and even a telepath of whom Guido, the protagonist, 
asks “How do you transmit thoughts?” 8½ is not interested in the products of creation but in the 
difficult process of sense-making which must be undertaken by the artist. 
In the last decade, the Cinema books have made increasingly frequent appearances in 
discussions of Deleuze’s metaphysical project. Unfortunately, however, they are too often 
considered a mere recapitulation of his ontology and consequently the philosophical novelty of 
Deleuze’s encounter with cinema is passed over. Addressing this issue and demonstrating the 
relevance and force of these works is part of my goal here. I argue that, far from merely 
recapitulating earlier work, Deleuze’s cinema volumes rework key elements of his metaphysical 
project. This, of course, does not mean that the Cinema books are all entirely novel or always 
representative of the sophistication of Deleuze’s earlier work. In his recent Gilles Deleuze’s 
Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide, James Williams criticises the Cinema 
books for their “conflation of the philosophical use of the [concept of the] image … with the 
cinematic image.”12 Indeed, because the books depend on a simplified distillation of Deleuze’s 
philosophy of time, Williams suggests that “the film works add little and in fact might take away 
from his philosophy of time in its most consistent and extensive form.”13 Williams suggests that this 
is “why many of the best commentators on Deleuze’s work on cinema reconstruct the underlying 
philosophy on the basis of other more purely philosophical works.”14  
Whilst this thesis intervenes in critical discussions of these two books, it does not so much 
reconstruct Deleuze’s ontology as take at face value a comment Deleuze makes about the necessity 
of understanding a philosopher’s œuvre as a developing project. In a lecture on Spinoza, Deleuze 
comments on what it means to engage critically with a philosopher’s work: “You never say that a 
philosopher contradicts himself; you will ask such-and-such page, in what sequence to put it, at 
                                                          
11
 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robbert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), 88. 
12
 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011), 160. 
13
 Ibid, 161. 
14
 Ibid., 161. 
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what level of the sequence?”15 Deleuze suggests that if we want to evaluate the concepts a 
philosopher develops, we can do so only by asking after the sequence in which the concept appears. 
In other words, any critical interrogation of a philosopher must be sensitive to the place of her 
concepts within a developing project. I would argue that this also means that if we want to grapple 
with Deleuze’s concepts we will only achieve some measure of success if we uncover the problems 
motivating the work and consider these concepts relative to the development of certain responses to 
those problems. Thus, I put the Cinema books in the context of Deleuze’s developing project and 
illuminate the power of these books relative to Deleuze’s broader project. 
I draw out the significance of the Cinema books by situating them at the point where two 
relatively recent, growing debates converge. First is the exploration of the potential ethical 
significance of Deleuze’s philosophy. While engagements with this issue have been appearing for 
some time, the incorporation of a section dedicated to ethics in the collection Afterimages of Gilles 
Deleuze’s Film Philosophy (2010), the appearance of the collection Deleuze and Ethics (2011), and 
a fine essay by Rosi Braidotti in The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze, “Nomadic Ethics” (2012), 
make it hard not to feel that this issue is finally receiving appropriate recognition as a genuinely 
Deleuzian problem. By responding to a problem articulated by Ronald Bogue in his contribution to 
Afterimages, I contend that the Cinema books make a significant contribution to this debate. In the 
Cinema books, Deleuze describes a situation whereby the world becomes unbearable or intolerable 
because it resembles an insipid, hackneyed or clichéd film. Because the world becomes unbearable, 
the sensory-motor schema fails and action ceases to follow perception. Bogue suggests that “[t]he 
only viable response to the intolerable is to think differently, to disconnect the world’s networks of 
certainties and pieties and formulate new problems that engender as yet unmapped relations and 
connections.”16 Bogue then turns to modern film and the potential it has for engaging this problem; 
however, while I agree with his assessment of modern cinema, I respond to this topic differently. I 
ask, is there anything immanent to experience itself which would make such a response possible? 
By taking the uniquely concrete philosophy of the Cinema books and connecting it to the concept of 
wounds that Deleuze evokes in his work of the late 1960s, I argue that it is experiences of the 
sublime, experiences whose magnitude shatter the sensory-motor schema, that force us to think 
differently and enable an experimentation with modes of life such that new connections become 
possible.  
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Elaborating why this is the case requires me to engage with a second problem: Deleuze’s 
potential contribution to an ecological or holistic ontology. The question of Deleuze’s relevance to 
ecology, environmental philosophy and biology in general has received growing attention over 
recent years, see for example Buchanan’s Onto-Ethologies, the collection Deleuze|Guattari & 
Ecology (2009), Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2009) and the work 
of John Protevi, particularly his Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (2009) and 
“Ontology, Biology, and History of Affect,” his contribution to the collection The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism (2011). I will not address directly the prospect that Deleuze’s 
philosophy is ecological in a biological or environmental sense. Rather, the central concern of this 
thesis is to trace the operations and transformations in how Deleuze’s ontology portrays the 
reciprocity between individuals and the whole of which they are parts. In the preface to the English 
edition of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze comments that the interconnection of the two 
problems formulated therein, a concept of difference liberated from identity, and repetition without 
reduction to the repetition of the same, are the central concerns of his project.
17
 I argue that these 
two problems persist because they allow Deleuze to simultaneously conceive individuals as 
expressions of subsistent relations as well as to account for these expressions as instances of 
genuine novelty. These issues, I argue, are in fact the mechanics employed in Deleuze’s œuvre to 
develop a particular kind of holistic ontology. That is, a holistic ontology in which the whole is 
itself immanent to, and subsistent in, the individual lives that both constitute and express it. 
Defending these claims requires undertaking a substantial engagement with the ecological 
conditions of the constitution of a being and will thereby contribute to this broader debate. 
In order to elucidate the convergence of ethics and ecological ontology in an ethology, this 
thesis has a broadly symmetrical structure: chapters two, three and four explore the development 
and transformation of this ontology in depth while chapters one and five frame this exploration by, 
on the one hand, setting out an ethical context for this exploration and, on the other, offering a 
reflection on and elucidation of the ethical significance of this ontology. 
In chapter one I discuss Deleuze’s critique of traditional morality and consider what ethics 
means for Deleuze and why his project is most fairly characterised as ethological. My contention is 
that for Deleuze any ontological discussion implies an ethical discussion and any ethical discussion 
implies ontology.
18
 Deleuze’s project is thus ethological to the extent that two problems 
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continuously communicate and transform each other: how do individuals make sense of and relate 
to transformations—diminutions and enhancements—to their power (ethics)? and what role does 
the production of sense play in the transformation of an individual’s power (ontology)? An 
argument that I will make throughout this thesis follows from this: Deleuze’s notorious fixation on 
immanence entails a reciprocity between the conditions of experience and experience per se. 
Experience determines the conditions of experience, and the conditions of experience determine the 
form of experience; experience necessarily refers back to a set of conditions which determine it, and 
the form of those conditions refer to prior experience. In this chapter I also introduce two crucial 
concepts: wounds and counter-actualisation. The significance of these concepts is their 
development of the conditions and process of the transformations with which ethics is concerned. 
Both concepts relate to, and express, the breakdown of the sensory-motor schema. Deleuze presents 
such experiences of failure, of the breakdown and rupture of sense-making and habitual modes of 
action, as crucial to the production of genuinely creative forms of transformation and change. 
Significantly, such experiences have the potential to confront an individual with a renewed idea of 
her place in the whole. The wound is a paradigmatic example of such experiences, which Deleuze 
understands as conditions of ethical transformation. Counter-actualisation is the process by which 
these transformations occur to the extent that it is the process by means of which an individual 
engages with and contemplates this renewed idea and thereby transforms how she makes sense of 
her milieu. Initially, the power of these concepts remains unclear because they are only developed 
as offshoots of the historical or literary figures Deleuze discusses. By undertaking a focussed 
discussion of the Cinema books, however, the conclusion of this thesis is able to more adequately 
disclose the concrete power of wounds and the process of counter-actualisation. In this sense, 
chapter one explores what ethics would be like for Deleuze but sets it out as problem that requires 
his entire project to solve concretely. When I undertake an in-depth engagement with Deleuze’s 
ontology across the next three chapters it is because the development of his ontology is the only 
way we will understand the content and significance of his concrete ethical claims.  
In chapter two I explore how Deleuze’s engagement with Spinoza enables him to argue that 
the conditions of ethical change occur holistically and reciprocally with the actual world. Deleuze’s 
encounter with Spinoza is a pivotal moment for the development of his holistic ontology. In 1956, 
Deleuze published an essay about Bergson, “The Concept of Difference in Bergson,” and suggested 
that being would be disclosed through a concept of difference in itself.
19
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Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze published a significant interpretation of Spinoza 
that, if taken in isolation, appears to be the work of a historian of philosophy presenting a 
particularly perverse interpretation of Spinoza. Against this, I argue that the significance of 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza becomes clear if we read it as echoing themes from his earlier work 
on Bergson and as a companion piece to Difference and Repetition, which was published the same 
year. Through his engagement with Spinoza, Deleuze is able to develop a relational ontology of 
univocal being that is crucial to his overall project. Spinoza is well known for his thesis of 
substance monism, a thesis in which a single substance is modified according to an infinity of 
attributes. On Deleuze’s reading, the attributes actually constitute substance as a qualitatively 
heterogeneous but numerically single whole. This constitution is simultaneously a production of 
infinite modal expressions of the constitution of the whole. This production is the production of the 
plurality of actual lives that fill out the world.  
The reciprocity of substance and modes outlined in this reading of Spinoza is the crucial 
first step towards Deleuze’s development of a holistic ontology. However, in Difference and 
Repetition (1968) Deleuze expresses a criticism of Spinoza’s metaphysics and sets about developing 
the tools that will allow him to retain this ontology while outmanoeuvring the problem he has with 
Spinoza. The logic of reciprocity between substance and modes means that the identity of substance 
is not determined by the modes even though their production follows from the constitution of 
substance. In light of the criticism, chapter three elaborates how the more familiar elements of 
Deleuze’s philosophy—the three syntheses of time, multiplicity and the distinction between the 
virtual and the actual—are elements of Deleuze’s effort to salvage a holistic ontology that replaces 
the identity of substance with the differentiation of degrees of power expressed by the modes. 
In chapter four I turn to Cinema 1 to show how, in his engagement with cinema, Deleuze 
draws on Bergson to argue that the reciprocity of the actual world and the whole is grounded in the 
formalisation of sensibility in experience. In other words, the determination of the conditions of 
experience is reciprocal with experience itself. This argument takes the conceptual tools outlined in 
chapter three and uses them to develop the logic of a part/whole reciprocity with affect as the 
double-sided process which simultaneously expresses the relationships between beings and 
constitutes the whole as the continuity of the relations which subsist in actual beings. The 
discussion concentrates on how Deleuze adapts two arguments made by Henri Bergson—the 
critique of concepts of movement in Creative Evolution and the concept of the image in Matter and 
Memory—to conceptualise actual beings as points within an affective continuum that are 
distinguishable only artificially. 
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In chapter five I explore Cinema 2 in order to return to the ethical themes of chapter one. 
My reading of Cinema 2 foregrounds a concept Deleuze adopts from Kant: experiences of the 
sublime. As Christian Kerslake suggests, Deleuze’s project is more Kantian than is often 
acknowledged and his project is more sensible when read in these terms.
20
 The sublime is 
significant because it is the sort of experience in which the sense-making processes that determine 
action are taken to a limit at which they break down. This breakdown confronts the subject of 
experience with a new idea of the whole and forces it to think differently. This new idea and the 
possibility of making sense differently is, Deleuze argues, the condition for forging new 
connections and participating in new relations. That is, experiences which rupture the logic by 
which action is traditionally formulated are also the condition for the transformations with which 
Deleuze’s ethics are concerned. 
For all the complexity of the work that I will undertake across the five chapters of this 
thesis, there is a concrete hypothesis which is served by all these arguments and which can be 
provisionally formulated now in anticipation of a more sophisticated articulation in the overall 
conclusion. Experiences that follow from disruptions to and breakdowns in the logic by which we 
act, and express solutions to the problems posed to us by the world—experiences of the sublime, 
experiences characterised as “too big for me”21— interact with the determination of our capacities in 
such a way as to transform and enhance the degree of power by which we participate in particular 
relationships. The ethological significance of this hypothesis is that, from an ontological point of 
view, it asks how we might make sense of the proposition that the content of our experience 
interacts with the determination of the degree of power we actualise in our relationships. Fleshing 
out this problem is the task of chapters two, three, and four, and their narrative regarding the 
ecological, that is, holistic, determination of an individual and her power. From an ethical point of 
view, this hypothesis asks why it is these particular experiences that are so vital to the 
transformation of our power. The significance of this ethical dimension of our hypothesis is why 
this thesis’ discussion of Deleuze’s ontology is framed the way it is: on the one hand, we must start 
by setting out the importance of the ethical question; on the other hand, we must consider how that 
discussion of ontology lends itself to a particular answer. Finally, when this all converges in the 
conclusion, we can articulate a more sophisticated version of our hypothesis by thinking through 
how and why Deleuze’s project lends itself to such a reading, as well as consider what it might 
mean in terms of a transformation of our modes of life for such an hypothesis to be true. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
On the Relationship Between Ethics and Ontology in Deleuze’s Ethology. 
 
This chapter confronts two questions in order to establish a framework that will 
contextualise this thesis as a whole. The first question is quite broad: how does Deleuze understand 
the relation between a set of beliefs and changes in the capacities of a body? In response I will 
argue that, for Deleuze, changes in capacities are inexorably bound up in our understanding of, and 
our beliefs about, how we are positioned within a set of actual relations. This is clearly an 
ontological issue insofar as it concerns the role of various subjective elements (beliefs, 
understanding, memory, etc.) in the determination of our relational capacities. Insofar as this entails 
questions about the ways our relations affect us and how those affects transform our capacities, this 
ontological issue simultaneously entails an ethical question: how might an actual person participate 
actively in the determination of changes in these capacities? I will argue that, when the logic by 
which we engage sensibly with the world breaks down, a new understanding of the relational nature 
of the world is possible and this understanding has the potential to enhance our powers and 
empower our participation in the whole. This chapter will explore these claims through an 
engagement with Deleuze’s ontology, his conception of ethical problems and the complex processes 
of subjective sense-making that hold the two discussions together. First, however, we need to 
understand the unorthodox nature of Deleuze’s project and so we will begin with his criticisms of 
traditional moral theory. 
 
Deleuze’s Critical Response to Moral Philosophy.  
In the ethical component of his ethology, Deleuze engages the assumption that the 
conditions of ethical problems are homogeneous. That is, Deleuze is less interested in the question 
of how we ought to act in certain circumstances, than he is in how and why certain circumstances 
present as ethical problems for particular individuals. A situation that presents as an ethical problem 
for one person, or one society, might not present as such for others. The defining issue for Deleuze 
is how an event affects an individual and how the event affects her capacities to affect and to be 
affected. In order to understand why he takes this unorthodox approach, we must begin by 
exploring Deleuze’s critique of morality, particularly consequentialist morality. 
24 
 
Deleuze’s critique of traditional morality is grounded in the claim that it is nihilistic. He 
argues that, insofar as morality turns towards rules abstracted from the particularity of events and 
insofar as we generate rules in order to judge events without consideration for their specificity, we 
deny “life,” which is to say that we deny life’s capacities by separating them from a power to act. 
The sense in which Deleuze considers morality to be nihilistic is distinctly Nietzschean and is 
inspired by sentiments such as Nietzsche’s claim that “[i]nsofar as we believe in morality we pass 
sentence on existence.”22 In many ways, Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche is an account of the latter’s 
war on morality; what concerns us here, however, is why this war is waged. What is at stake, for 
instance, when Deleuze describes morality as the successor to Christian dogmatism?
23
 The answer, 
in short, is the separation of a power from what it can do or, to put this another way, the separation 
of a body from its capacities. For Deleuze, reactive forces, the forces that find their expression in 
transcendent and ascetic morality, are characterised by “their opposition to what they are not, their 
tendency to limit the other: in them, negation comes first.”24 and this is the specific sense in which 
Deleuze uses the term nihilistic: “In the word nihilism nihil does not signify non-being but 
primarily a value of nil. Life takes on a value of nil insofar as it is denied and depreciated.”25 
Indeed, this anticipates a Spinozist theme that will be important for the Deleuzian conception of 
how ethics intersects with ontology. In his reading of Spinoza’s ethics, Deleuze is concerned with 
Spinoza’s theory of the passions and the affects which correspond with enhancements or 
diminutions to our powers of acting.  
The primary target of this critique of morality is any form of thinking about life that we might 
broadly call Platonic, any system where abstract values judge the worth of an event or action from a 
transcendent point of view. As Deleuze writes: 
Depreciation always presupposes a fiction: it is by means of fiction that one falsifies and 
depreciates, it is by means of fiction that something is opposed to life … The idea of another 
world, of a supersensible world in all its forms (God, essence, the good, truth), the idea of values 
superior to life, is not one example among many but the constitutive element of all fiction. 
Values superior to life are inseparable from their effect: the depreciation of life, the negation of 
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this world. And if they are inseparable from this effect it is because their principle is a will to 
deny, to depreciate.
26
  
Typically, Kantianism, particularly with its juridical deontology, is highlighted as a target of 
Deleuze’s critique.27 Deleuze begins Difference and Repetition by asking a bluntly Kantian question 
about morality: “what good is moral law if it does not … make reiteration possible and give us a 
legislative power from which we are excluded by the law of nature?”28 Deleuze wants to argue that 
moralists divide the world up into Good and Evil. For moralists, Evil arises when our actions are 
formulated according to a law of nature and lead only to despair or boredom. Good, however, holds 
out the possibility of generating something new, something enhanced, because it depends upon a 
law of duty to which we cannot be subject without also being legislators. It is in this sense that 
Deleuze describes Kant’s “‘highest test’ … as a criterion which should decide what can in principle 
be reproduced—in other words, what can be repeated without contradiction in the form of moral 
law”.29 Unfortunately, however, this law of duty ends up repeating pre-existing values by at once 
elevating them to the status of transcendent laws and simultaneously internalising them as laws of 
nature. Indeed, it is entirely possible to read Nietzsche and Philosophy as the story of Nietzsche’s 
struggle against Kant, filled as it is with reproaches to Kant for having concealed a renovated 
theology in the unity of legislator and subject, and an interpretation of Kantian legislative reason as 
“an arbitrator, a justice of the peace who supervises the distribution of domains and the allocation of 
established values.”30 
Still, from the point of view of this thesis’ concern with modifications to the power which 
characterises a living being, consequentialism is a more salient counterpoint for Deleuze’s approach 
to ethics. At first, Deleuze’s ethics seems to share a common ground with consequentialist moral 
theories insofar as they both reject duties in favour of a concern with the consequences of an 
event/encounter. In their respective contributions to the collection Deleuze and Ethics, Levi Bryant 
and Nathan Jun take up the difference between Deleuzian ethics and consequentialist moral 
                                                          
26
 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 147. 
27
 See, for example, Dan Smith who presents Deleuze’s immanent ethics in contradistinction to an ethics that refers 
itself to something—God, values or a moral law—that is transcendent. As Smith argues, Kant, in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, posits the moral law as “a transcendent law that is unknowable.” Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze and the 
Question of Desire: Towards an Immanent Theory of Ethics,” in Deleuze and Ethics, eds. Nathan Jun and Daniel W. 
Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011),125 . See also Steven Shaviro, “The ‘Wrenching Duality’ of 
Aesthetics: Kant, Deleuze, and the ‘Theory of the Sensible,’” Scholarly Articles (in pdf format), November 10, 2007, 
accessed September 04 2013, http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/articles.html. Shaviro outlines an important 
distinction between Kantian and Deleuzean morality; Kant’s morality, according to Shaviro, is “categorical and 
universal,” whereas Deleuze’s is “hypothetical and singular.” Ibid., 7. In other words, Kant’s morality is a subjection of 
individual agents to categorical imperatives derived from a universal law; Deleuze’s, meanwhile, is the production of 
specific, singular imperatives that are always immanent to a particular problematic moment. 
28
 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 4 
29
 Ibid., 4. 
30
 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 93--94. 
26 
 
theories. Such theories, for instance Mill’s or Bentham’s versions of utilitarianism, require a kind of 
retrospective validity insofar as they claim to analyse past events and thereby derive criteria for 
prescribing the actions necessary to produce good outcomes in future encounters. This use of 
retrospective validity, Jun argues, derives transcendent criteria such that all attempts to make 
decisions about the morally correct course of action in the lead up to a given event are essentially 
hypothetical imperatives of the form “if you want X you ought to do Y.”31 As Jun puts it, this 
presence of transcendent criteria is at odds with Deleuzean ethics because Deleuze is part of a 
philosophical movement that, “is nothing if not a systematic repudiation of transcendence.”32  
Bryant’s argument is also concerned with consequentialist moral theories’ reliance on 
retrospective validity, but his criticism is directed at the assumption that, if such retrospection is to 
work, affects must necessarily be homogeneous. Bryant takes aim at JS Mill who, in his seminal 
Utilitarianism, argues that: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, “utility” or the “greatest happiness 
principle” holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the 
absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. … all desirable things … 
are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure 
and the prevention of pain.
33
 
With this, Mill allows us to take account of the fact that, in any given situtation, the 
differences between the parties involved are not arbitrary, and, thus, the affective states of the 
participants are foregrounded. That is, simply asking after our duties, à la Kant, overlooks how an 
action or the circumstances of a given event affect those involved. Mill emphasises that the criteria 
for determining the rightness of an action cannot be indifferent to its effects on those whom it will 
affect. As such, the outcomes of an action, the affects that it promotes, are the final criteria for 
determining the rightness of an action. 
Bryant is concerned with what he considers “the essentialist presuppositions regarding 
subjects that seem to underpin utilitarian ethical theories.”34 Consequentialism presupposes a 
homogeneity to compare possible cases of being affected, and so, while Bryant commends the 
consequentialist emphasis on affect, he is uneasy about the way that “our capacity to be affected 
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pleasurably or painfully here seems to be assumed as a brute and unchanging given.”35 Quite 
simply, utilitarianism of the kind Bryant takes issue with, attempts to achieve an abstraction that 
would make it possible for these consequentialist moral theories to be prescriptive. If utilitarianism 
does indeed take this task upon itself, it is problematic for a very specific reason: in order to 
succeed at this endeavour, utilitarianism needs to be able to homogenise how an event’s affects fit 
into our anticipation of the unfolding of an event or action. That is, if we are going to evaluate an 
action or event according to its consequences, then the consequences must be sufficiently similar to 
prior, analogous actions or events. Bryant is troubled by this homogeneity precisely because it is 
unable to account for those events and actions which might change our capacity to be affected: “Yet 
what are we to do if action itself transforms our capacity to be affected by generating new capacities 
to be affected?”36 
For an example we need only turn to a significant influence on Deleuze’s formulation of 
ethics in the Logic of Sense: the case of Joë Bousquet who became a poet and novelist after 
suffering a devastating spinal injury during his service in World War 1. Bousquet is significant 
because, had he not suffered an injury that left him incapacitated and in constant pain, he might 
never have become the writer he did. Since he is interested in the extent to which Bousquet’s 
writing is an affirmation of the injury he suffered, Deleuze repeatedly cites Bousquet’s sentiment 
“my wound existed before me, I was born to embody it”37 as an expression of Bousquet’s 
affirmation of his wound as a trauma that was necessary to his becoming a writer. Utilitarianism is 
unable to account for situations like these. Indeed, according to Bryant, when considering an event 
such as this in which Bousquet’s wound brings about an increase of pain that enhances his capacity 
to be affected by the world, “it is no longer possible to track the relation between action and affect 
in the way proposed by utilitarianism.”38 From this point of view, utilitarianism cannot manage an 
event about to happen, an event whose consequences are not yet known. This is a significant issue 
because it cannot cope with the possibility that the event might change the capacities of the 
individuals involved to the extent that what was considered a preferable outcome in the lead-up to 
the event is no longer preferable once it has actually occurred.  
There is a clear conclusion we can draw from this: Deleuze’s critique undermines the 
traditional ethical endeavours to determine how we should act as well as the criteria by which we 
ought to evaluate actions. Deleuze problematises the attempt to apply consequentialist criteria in 
order to determine correct actions because, according to his metaphysics, the “consequences” of an 
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action only arise after it has occurred. Deleuze thus undermines the criteria by which both actions 
and events are retrospectively evaluated; not only must the evaluative criteria be immanent to the 
event being evaluated, but the evaluations themselves will be subject to constant revision. In 
Bousquet’s case, Mill’s pleasure/pain calculus could offer claims about whether it is right for 
Bousquet to be injured; insofar as Bousquet’s being injured causes pain and deprives him of 
pleasure, it is wrong. However, for Deleuze, Bousquet eventually affirms his injury as a 
consequence of an ongoing sense-making process wherein the significance of his injury changes.  
The primary issue for a Deleuzean conception of ethics is, then, the question of how to engage 
productively with genuinely novel situations. That is, when faced with something novel—
something unexpected and unprecedented, something “too big for me”39—under what conditions 
are we able to engage productively with the event? To engage with this problem, Deleuze turns 
initially to Spinoza’s understanding of modes of life which entail “a production, a productivity, a 
potency, in terms of causes and effects.”40 For Deleuze this means an emphasis on the degree to 
which an individual determines the type and form of the encounters that fill out her life. However, 
this does not mean that she makes a rational choice about these encounters. Rather, following 
Spinoza, Deleuze identifies the individual with a degree of power that is expressed in the affects she 
experiences given the relationships in which she is involved. As a degree of power, the individual 
may be said to determine events to the extent that the determination of the event involves her 
power. The extent to which an event or encounter is productive follows from the limit to which her 
power is taken: an event is more productive if her power is enhanced—that is, if she becomes more 
capable of affecting and being affected. I argue that it is in this sense that a new understanding, a 
new belief, would compel the determination of this productive engagement. This is why Deleuze’s 
ethology is consistently interested in the way the memory of the action or event subsists in the 
ongoing processes of sense-making and how that subsistence affects an individual’s capacities at 
any given moment. 
This argument is thus symptomatic of a recurrent theme in Deleuze’s philosophy, namely the 
relationship between problems and solutions. This is to say that at the centre of Deleuze’s 
metaphysics lies a dialectic of problems. With regards to his ethics, this dialectic is not concerned 
with finding correct solutions to abstract problems but, rather, with the conditions that determine 
specific problems. When Bryant incredulously asks, “Did anyone ever really doubt whether we 
should, by and large, keep our contracts, be honest, or not murder our fellows?”41 it is because 
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traditional problems—lying, stealing, killing, etc.—are exemplars of what Deleuze calls “false 
problems.”42 If this is problematic for Deleuze, it is because of the assumption that problems await 
philosophers who will answer them; aside from minor tweaking, the problems given to moral 
philosophers are already formulated and so pass over the specific determination of a problem as a 
problem.
43
 Traditional ethical theory has, according to Bryant, a “fetishistic obsession … with 
whether or not lying is moral or whether or not it is just to kill another person”;44 the inadequacy of 
this obsession is in its passing silently over questions of the conditions of the emergence of concrete 
ethical problems. This is why, for Deleuze, the question what is ethics? is a less interesting question 
than “the strange question of when ethical problematics arise.”45  
A central theme in Deleuze’s ontology is the necessity of a rupture—what Deleuze calls a 
caesura—between past events that can be represented in abstract moral theory and a future that is 
not yet given. In critiquing traditional morality, Deleuze has brought the question of ethics into a 
confrontation with the strangeness of this caesura and brought to light the relation between the 
composition of novel actions and the “moment where ‘principles’ governing a composition no 
longer hold.”46 In a famous sentiment from Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze offers a 
description of this ethical problem in terms of our attitudes towards the world: 
The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the 
events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. It is not we who make 
cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film.
47
 
Deleuze’s point, and the problem that drives his ethics, is that the world has been stripped of 
meaningful content and significance. Here Deleuze is talking about the collapse of the sensory-
motor schema; this caesura between the past and the future is a crucial feature of the threshold 
between perception and action.
48
 However, the collapse of the sensory-motor schema that Deleuze 
discusses in the two volumes of Cinema concerns the loss of the meaning of this caesura—the loss 
of a belief in the significance of what happens to us. Where the world was once filled with 
meaningful events, these events have become clichés and, in Deleuze’s diagnosis, this failure of 
significance diminishes a being’s capacity to generate new actions. The foremost concern of 
Deleuze’s ethics, then, is to grapple with the conditions, structures and consequences of these 
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clichés; to generate a new point of view on the world and thereby participate in the construction of 
new relations, new connections, and new worlds. The dialectic of problems and the reciprocity of 
problems and solutions is at the heart of Deleuze’s ontology. And so, to understand the conditions 
under which problems arise, we must explore the ontological component of Deleuze’s ethology. 
 
The Ontology that Correlates with Deleuze’s Ethics. 
Deleuze’s ethics is then concerned with the way our understanding, our beliefs and 
expectations, determine the way we participate in novel events. His approach to ethics has its 
sources in Spinoza’s Ethics and Bergson’s Matter and Memory. Following Spinoza and Bergson, 
Deleuze denies, in principle, the possibility of an external point of view on an event. This means 
that any attempt to assemble knowledge into a prediction or anticipation of the outcome of an event 
is simultaneously a participation in the determination of the event. An event is not novel because it 
is undetermined; it is novel because it cannot be predicted or given in advance of its actual 
occurrence. To elaborate this reading of Deleuze’s ethics, we must examine Deleuze’s conception 
of the relationship between the understanding of what happens and the happening itself. In this 
section I will outline some key components of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, particularly the 
latter’s parallelism, in order to show that, in the relational ontology Deleuze expounds, 
understanding correlates with embodied existence. 
A key element of the interpretation I will offer over the next three chapters is that, within 
Deleuze’s ontology, particular entities are not understood as self-sufficient, atomic individuals, but, 
rather, as individuating events. For Deleuze, there is no thing which is individuated in or by these 
events. Ultimately, Deleuze posits a complex conception of individuals and the whole as reciprocal 
such that, on the one hand, an actual individual’s participation in the whole is simultaneously a 
participation in the whole’s constitution, and, on the other hand, the whole’s constitution is its 
expression in beings that modify the whole. In other words, the processes that generate actual 
individuals, simultaneously constitute the whole in which the individuals participate. Within 
Deleuze’s metaphysics all beings are relational and, as such, the reciprocity between an individual 
and the whole determines changes in an individual’s capacities in a complex way. To say something 
meaningful about a being, we must therefore attend to the relationships in which they participate. 
From the point of view of these relationships, the individual is the expression of a degree of 
power—of a certain, determinate capacity. Indeed, within Deleuze’s metaphysics, an individual just 
is the expression of a capacity; the degree of power expressed is synonymous with an individual’s 
“essence.” 
31 
 
For an example we need only turn to Deleuze’s fondness for biologist and ethologist Jakob 
von Uexküll. In an essay entitled “Spinoza and Us,” Deleuze discusses a now famous case from 
Uexküll: the tick. At the beginning of his work A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 
Uexküll is interested in the humble tick as an exemplar of the problem of whether an organism is 
best thought of as “a mere object or subject.”49 Uexküll is interested in the distinction between 
physiology and biology. While a physiologist would argue that a tick is merely a machine 
responding reflexively to its environment, a biologist would argue that the tick is a “machine 
operator” insofar as it is a “subject that lives in its own world, of which it is the center [and] 
therefore [can only] be compared … to the machine operator who guides the machine.”50 Uexküll is 
interested in disposing of the crude opposition between the machine and the machine operator and 
instead explores the dynamic relation between the two such that, ultimately, his project is a story 
about the intensive world unique to an organism that casts the subject/object distinction as a 
question of points of view within a particular milieu. 
Uexküll is an important touchstone for Deleuze’s ethology because Uexküll’s story of the tick 
and its relationship to its environment stresses the phenomenal content of the tick’s world. The 
intensity of the tick’s world is defined by its affective entanglement in its world: “a body affects 
other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that 
also defines a body in its individuality.”51 Understood in terms of its affects, Deleuze argues, an 
individual is its relationships and the degrees of power that it expresses in its relationships:  
You will not define a body (or a mind) by its form, nor by its organs or functions, and neither 
will you define it as a substance or a subject. … You will define an animal, or a human being, 
not by its form, its organs, and its functions, and not as a subject either; you will define it by the 
affects of which it is capable.
52
 
When Deleuze takes up Uexküll’s example it is because his tick is defined in terms of its three 
primary affects: its receptivity to light, smell and temperature.
53
 As Brett Buchanan notes, “At issue, 
therefore, is how the tick relates to its surroundings, where the emphasis is neither on the tick … nor 
on the environment … but on the ‘affective’ relation itself.”54 From the point of view of Deleuze’s 
metaphysics, it is trivial to say that, for example, the tick has the property of being blind such that 
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its possession of this property is prior to its deployment in an encounter. Of course, the tick is blind, 
but this is beside the point. The ethological issue concerns how the photosensitivity of the tick’s 
skin, in lieu of eyes, constitutes a capacity—a degree of power—deployed within an actual, lived 
encounter. It remains for this chapter to outline how this affect-centred ethics might inform our 
concern with the modification of a being’s power.55 There is an important thread running through 
these arguments. This section began by noting that novelty in Deleuze’s ontology is grounded in an 
event’s being determined by, though not given in, a being’s relationship with the ideal formulation 
of that event. Ultimately, we will see that, à la Uexküll’s tick, affective encounters drive this 
relationship. By articulating more clearly how Deleuze conceives the impossibility of a 
transcendent point of view, we can build a much stronger foundation for this broader argument 
about affective encounters.  
This argument that the essence of an individual follows from its relations is rooted in classical 
philosophical arguments about the relationship between what an individual does and what it is. In 
his formulation of substance dualism, for instance, Descartes argues that events that occur in the 
actual world are substantially distinct from the minds of those who observe them. In the sixth 
meditation, Descartes observes that his essence consists solely in being a being who thinks, that is, a 
soul or a mind, and that, although he is intimately connected to a body, he is really distinct from his 
body and could exist independently of it.
56
 This formal independence means that Descartes’ mind 
can more or less accurately understand and describe events that it encounters; however, by virtue of 
his mind’s radical distinctness from the event, his observation does not actually modify the event it 
observes. In an incisive article, Robin Durie outlines the arguments underlying this Cartesian theory 
of substance dualism. Descartes’ dualism is grounded in the assertion that a substance has one 
principal attribute through which its nature and essence is constituted. According to this argument, 
where an attribute is able to be conceived without reference to any other attribute or property, this 
attribute may be understood to be really distinct. Finally, where there is a really distinct attribute 
there is a substance whose nature and essence it constitutes. Thus, where there is a plurality of 
attributes there is a plurality of substances.
57
 To put it simply, for Descartes, each of the ways an 
action can be predicated of a subject—that is, that a subject thinks, or that a subject is extended—
constitutes an attribute; each really distinct attribute (an attribute that has a self-sustaining existence 
and does not require reference to another attribute to exist) presupposes a substance that grounds 
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this attribute so, whenever a form of action—be it thought or material action—occurs, it implies a 
really distinct substance that gives it its content. 
Spinoza does not disagree that the attributes of thought and extension are really distinct; 
indeed, he goes further than Descartes and argues that there are an infinite number of attributes, all 
of them really distinct. However, he disagrees with Descartes over the subtler point of how 
attributes presuppose substances. Indeed, the first task Spinoza sets himself in the Ethics is to make 
the case that there is only one substance for all attributes. This gives rise to the theory of the 
relationship between body and mind that has been dubbed parallelism. In his interpretation of 
Spinoza’s parallelism, Deleuze refers to it as a “univocity of the attributes.”58 That is, when Spinoza 
argues there is only one substance presupposed by all attributes, Deleuze takes this to mean that all 
attributes are predicated univocally, said in a “single and same sense”59 of a unique substance. 
Through this argument, Deleuze mobilises the logic of univocal attribution to show that 
understanding correlates with embodiment and this converts understanding into an active, rather 
than merely reflective and descriptive, faculty. Deleuze argues that, while there is a formal 
distinction between the attributes (they are really distinct), there is no numerical—no modal or 
actual—distinction between these attributes so that, while Descartes argued that there is one 
substance for each attribute, Spinoza has only one substance for all attributes, even though that 
substance is qualitatively heterogeneous.  
At the same time, this univocal predication is simultaneously a univocal constitution of 
substance.
60
 That is, attributes are really distinct and so the orders of events—the order of mental 
events and the order of extended events—never interact; however, the sense in which an attribute 
constitutes substance is, in fact, the single and same sense in which every attribute participates in 
the constitution of substance. Because of this univocal expression, the order of mental events 
corresponds fully with the order of extended events, even though they are formally distinct and do 
not interact. When it comes to the individual events themselves—actual bodies, actual minds—there 
is a very particular reason why Deleuze affirms their modal distinction; one body is distinct from 
another body only insofar as each expresses a degree of the constitution of a heterogeneous, 
relational whole. However, so far this accounts only for how the orders of events participate in the 
constitution of a whole, it does not yet account for how orders of events (the attributes) relate to the 
actual events themselves—the modes. This is why the next step in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is 
to argue that whenever a degree of power or a capacity is expressed or actualised in a certain way—
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in an affective encounter, for instance—it simultaneously belongs to an attribute which contains this 
degree of power. From the point of view of the containing attribute, this degree of power is in fact 
an expression of the sense in which the attribute constitutes the whole of which the individual is a 
part.  
The interpretation that Deleuze puts forward here is not entirely unique. Indeed, a significant 
portion of Deleuze’s reading has a precedent in the interpretation of Spinoza put forward by Alfred 
Weber who contends that for Spinoza, “Matter and mind are not two opposite substances, as in 
Cartesianism; they are two different ways of conceiving one and the same substance, two different 
names for one and the same thing.”61 It is on the basis of this conception of substance that Deleuze 
is able to claim that, for Spinoza, the states of a body within a sensible encounter correspond to an 
idea of that body. But this idea, insofar as it is actualised as a mode of thinking, is also a degree of 
power that is the expression of the sense in which the attribute of thought participates in the 
constitution of the whole. Deleuze again follows Weber’s interpretation of EIIP7S where the latter 
claims that “though thought and extension exclude each other insofar as they are attributes, they 
belong to the same substance; conceived thus, mind and matter are the same thing.”62 So, for 
Deleuze, insofar as mental events and bodily events are univocal expressions of the same event—
the constitution of the whole—they are identical: “all that is action in the body is also action in the 
mind, and all that is passion in the mind is also passion in the body.”63 That is, from the point of 
view of what they express—their substantive content—the body and the mind are identical. When 
considered as expressive events, the body and the mind are not actually distinct or, rather, they are 
each an identical expression happening within a unique, “autonomous”64 order of events. As Beth 
Lord explains, “Due to parallelism, experience is both bodily and mental.”65 Spinoza’s parallelism 
follows from emphasising that body and mind occur under qualitatively distinct attributes while 
simultaneously arguing that each shares an identical cause. As Lord argues, the modes of neither 
attribute—thought and extension—interact causally with each other and yet, insofar as they share a 
common cause—God, whose modification they express66—a “thing and its idea are therefore the 
same mode expressed through different attributes.”67 
What this means for Deleuze is that, what affects the mind, affects the body and vice versa. 
Of course, Deleuze maintains Spinoza’s parallelism so body and mind never interact; however, the 
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immediate consequence of their correspondence is that the affections of the mind are 
simultaneously expressed in the individuation of the body and the actions and modifications of the 
body are expressed ideally. When he was preparing his work on Spinoza, these ideas intermingled 
with his interpretation of Nietzsche, of whom Deleuze wrote that “the unity of life and thought … is 
a complex unity: one step for life, one step for thought. Modes of life inspire ways of thinking; 
modes of thinking create ways of living. Life activates thought, and thought in turn affirms life.”68 
We can say of Deleuze’s deployment of Spinoza’s parallelism that it amounts to the claim that, 
while my thoughts and my bodily affections belong to different orders of events and thus do not 
interact, they are in fact identical; that is, there is no actual distinction between what is expressed as 
a thought and what is actualised in an action. The only actual distinctions Deleuze allows are 
between different occurrences within the same order; in other words, there is an actual distinction 
between Peter’s and Paul’s bodies, just as there is an actual distinction between their respective 
minds. However, there is no actual distinction between Peter’s body and his mind, nor is there any 
actual distinction between Paul’s body and his mind. In this way, modifications of the mind are 
duplicated and expressed as modifications of the body, and vice versa. This duplication is the same 
event—the modification of a power of participating in the whole—under a different order of events, 
a different system of conception. 
In light of Deleuze’s conception of the active nature of understanding, the task that remains is 
to reformulate and repose our ethical question. The question of how we might modify the power of 
a living being shifts and we can ask new questions: how are different affective relationships 
expressed ideally? How does a particular mode of understanding correspond with the determination 
of new powers for the body? Does the affection of the body open avenues for the transformation of 
understanding? Moreover, how would this transformation in understanding correlate to a 
transformation in the powers of the body? I argue that the affection of the body does open avenues 
for a renewed apprehension of the relational composition of our lives. However, this renewed 
apprehension is not merely an exercise in reflecting on what happens to a body; as a result of the 
doctrine of parallelism Deleuze inherits from Spinoza, the renewal and expansion of an 
understanding of the affections of the body corresponds with the determination of corporeal power. 
What remains is to elaborate the way Deleuze conceives the workings of this correspondence. In 
order to explore this issue we must turn to a process of evaluative contemplation that Deleuze calls 
counter-actualisation. With this concept of counter-actualisation, Deleuze argues that passive 
processes of contemplation and sense-making determine the degree of power characteristic of an 
individual life. 
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Contemplation and Counter-Actualisation. 
Given that Deleuze places himself in a tradition that rejects substance dualism, we can set out 
this part of our discussion of contemplation with the observation that an observer, the one who 
contemplates, is not outside of the happening to which her contemplation refers. Indeed, 
contemplation is a crucial part of how of how an agent’s past constitutes a set of concrete capacities 
that determine the way in which she participates in present events and encounters. Reflecting on 
Nietzsche’s so-called “transvaluation of values,” Deleuze suggests that  
[e]valuations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who 
judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge. This is 
why we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or 
our style of life.
69
  
This is a key point for Deleuze’s ethics; the final sentence of this passage resonates with his 
reflections on Spinoza:“[i]n a certain manner, you say: whatever you do, you will only ever have 
what you deserve.”70 With this claim, Deleuze offers an ethical formulation of a point central to 
Spinoza’s metaphysics. In his correspondence with Willem van Blyenburgh, Spinoza claims that 
“whatever is, when considered in itself without regard to anything else, possesses a perfection 
coextensive in every case with the thing’s essence.”71 Deleuze reads this as the claim that a being’s 
actual existence is always an expression of the entirety of its capacities: “[i]t remains that a mode … 
has no power that is not actual: it is at each moment all that it can be, its power is its essence.”72 In 
other words, it makes no sense to ask about what capacities an actual being has that it does not 
express because the expression of the totality of its power is the existence of an actual being, 
nothing more, nothing less. Of course, this does not mean that the powers of an actual being are not 
modified over time. Rather, Deleuze expands his conception of the relational nature of being and 
argues that, whatever this or that being will eventually be capable of, potential capacities are not 
actual capacities. Following Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson, Deleuze argues that what a being will 
become is not merely an instantiation of an ideal already contained within it. As such it makes no 
sense to talk about a being possessing unexpressed power or unrealised potential since any being is 
all that it can be, and this is what Deleuze means when he interprets both Spinoza and Nietzsche as 
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supporting the claim that “you will only ever have what you deserve”; to put this another way, all 
that you have is all that you are actually capable of having. 
Still, this does not exhaust the meaning of Deleuze’s comment on evaluation in Nietzsche. 
Even if we take Deleuze’s final claim that “we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that 
we deserve given our way of being or our style of life” as a formulation of the parallelism discussed 
above (that is, our beliefs, feelings and thoughts mirror or express embodied modes of existing), 
Deleuze’s claim that evaluations are modes of life requires some unpacking. The first point is that, 
for Deleuze, evaluation is not merely a gratuitous epistemological exercise. Evaluation is instead a 
process by which the past in the form of memories, beliefs, feelings and understandings, is 
contracted into the determination of a set of actual capacities in response to a present event. Indeed, 
when Deleuze goes so far as to proclaim that “all is contemplation!”73 he insists that this process of 
selection and contraction is an ontological condition of all life.  
To see the significance of Deleuze’s claim here we must turn to The Logic of Sense and one of 
the most difficult, subterranean concepts in his œuvre: counter-actualisation. Counter-actualisation 
concerns expressive movements that pull away from a mode’s actual existence and affirm the 
degree to which the actual being is simultaneously the constitution of a whole. However, this 
counter-actualisation does not consist of an actual movement; rather, it affirms the sense and 
significance of what actually happens insofar as it is constitutive of a whole. And, because these 
processes of actualisation and counter-actualisation are temporal, a counter-actualisation is a 
determination of the form of what occurs. As James Williams puts it, “[c]ounter-actualisation is … 
a reciprocally determining interaction between sense and the actual side of events.”74  
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze recapitulates a description of the individual that he had found 
and affirmed in Nietzsche, namely that a body is “the fruit of chance … and appears as the most 
‘astonishing’ thing”;75 the individual is a “fortuitous case.”76 In this context, Deleuze offers what he 
considers,  
the ultimate sense of counter-actualization … that the individual, born of that which comes to 
pass, affirm her distance with respect to every other event. As the individual affirms the distance, 
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she follows and joins it, passing through all the other individuals implied by the other events, 
and extracts from it a unique Event which is once again herself.
77
 
Counter-actualisation sets out from the Nietzschean idea that an individual is a fortuitous 
case—an ensemble of material parts brought about at the locus of a series of affective encounters—
and affirms the significance of the conditions of the power she expresses relative to the conditions 
of the power expressed by those who inhabit her world and relate to her. The concept of sense is 
crucial to what Deleuze is here calling an event. Insofar as an actual occurrence is an expression of 
the constitution of a whole, the sense of that constitution is something; it is not an actual thing but it 
is no less real for not being so. This sense, as we have seen, is itself the determination of the power 
expressed in the existence of an actual being. Every event implies the totality of all events, and their 
singularity relative to other events is what Deleuze, borrowing a phrase from Nietzsche, calls a 
“pathos of distance.”78 Given that these events are not actual occurrences, their distance is not a 
spatial distance; it is, rather, an intensive distance that expresses the degree to which the event 
implies certain other events in certain ways. It is a situation whereby events, as Williams puts it, 
“may be far removed, but this does not mean that they have no contact. Everything connects and 
can be connected, but this connection is not smooth and well-regulated; it is a matter of series that 
converge and diverge according to disjunctive syntheses carried by mobile elements.”79 
To return to the above passage from Deleuze, then, counter-actualisation is grounded in the 
individual’s capacity to affirm the intensive distance—the conjunctions and disjunctions—between 
the event that determines her power and the events which determine the powers of those with whom 
she interacts. For Deleuze, this affirmation involves connecting with the event and expressing and 
grasping the pathos—the affects invoked—of its proximity to and distance from other events; it 
requires following the lines of this distance and connecting with the individuals implied by the 
events along these lines. Finally, it involves the individual returning to herself and carrying with her 
an awareness of herself and her power from the point of view of all the individuals, all the 
conjunctions and disjunctions, implied in her actual existence. This element of counter-actualisation 
that involves affirming the pathos of the event’s relationship with other events is exemplified in one 
of Deleuze’s favourite stories, Jorge Luis Borges’ “The Garden of Forking Paths.” “The Garden of 
Forking Paths” takes place during WWI and tells the story of a German spy, Dr. Yu Tsun, a 
Chinese professor of English, trying to discover and reveal the location of a new British artillery 
park. The majority of the action takes place in the home of Dr Stephen Albert, an academic whom 
Yu Tsun visits. An ancestor of Tsun, Ts'ui Pên, had famously set out to construct a vast and 
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intricate novel, as well as an equally complex labyrinth. Albert, who reveals he has spent much of 
his life studying Ts'ui Pên’s novel, excitedly tells Tsun that he believes the novel and the labyrinth 
are actually one and the same and that Ts'ui Pên’s garden of forking paths is this sprawling novel 
whose narrative forks temporally and attempts to recount scenarios in which its characters face all 
of the possible outcomes of their actions. In some cases the orders of time that a character inhabits 
will be oblivious to others, and in other cases, orders of time will converge and diverge, confronting 
characters with the consequences of earlier actions that occurred in a different temporal series. Ts'ui 
Pên’s novel, according to Albert, is an attempt to explore and portray the possibility that each 
outcome of any event has its own series of consequences which proliferate to infinity. Albert 
describes Ts'ui Pên’s work in terms of the divergence and convergence of these temporal orders: 
[Ts'ui Pên] believed in an infinite series of times, a growing dizzying web of divergent, 
convergent, and parallel times. That fabric of times that approach one another, fork, are snipped 
off, or are simply unknown for centuries, contains all possibilities. In most of these times, we do 
not exist; in some, you exist but I do not; in others, I do and you do not; in others still, we both 
do. In this one, which the favouring hand of chance has dealt me, you have come to my home; in 
another, when you come through my garden you find me dead; in another, I say these same 
words, but I am an error, a ghost.
80
 
Ultimately, Tsun is only able to communicate to his superiors in Germany that the artillery 
park they seek is in the French commune “Albert” by having his name appear in a newspaper report 
as the killer of Dr Albert. Thus, Tsun resolves to murder Albert. However, Tsun is only able to kill 
Albert by virtue of his affirmation of Albert’s house as “saturated, infinitely, with invisible persons. 
… Albert and myself–secret, busily at work, multiform–in other dimensions of time.”81  
Contemplation is then integral to Deleuze’s ethology precisely because of the way that 
understanding, in the sense of an altered point of view or an expanded awareness, participates in the 
determination of what is actually possible. When Deleuze cryptically suggests waging war against 
war, or affirming death so as to will death per se against all particular deaths, he offers a description 
of counter-actualisation as a process whereby, instead of resenting what happens to us, we make 
something positive out of it precisely by apprehending that element of such occurrences that 
connects it to all events.
82
 Elsewhere, Deleuze invokes the relationship between love and hate as an 
example of the intensive distance traversed by counter-actualisation: “My love is an exploration of 
distance, a long journey which affirms my hate for the friend in another world and with another 
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individual.”83 In his commentary on The Logic of Sense, this example is taken up by James 
Williams who emphasises that this is an issue of our relationship to the sense of what happens to us. 
What matters in this example, argues Williams, is that infinitives such as “to love” or “to hate” 
express a differential relationship between affects and so the expression of the infinitive is really an 
expression of the potential to connect to different infinitives.
84
 As such, this positive production 
does not necessarily mean something good; in some cases, for example Bousquet’s literary career, 
production follows from counter-actualisation and, in others, such as Yu Tsun’s murder of Stephen 
Albert, destruction follows. Regardless of what happens, counter-actualisation ensures that 
something can happen. To put it simply, where action was once limited—where possibilities were 
diminished—it is expanded as a consequence of counter-actualising what actually happens to us. 
What I wish to suggest here is that, for Deleuze, one of the ways counter-actualisation is immanent 
to our experience is in encounters which disrupt the sensory-motor schema and confront us with a 
new idea of the whole: wounds. It is to this topic that I turn in the last section of this chapter. 
 
Wounds and the Modification of Power. 
When he describes counter-actualisation in the Logic of Sense, Deleuze provides an abstract 
account of how a transformation in understanding correlates to a transformation in the power 
characteristic of actual life; a renewed understanding involves an apprehension and affirmation of 
an individual’s life relative to all the other lives implied in its existence. In this sense, I argue that 
wounds, understood as the breakdown of the sensory-motor schema, present a concrete case which 
illuminates the point Deleuze is making about counter-actualisation. The tick example discussed 
earlier offers a relatively simple example of what Deleuze means by the breakdown of the sensory-
motor schema. The sensory-motor schema is a process which links “perceptions, affections and 
actions”85 and we see this process carried out in the lives of all beings. In the tick’s interaction with 
its environment, it is capable of three affects which characterise its entanglement in its environment. 
When Deleuze says that the tick is capable of being affected by light, smell and temperature,
86
 he is 
referring to Uexküll’s description of the tick as being capable of doing three things: its sensitivity to 
light facilitates its climbing to the top of bushes in anticipation of small mammals wandering 
underneath it; its olfactory sense allows it to distinguish suitable hosts from its surroundings; and its 
sensitivity to changes in temperature allow it to find the patch of skin on its host’s body that is most 
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amenable to providing it with the opportunity to gorge on its host’s blood.87 However, the 
description Uexküll offers here only describes how affective entanglements describe the tick’s life. 
What is more interesting for Deleuze is the question of why beings are characterised by particular 
affects. Since his is a transcendental project, Deleuze’s ethology is concerned with the conditions 
and immanent logics that generate this or that particular mode of life, rather than a description of 
how the mode in question lives its life.
88
 The sensory-motor schema of Cinema 1: The Movement-
Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image describes the process by which a being’s life expresses the 
convergence of affective entanglements in a series of behaviours. The breakdown of the sensory-
motor schema would thus concern the tick’s failure to generate a response to its environment. In his 
books on cinema, Deleuze expands on his reading of Bergson and outlines an ontology that 
describes the relationships between beings and their environments in terms of problems posed to an 
organism by its environment (how Deleuze conceives perception) and the solutions that the 
organism expresses in its actions. The sensory-motor schema is a logic by which this action is 
formulated and expressed in the organism. Of course, Deleuze is a critic of transcendence in all its 
forms so the sensory-motor schema, insofar as it is a logic, operates in a manner that is entirely 
immanent to the particular encounter in which an organism is embroiled. Indeed, it is not entirely 
correct to refer to the sensory-motor schema as though it is a logic which reappears in various 
encounters; rather, the tick in this scenario is part of an affective continuum whose parts can be 
modally distinguished but together constitute “a sensory-motor whole.”89 The whole, and therefore 
its parts, are defined by their sensory-motor relations but there is no transposable schema which 
determines how any particular organism will solve a given problem. By the same token, it is 
misleading to read an elevation of the subject into a phrase like the tick’s life expresses. The life we 
call the tick’s does not belong to the tick. That is, the tick does not precede its life; its status and 
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identity as a tick are, for Deleuze, determined by the affective entanglements that are expressed in 
its life. 
In Cinema 1, Deleuze explicitly links his account of counter-actualisation to the criteria by 
which an organism is able to formulate and actualise its response to its affective milieu:  
On the one hand a sensory contact must be established with the objects adjacent to the situation 
[which poses a problem] … On the other hand the object must, in this way, awaken an affective 
memory, reactualise an emotion which is not necessarily identical, but is analogous to that which 
the role calls up.
90
 
If an individual is to actualise a response to her milieu, there are conditions that must be met. 
Obviously, this individual must actually be in a relationship with the beings that constitute the 
problematic environment and this must be an actual, sensory relationship. But more must be done. 
Crucially, the environment, the beings that fill it out, must induce the individual to, as Deleuze puts 
it, “affirm her distance with respect to every other event” and in so doing grasp the pathos, the 
affective entanglement, of her life with respect to the whole of life. 
What is so compelling about the Cinema books, Cinema 2 in particular, is the attention they 
devote to the conditions under which this process fails. However, Deleuze does not just trace the 
failure of the sensory-motor schema, he is also interested in the way that new forms of engagement, 
new methods of formulating responses, emerge from this failure. Deleuze’s description of the 
failure of the sensory-motor schema—la faillite des schèmes sensori-moteurs91—indicates that what 
interests him is not just that it fails but why it fails: as Deleuze says, “we no longer believe in this 
world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half 
concerned us.” The constitution of an action as a response to a problem posed by the environment, 
the so-called action-image, is plunged into crisis once a state is reached in which, 
We hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give rise to an action which is capable 
of modifying it—no more than we believe that an action can force a situation to disclose itself, 
even partially. The most ‘healthy’ illusions fall. The first things to be compromised everywhere 
are the linkages of situation action, action reaction, excitation response, in short, the sensory-
motor links which produced the action-image.
92
 
These two beliefs refer to the two forms of the action-image. Ronald Bogue, in his 
indispensable Deleuze on Cinema, describes the action-image as, on the one hand, appearing in 
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what Deleuze calls the “large form” which “consists of a milieu of forces that constitutes an initial 
Situation (S), a duel of forces that comprises an Action (A), and a consequent modification of the 
situation (S’): S-A-S’.”93 On the other hand, there is also a “small form” where “the movement is 
from an equivocal action (A) to a clarified situation (S) that makes possible a modified or new 
action (A’)[:A-S-A’].”94 Insofar as he retains the language of sensory contact between objects, 
Deleuze does not suggest that we cease to have sensory relations with the world. Rather, the crisis 
of the action-image is concerned with the failure of these relations to constitute a compelling 
problem. Particularly, Deleuze is concerned with the ruptures in the process by which these sensory 
relations are synthesised ideally in order to induce an action; in this sense he is concerned with the 
breakdown of our belief in the world. That is, Deleuze is interested in experiences and encounters 
that disrupt our habitual approach to the world. In Difference and Repetition’s philosophy of time, 
he argues that a primary condition of subjective action—that is, the constitution of a subject as a 
being who actively engages with her world—is an unconscious synthesis of her previous 
experiences into an anticipation of the future. This is why I have insisted on the importance of 
contemplation; action is, in part, predicated on a process of sense making, of synthesising memories 
and experiences into a comprehensible image of the world.
95
 The breakdown of the sensory-motor 
schema and the loss of faith in the world turns on experiences that confront that synthetic process 
with its limit, and so render it unable to generate either a comprehensible image or an action. In the 
case of the large form, we lose our belief in a totalised world which can induce actions that modify 
it: “the [action-image] no longer refers to a situation which is globalising or synthetic, but rather to 
one which is dispersive.”96 That is, we are no longer able to think honestly of the world as a 
sensory-motor whole into which our actions fit as a catalyst for transformation. Similarly, in the 
case of the small form, we can no longer expect the world to respond to our actions by disclosing an 
ordered, cogent situation from which we can derive further actions: “the line or the fibre of the 
universe which prolonged events into one another, or brought about the connection of portions of 
space, has broken.”97 
While the crisis of each form presents a different failure, both entail a similar symptom: “the 
sensory-motor action or situation has been replaced by the stroll, the voyage and the continual 
return journey.”98 The crisis exhibited in both the large and small forms of the action-image results 
in actors who, instead of responding to the world, can now only wander through the world as 
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spectators and voyeurs, whether they journey around the world or stroll through a single suburb. 
Since the world, or at least the world qua set of relations that involve a particular actor, was 
previously related reciprocally with the actor’s actions, Deleuze asserts that in the new picture, 
where the sensory-motor linkage has failed, it is clichés that hold together the ensemble of relations 
into which the actor fits: “we ask ourselves what maintains a set [ensemble] in this world without 
totality or linkage. The answer is simple: what forms the set are clichés, and nothing else. Nothing 
but clichés, clichés everywhere.” These clichés are not merely constitutive of the situations to which 
we respond, that is, it is not just that the world has become clichéd; rather, we also internalise these 
clichés. Clichés come to constitute our internal life “so that everyone possesses only psychic clichés 
by which he thinks and feels, is thought and is felt, being himself a cliché among the others in the 
world which surrounds him.”99 This picture of a world filled with proliferating clichés amounts to 
the presentation of a world filled with “events that hardly concern those they happen to.”100 
In light of this, our definition of wounds can go beyond the provisional definition offered in 
the introduction. Clearly, a wound in the Deleuzian sense is not the standard sense of an injury 
inflicted on, or suffered by, an individual, even though injuries are sometimes wounds. Wounds are 
those occurrences in a life that rupture or break apart the sensory-motor schema in such a way that 
an individual loses faith in the world. Paradoxically, Deleuze sees this loss of faith as potentially 
enabling to the extent that it disrupts the belief in an individual’s separateness from the world thus 
making it impossible to understand oneself as a fulcrum through which events and situations are 
disclosed and modified. If such a belief is disrupted, Deleuze argues, the individual expresses more 
fully her embeddedness in her milieu and thus participates more actively in its becoming. Williams 
emphasises the rarity and value of wounds: “[a] wound is then a rare event and a form of destiny, 
rather than the many injuries that assail a life without determining it (including deadly ones).”101 A 
wound is rare precisely because it is not synonymous with an injury. While not all wounds are 
injuries and not all injuries that befall an individual are wounds, poet Joë Bousquet is an example of 
the overlap between wounds and injuries that Deleuze repeatedly celebrates. A wound is valuable 
precisely because of what it discloses, because of the potential it offers for enhancing the 
individual’s ability to participate in the world. Crucially, it is not the individual herself who is 
empowered. The enhancement is an increase in the degree to which her embeddedness in the world 
fosters new connections and composes more potent, productive modes of life. Her participation in 
the world is an expression of the forging of new connections and new relations; to participate in the 
formulation of new problems that, when solved, enable the individual to live a life that, as Ronald 
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Bogue has it, constitutes “a mode of existence that is inseparable from the becoming of the 
cosmos.”102  
Perhaps this may not sound like a particularly attractive scenario; after all, Deleuze’s portrait 
of the individual does not portray her as deliberative and self-determining. But then, Deleuze’s 
ethics are critical of the moral systems which would support belief in such a subject. And, by the 
same token, Deleuze’s ontology rejects the view of the individual as the sort of autonomous, 
voluntaristic subject capable of choice or self-determination. Empowerment, as Deleuze envisions 
it, is concerned with the transformation of the actual capacities of an individual relative to the 
milieu she inhabits. Deleuze’s ethics is grounded in an ontology which conceives an individual as 
only artificially distinct from her milieu such that her empowerment lies not in having more power 
to do as she pleases but in the ability to convert her understanding of the world so as to engage 
productively with the strange and uncertain problems posed to her by her environment. Or, as D.N. 
Rodowick puts it, “[i]n ethical expression, we evaluate our current mode of existence, seeking to 
expand, change, or abandon it in the effort to achieve another way of living and another form of 
community.”103 The enhancement of power is not a matter of an individual possessing more power. 
For Deleuze, power is not that which one might possess. Instead, it is the modification of an 
individual’s engagement with the world that follows from a renewal of the individual’s 
understanding of the world. By evaluating differently her place in the world, an individual may be 
able to participate in more productive relationships. This is why Deleuze says that “[t]rue freedom 
lies in a power to decide, to constitute problems themselves”;104 producing new solutions to the 
same old problems does not empower us. The enhancement of our power is a function of 
participating more actively in the determination of problems; after all, it is the way that problems 
are formulated that determines the nature of the response, the kind of life we live. 
 
Conclusion. 
This chapter offers a broad framework around which this thesis will be built. The brief 
exposition of Deleuze’s Spinozism offered here is explored in greater depth in chapter two as the 
first step in a broader engagement with the transformations in Deleuze’s ontology relevant to 
understanding his creative combination of ontology and ethics. For Deleuze, ethics is the correlate 
of ontology; every ontological problem corresponds to an ethical problem and every ethical 
                                                          
102
 Bogue, “To Choose to Choose,” 123. 
103
 D.N. Rodowick, “The World, Time,” Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 97--98. 
104
 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 15. 
46 
 
problem corresponds an ontological problem. On the one hand, ontology is concerned with living 
beings from the point of view of their constitution and duration, their relations and the powers 
expressed in those relations. And, on the other hand, ethics is the problem of relational powers, of 
constitution and duration, from the point of view of the being who lives her life at the nexus of these 
relations. The interconnectedness of these domains—ontology and ethics—is what Deleuze calls 
ethology. 
Deleuze’s ontology centres on the dynamic conception of a heterogeneous whole, 
individuals whose lives express the constitution of the whole, and the reciprocity between the two. 
Crucially, the concept that Deleuze develops of this reciprocity resists the subordination of 
individuals to the identity of the whole. Ultimately, he achieves this by arguing that the 
relationships between individuals, or, more correctly, the degrees of power expressed in those 
relationships, simultaneously determine and are determined by the constitution of the whole. In 
chapter two I show how Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza puts the construction and expression of sense 
in affective encounters at the heart of this reciprocity. Because this involves the power characteristic 
of individuals and centres on their affective entanglement with each other, this discussion is as 
concerned with ethics as it is with ontology. I return to the ethical dimension of this discussion in 
the conclusion and explore the role of wounds in facilitating the process of counter-actualisation 
and the subsequent renewal of problems. Even though we will set this discussion aside whilst we 
explore the development and transformation of Deleuze’s ontology, it is important not to forget that, 
since Deleuze’s ontology is an ontology of sense, it is inseparable from its correspondence with 
ethics in the formulation of an ethological project.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
On Deleuze’s Spinozism: Expression and Sense-Making in the Logic of Holism. 
 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza defends two themes that are crucial to the ethology that he 
develops throughout his career. First, he constructs a system in which the whole and the individuals 
who are its parts are generated simultaneously. In the terms of Spinoza’s Ethics, the expressive 
event in which substance is constituted as unique and absolutely infinite is the same event through 
which the modes are produced. The second theme Deleuze develops in his interpretation of Spinoza 
follows from the logic of this simultaneity: the process which guarantees that the modes are 
produced in the same event as substance is constituted requires that substance be constituted 
through expressions that make sense. That is, substance and modes relate through complex 
dynamics wherein sense is manufactured, expressed and apprehended. Substance is produced 
through the expression of sense. And, by the same token, a modal universe is produced on condition 
that these sensible expressions are expressed to a mind which comprehends them.
105
 In short, the 
initial formulation of Deleuze’s ontology that we find in his reading of Spinoza anticipates 
persistent ethological themes: individuals and the whole to which they belong are produced 
simultaneously and reciprocally but only insofar as the relationship between the two turns on the 
production and expression of sense. To work through these themes we must begin, however, with a 
problem that is present in Deleuze’s earliest publications: immanence. 
 
Immanence. 
The problem of immanence runs throughout Deleuze’s early work on Hume, Nietzsche and 
Bergson, and he repeatedly hints at how a plane of immanence will work; however, it is in 
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza that Deleuze constructs an operating plane of immanence for 
the first time. Right up until his last book, What is Philosophy?, a collaboration with Félix Guattari, 
Deleuze describes immanence as a generative operation that refers to no preceding identity. This 
operation generates individuals as “intensive features” of this field.106 What is Philosophy? was 
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published in 1991, nearly four decades after Deleuze first articulated the problem of immanence in 
his book on Hume, Empiricism and Subjectivity, so, of course, its arguments cannot simply be read 
backwards into an interpretation of this problem. However, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is a 
crucial moment in the passage between the two; as he says in What is Philosophy?, “Spinoza was 
the philosopher who knew full well that immanence was only immanent to itself and therefore that 
it was a plane traversed by movements of the infinite.”107  
There are four features of Deleuze’s Spinozism that are fundamental to his conception of 
immanence: substance is defined as a heterogeneous field whose constitution must itself be 
explained; individual beings are described as “intrinsic modalities” of being;108 attribution is a dual 
process which constitutes the plane of immanence and simultaneously expresses the modalities of 
being which are actualised in individual beings; and, finally, finite beings are expressions of the 
infinite under determinate relations. 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza owes a great deal to scholasticism insofar as he reads Spinoza 
as intervening in a long-running theological debate concerning the nature of God as a causal agent. 
For the scholastics, there were three conceptions of how God’s being a cause could take place: 
through immanent, emanative and transitive causation. Emanative and transitive causes are not 
entirely dissimilar insofar as both entail understanding the causal agent as external to its effects. 
Transitive or efficient causation is a strictly mechanistic view of causation in which the powers 
proper to a cause are transferred to its effects, even if only partially, in order that the effect be 
realised. In the case of emanative causation, however, the agent remains within itself; that is, its 
powers remain in itself such that the agent’s effects emanate from their cause as an overflowing of 
its abundance. Crucial to the distinction between emanative and transitive causes is the origin of 
laws by which God’s creation proceeds. In a discussion of the place of concepts of causation in 
Spinoza, Pierre Macherey argues that a transitive cause produces “an effect externally in accordance 
with an extrinsic law.”109 This claim, however, implies limitations on God insofar as God becomes 
subject to laws which are not his own, or do not follow from his nature. While this may seem a 
peculiar claim to make about the theistic god, it is precisely the claim made by Christian 
theologians who, attached to a scriptural account of creation, needed to posit the world as produced 
by, but external to, a god that functions as an agent exploiting the means or agency of other 
elements in order to fabricate artefacts which are themselves only the constituent parts of a larger 
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chain of effects and “are thus removed to an infinite degree from that which constitutes their proper 
nature.”110  
With respect to immanence, Deleuze’s fundamental claim is that the expressions of the 
powers of a causal agent cannot be conceived distinctly from the agent’s possession of those 
powers.
111
 Deleuze finds an account of this in Spinoza’s ontology insofar as Spinoza identifies the 
cause of the world with the world caused. That is, for Spinoza, the being of God, or the being of the 
cause, is said in the same sense as the being of the caused. This complicates emanative causation 
precisely because the cause is no longer separate from and unaffected by the beings it causes. 
Rather, determined beings are in their cause or their cause is in them, such that the causal process is 
complicated by the beings that are its effects. It is in this sense that Deleuze describes a relationship 
of reciprocal determination between actual beings and their power. The immanent cause’s causing 
things to exist follows from its nature and in producing effects it expresses its own power. The 
particularity of immanent causation is that an effect remains in its cause. Macherey argues that 
Spinoza’s demonstration of EIP18, the proposition that God is the immanent cause of all things, 
operates in terms of these descriptions of emanative, transitive, and immanent causes.
112
 Thus, on 
Deleuze’s reading, when Spinoza describes his conception of a God in whom all things exist and, 
consequently, must be conceived, he describes a universe where each thing explicates God yet, 
simultaneously, God “complicates” all things, that is, “comprehends them in itself.”113 Thus, God, 
encompassing all things and operating only in order to express or perfect its own nature, is the cause 
of all things. However, because all things are in God both conceptually and actually, that is, as 
possibilities and as effects, God is an immanent cause. 
 
Univocity. 
As in the causal case, there are generally three conceptions of how the relations between 
God and the world would work: univocally, equivocally and analogously. These relations describe 
the predicative relationship between Being and beings. This problem of predication concerns the 
sense in which we say that a thing lives its being a thing; that is, how we understand a being insofar 
as it is a being. In the case of univocity, the sense in which Being is predicated of a being is the 
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same for all beings. This is wholly amenable to Spinoza’s conception of a God who causes the 
world immanently given that, as Daniel Smith points out, “God [will thus be] cause of all things in 
the same sense that he is cause of himself.”114 At EIP11, Spinoza employs a form of the ontological 
argument for the existence of God to argue that God’s existence follows necessarily from his 
essence, and then, at EIP16, Spinoza argues that infinitely many modes are produced actually and 
necessarily in accordance with the essence of God. That is, the existence of both God and the 
infinite diversity of beings that populate the actual world follow necessarily from the essence of 
God. In this case, univocity is the name for the fact that God and beings follow from the essence of 
God in the same sense. 
Deleuze argues that there is an implicit tradition concerned with the problem of univocity 
running through Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson, amongst others, and in this tradition 
he finds a desire to “conceive of several formally distinct senses [of modes of being] which none 
the less refer to being as if to a single designated entity, ontologically one.”115 Deleuze argues that  
being, … insofar as it expresses itself, is said in turn in a single and same sense of all [beings]. 
In the ontological proposition, not only is that which is designated ontologically the same for 
qualitatively distinct senses, but also the sense is ontologically the same for individuating modes, 
for numerically distinct designators or expressors: [univocity] involves a circulation of this 
kind.
116
 
Deleuze retains the concept of an essence since it is a key  concept for Spinoza; however, he 
redefines it so that an essence is no longer the defining quality of Being, where Being would have a 
single and same sense, but locates it in the sense in which a being, an individuating difference or 
intrinsic modality, is said to relate to Being. That is, all the modalities which express Being are 
different to each other but they express Being, Being is said of them, in the same way. This is why 
Deleuze argues that the “essence of univocal being is to include individuating differences, while 
these differences do not have the same essence and do not change the essence of being.”117 Deleuze 
establishes univocity as the ground to work through an ontology of difference in itself rather than an 
ontology of difference as merely the differentiation of the similar. The driving concern of Deleuze’s 
ontology is, therefore, to articulate the process of individuation or production of individuals as 
events which express differentiation within univocal being.  
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This claim, that actual individuals express differentiations within univocal being, is offered 
quite literally when Deleuze argues that individual modes are the actual side of “intrinsic modalities 
of being, passing from one ‘individual’ to another, circulating and communicating underneath 
matters and forms.”118 These intrinsic modalities are not actual modes, they are substantive events 
that occur within the attributes which characterise actual, finite modes. We must note that Being 
here does not refer to a being, a one, who would contain all beings and whose unity would 
transcend the plurality of modes. Rather, in anticipation of arguments later in this chapter, we might 
describe Being as an existential plane; the univocity of this plane consists in the fact that all beings, 
even the most diverse, populate or belong to it. In this sense, Deleuze argues that 
[there] is a single ‘voice’ of Being which includes all its modes, including the most diverse, the 
most varied, the most differenciated. Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of 
which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself.
119
 
For Deleuze, this is why “univocal Being belongs only to difference.”120 The equality or 
univocity of being resides in difference as a transcendental principle which inhabits individuating 
factors and is actualised in hierarchically organised modes which express this being: “[the] words 
‘everything is equal’ . . . resound joyfully, on condition that they are said of that which is not equal 
in this equal, univocal Being.”121 What this means is that, even though the doctrine of univocity 
denotes a strict equality of being at the level of its being an infinitive—that is, the verbal form to be 
is the same for all beings—the degrees of power which characterise actual beings are themselves 
unequal. Insofar as finite modes are identical to a potestas—that is, what a body is actually capable 
of122—which follows necessarily from the essence of God, finite modes, actual beings, are 
characterised, by a degree of power. These degrees of power are quantitative and thus univocal 
Being still admits of a certain hierarchy and method of distribution.
123
 This hierarchy makes it 
possible to “conceive [of] a reconciliation between analogy and univocity”;124 the analogous in 
being concerns the intrinsic modes or individuating factors. The modalities intrinsic to univocal 
Being are, of course, different; they “have nothing ‘really’ in common.”125 In other words, the 
modes characterised by degrees of power contained within the attributes are distinct; by definition 
they are the differentiation of power. However, these distinct modes still interact with each other 
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and, so, the sense of analogy that Deleuze claims is reconciled with univocal being is precisely the 
relationality of intrinsic modalities insofar as they are quantitatively diverse. Thus, Deleuze claims, 
even where being is called equal, or univocal, in relation to itself it is “unequal in relation to the 
modalities which reside within it.”126 On the face of it, then, it would seem that, even though 
difference is a generative principle for being (that is, being can only be expressed univocally if it is 
said of that which differs), the modalities of being, as intrinsically different, can only relate by 
virtue of being analogous to one another. However, in order to avoid “distorting the two theses,”127 
univocity and analogy, and confusing generic difference with specific difference, Deleuze insists we 
understand how ontological difference, is “presupposed by the forms, matters and extensive 
parts”128 of Being in its empirical expressions: 
We must show not only how individuating difference differs in kind from specific difference, 
but primarily and above all how individuation precedes matter and form, species and parts, and 
every other element of the constituted individual.
129
 
And so, the problem of the intrinsic modalities of Being engages with different kinds of 
difference: on the one hand, it deals with generic or individuating difference which precedes matter 
and form and constitutes individual modes; on the other hand it deals with specific difference which 
differentiates the modes. Confronting this problem is one of Deleuze’s primary tasks in his reading 
of Spinoza. Consequently, it is to the differential relations between the attributes, and the 
constitution of substance through differentiation, that we must now turn.
130
 
 
Attribution, Distinction & the Constitution of Substance. 
Deleuze argues that the differentiation of the attributes constitutes substance and that the 
expressive operations by which substance is constituted by the attributes forms one half of a 
reciprocally determining relationship between an individual and its environment. This argument that 
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the attributes constitute substance is fundamental to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza because it 
enables Deleuze to describe substance as constituted by degrees of differentiation. In this section, I 
will consider the way that qualitative distinctions amongst the attributes account for the constitution 
of substance. Following this, I will set out to demonstrate how, for Deleuze, a modification of 
substance is, in fact, an actualisation of the degree to which substance is constituted. 
In his final essay, “Immanence: A Life,” Deleuze argues that, for Spinoza, “immanence is not 
immanence to substance; rather, substance and modes are in immanence”.131 His point is that 
nothing, neither substance nor mode, transcends the plane of immanence in which all beings express 
powers of becoming. Twenty seven years earlier, in Expression in Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze 
argues that “[i]mmanence is revealed as expressive, and expression as immanent, in a system of 
logical relations within which the two notions are correlative.”132 This correlation between 
expression and immanence raises a problem for Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza: how is a system of 
expressions constitutive of a plane of immanence? Deleuze’s response is that the differentiation of 
the attributes constitutes substance and that the degrees to which the attributes are differentiated are 
themselves expressible as degrees of power which correspond to and characterise modal existences. 
The essence—the degree of power—of an actually existing being is the expression of a degree of an 
attribute’s participation in the constitution of a whole. Substance and modes are in immanence 
insofar as each is determined wholly by the operations of the attributes. For Deleuze, the attributes 
are “verbs rather than adjectives.”133 That is, the attributive operations that determine substance and 
modes can only be characterised by what they constitute, not what they are: “it is not the attribute 
that exists through itself, but that to which the essence of each attribute relates, in such a way that 
existence necessarily follows from the essence thus constituted.”134 The essence constituted by an 
attribution is the essence of substance and the essence contained in an attribute is the determination 
of an actual mode, and, in this sense, the attributes are the operations of immanence. 
Robin Durie argues that Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza turns on an interpretation of substance 
“as a complex whole, or aggregate” which is constituted by really distinct parts.135 Spinoza appears 
to deny this when he argues that “no substance ... insofar as it is a substance, is divisible”;136 indeed, 
Spinoza states that to think of substance as divisible would require that substance be finite. This, of 
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course, is an obvious contradiction of the very definition of a substance.
137
 However, this only 
seems contradictory because of the irreconcilability of a concept of a One which has no parts and a 
concept of a One with parts. In this case, the problem of the One and the many appears intractably 
contradictory precisely because it takes two essentially different things—a concept of the One in its 
heterogeneous sense and a concept of the One in its homogeneous sense—and obsesses over the 
irreconcilability of the two. In other words, the problem of the one and the many begins from static 
concepts and asks after their relationship as though they are already established. As Durie argues, 
the problem arises from assuming “the principle of the identity of substance” and then trying to 
derivatively understand the diversity of this very identity. Instead, Durie urges, the reader must 
begin from the logic of this diversity and then understand how the identity and unity of substance is 
generated.
138
 This is why Deleuze claims that Spinoza sets out from infinity; Spinoza, Deleuze 
argues, does not begin with a concept of God which he is obliged to explicate in terms of its 
relationship to the many. Rather, he sets out from an “innocent” concept of an absolute infinity; that 
is, “a novel conceptual frame [which will] bring out the power and the actuality of positive 
infinity.”139 This absolute infinity is the conception of God that Spinoza articulates at EID6, “By 
God, I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of 
attributes, of which each expresses an eternal and infinite essence.”  
Spinoza’s argument for the existence of God rests on defending the coherence of predicating 
an infinity of attributes of a single substance. Indeed, his argument for the absurdity of inferring a 
substance for each distinct attribute is prefaced by definition four where he sets up the theory of 
numerical and real distinctions. The method of distinguishing two or more things we conceive to be 
distinct can, Spinoza claims, operate either by a difference in the attributes of substance or by a 
difference in the affections of substance.
140
 In other words, distinction must operate in one of two 
ways; it can either be carried out through an attempt to distinguish substances or it can be a 
distinction between the modes of that substance.
141
 For Spinoza it is simply absurd to posit a 
distinction between substances because to do so would be to ask after two or more absolutely 
infinite beings. The former method—distinction between substances—must, by D3, D4 and D6, 
concern itself with the distinction between attributes as well as the understanding of how such a 
distinction expresses “an eternal and infinite essence” of substance. Conversely, distinction between 
modes, the latter method, must concern itself with the sense in which an attribute constitutes a 
modification of substance.  
                                                          
137
 EIP13CS 
138
 Durie, “Immanence and Difference,” 166. 
139
 Deleuze, Expressionism, 28. 
140
 EIP4 
141
 EIP4D 
55 
 
Deleuze’s interest in Spinoza’s argument for the necessity of distinguishing substances 
through their attributes revives the discussion of immanent causation—that Deleuze revives this 
discussion is of the utmost importance to the broader discussion of his ethology and the reciprocity 
between finite beings and the whole of which they are a part. Because immanent causation is a 
process whereby a cause remains in itself even as it is expressed in its constitution and its effects 
remain internal to it, it is through the theory of distinctions that Deleuze interprets and appropriates 
Spinoza’s claim that substance “is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.”142 Deleuze 
argues that it is in the scholium to EIP8 that Spinoza develops a positive demonstration of the 
argument for distinguishing substances by their attributes through highlighting the absurdity of the 
inverse proposition that substances could be accounted for through transitive or “external” 
causality.
143
 This demonstration consists of three parts which establish that, because it is a 
contradiction of the very concept of substance to suppose that an absolutely infinite being is subject 
to causal processes which refer to finite things, and that, because “[n]umerical distinction requires 
an external cause to which it may be referred,”144 then numerical distinction cannot operate on or 
within a substance. In other words, given the nature of numerical distinction, it is inapplicable to 
substance precisely because of substance’s infinity; consequently, numerical distinction is 
applicable only to finite modes that involve the same attribute.
145
 We will recall that, for Spinoza, a 
mode is precisely that finite being which is in and conceived through another;
146
 therefore, the 
modes distinguished numerically must involve the same attribute, because the modes are, by their 
nature, numerical or quantitative. As Deleuze puts it, “numerical distinction can … only [ever 
distinguish] modes that involve the same attribute. For number expresses in its own way the 
character of existing modes: the composite nature of their parts, their limitation by other things of 
the same nature, their determination from outside themselves.”147  
For Deleuze, Spinoza’s argument must be understood in the context of 17th Century 
metaphysics, particularly against René Descartes, of whose argument that modes and attributes are 
identical
148
 Spinoza is especially critical. However, Deleuze retains what Durie calls a “Cartesian 
clue” insofar as he imports into his Spinozism a Cartesian notion of attributes as qualities: “Any 
given attribute is a quality, in that it qualifies a substance as this or that, but also a mode in that it 
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diversifies it.”149 This means that Deleuze is able to distinguish the attributes qualitatively, even as 
what they constitute remains numerically indistinct.
150
 From this, Deleuze sets about interpreting 
Spinoza in terms of an expressionistic logic which allows the introduction of qualitative, real 
distinction into God while maintaining that substance is indeed numerically one.  
This problem of attributive distinction emerges from EIP9 and EIP10 where Spinoza argues 
that substance has an infinity of attributes. The qualitative, or formal, distinctions between the 
attributes are, Deleuze claims, real yet exclude any numerical division from the concept of 
substance.
151
 The distinction between the attributes concerns the nature of the attributes such that 
together they constitute a substance that is qualitatively heterogeneous even though the constituted 
substance is quantitatively unique. Deleuze thus posits the attributes as expressions of qualitative 
degrees of substance—or essences—thus introducing real distinction into substance while retaining 
a rigorous sense of substance’s unary nature. From this point of view, Durie argues, “we can begin 
to see the significance of Deleuze’s claim that attributes are the dynamic or genetic elements of 
substance”.152 Deleuze argues that the existence of the essence of substance follows from the 
attributes insofar as it is expression in the attributes that gives existence to the essences. At EIP11, 
Spinoza adapts the classical ontological argument for God’s existence to argue that the existence of 
substance follows necessarily from its essence.
153
 Thus, to the extent that attribution expresses 
essence and essence has no existence outside of its expressions,
154
 the dynamism here flows from 
the attributes to essence. And, to the extent that the existence of substance follows necessarily from 
its essence, the dynamism then flows from essence to substance.
155
 This is how Deleuze justifies the 
argument that Spinoza introduces real distinction into substance; as long as the attributes are really 
distinct then the constitutive elements of the essence of substance which they express will also be 
distinct. However, distinct though they are, the essences are never expressed of the attributes; the 
essences are always expressed as essences of substance.
156
 In other words, the existence the 
essences have in their expression in the attributes is never enough to give substantial content—in its 
general sense—to the essences. This content fills the essences only because they are said of 
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substance—in its specific sense—and its nature as multiplicity.157 Thus “the relationship from 
attribute to essence to substance” consists of a recursive dynamism that generates its own terms.158 
In this context, we can see a crucial element of how Deleuze interprets Spinoza’s argument 
that there is only one substance. Substance consists of parts—that is, it is heterogeneous—from the 
point of view of the attributes. However, from the point of view of the constituted substance, we 
cannot speak meaningfully of parts. This is because the distinctions amongst the attributes are 
qualitative distinctions and qualitative distinctions are never numerical.
159
 Consequently, substance 
cannot be considered to consist of enumerable parts and is, in the most precise sense, singular. In 
other words, substance as multiplicity—substance qua substance—is distinct from its essence only 
insofar as there are qualitative distinctions amongst the essence of substance—as that “which is 
expressed”160—that are absent in substance. At the same time, substance quite literally has no 
existence external to its expression through the essences. It is the attributes that constitute this 
difference between essence and substance precisely through their rendering the essences as real, 
existing qualities. And, because substance achieves existence through the expressive differentiation 
of its essence, it is through differentiation that substance exists and thus exists as cause of itself—as 
an immanent cause—because it is rendered as difference in itself.161 So, Deleuze claims that it is 
through the qualitative differentiation of essences—the expression of distinct essences relative to 
each other—under the formally determinate relation of expression that substance is constituted as 
existing. From here he must demonstrate how this determinate differential relation also generates 
modes.  
 
Attribution and the Production of the Modes. 
When he fleshes out his interpretation of why the constitution of substance is simultaneously 
the production of the modal universe, Deleuze sets out an argument that will be crucial to his entire 
project. The existence of the actual universe follows from the expression of the constitution of 
substance as a series of sensible propositions. That is, to the extent that substance is constituted 
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through the expression of propositions—the attribution of essence to substance—the modal 
universe is the consequence of these propositions making sense. For Deleuze, even when they are 
predicated of different beings, “infinite beings and finite beings, substance and modes, God and 
creatures,” the attributes retain their essential nature.162 As such, a central element of his reading of 
Spinoza is the latter’s argument that God causes the modal world at the same time and in the same 
sense as he is cause of himself. At EIP25, Spinoza argues that, because the modes are the affections 
or modifications of substance, “God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in 
which he is called the cause of himself.”163 In other words, “[p]articular things are nothing but 
affections of God’s attributes or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and 
determinate way.”164 This is an argument that Deleuze reads as describing a relationship of 
equivalence between God’s self-causation and God’s production of the modal universe.165 For 
Deleuze, the activity of the attributes—attribute as attribution—is crucial to the simultaneity of 
God’s self-causation and immanent causation of modes. 
To unpack the reasoning behind Deleuze’s interpretation of this relationship between God’s 
self-causation and the production of a modal universe, we need to understand what it means for an 
essence, in its expression, to be referred to substance. That is, we must turn to why the method of 
the attribution of essence to substance determines the production of modes. When Deleuze describes 
expression and outlines the relationship between substance, attributes and essences, he presents the 
beginnings of the linguistic sense of expression that he will foreground for thinking through the 
production of modes. In the articulation of this linguistic sense Deleuze makes the following, 
pivotal, claim:  
[o]ne distinguishes in an expression … what it expresses and what it designates. What is 
expressed is, so to speak, a sense that has no existence outside the expression; it must thus be 
referred to an understanding that grasps it objectively, that is, ideally. But it is predicated of the 
thing and not of the expression itself; understanding relates it to the object designated, as the 
essence of that object.
166
 
By emphasising the correspondence between an essence and the sense of an expression, this 
argument reiterates Deleuze’s claim that the essence of a substance has no existence outside of the 
attribute which expresses it. At the same time, as Durie puts it, for an expression to “‘function,’ that 
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is, for it to have sense,”167 its referral of essence to substance must be disclosed to an understanding 
that comprehends the expression. Employing the conclusion of the ontological argument—that 
whatever is in God’s power necessarily exists—and drawing on EIP16—that “from the necessity of 
the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., 
everything which can fall under an infinite intellect)”—Spinoza argues that “In God there is 
necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of everything which necessarily follows from his 
essence.”168 Deleuze takes this to mean that “[i]nfinite understanding is … the form of the idea that 
God necessarily has of himself or of his own essence.”169 In other words, there is necessarily within 
God a power for the deduction of properties of his essence and it is this that we call understanding. 
This is why, when essence is expressed as the essence of substance, it is expressed to substance. 
Spinoza defends this proposition by recourse to two earlier propositions: the aforementioned EIP16, 
and EIIP1, “Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.” So, in the scholium to 
EIIP3, Spinoza argues that God’s production of the world corresponds necessarily with his self-
understanding: “God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself, that is, just as it 
follows from the necessity of the divine nature … that God understands himself, with the same 
necessity it also follows that God does infinitely many things in infinitely many modes.” This 
means that, as God’s power is expressed through an infinity of attributes, God’s power is expressed 
as an extended thing and as a thinking thing. As a result, because the attributes are infinite in their 
own kind, God’s power of extension is infinite, as is his power of thinking. 170 
This is to say that the production of the modal universe follows from the expression of 
essence as a sensible proposition. This is why Deleuze says that if the sense of the expression is to 
function it can do so only by being referred to an understanding which apprehends it as essence. It 
follows that the dynamic of substance, attribute and essence is double; on the one hand, attributes 
express essences but express them as essences of substance and in so doing attribute to substance 
the heterogeneous essence which constitutes its existence. On the other hand, this process of the 
attribution of essence can only function by virtue of an understanding which grasps the essence as 
referred to its object: substance. The question, then, is how does this double expressivity not merely 
account for the expression of essence but also the production of a modal universe? At this point 
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Deleuze makes, as Durie puts it, “the most audacious wager in his attempt to secure an immanent 
ontology of univocity from Spinoza’s text”171 insofar as he reads expression in linguistic terms: 
Attributes are univocal or common forms, predicated, in the same form, of creatures and creator, 
products and producer, formally constituting the essence of one, formally containing the essence of the 
others. The principle of necessary production thus reflects a double univocity. A univocity of cause: 
God is cause of all things in the same sense as he is cause of himself. A univocity of attributes: God 
produces through and in the same attributes that constitute his essence.
172
 
For Deleuze, the univocity of the attributes means that there is a doubleness implicit in 
attribution. Deleuze claims that Spinoza is “too careful a grammarian to allow us to miss the 
linguistic origins of ‘expression’”173 and it is precisely this linguistic element of expression which 
Deleuze employs to support his argument that attribution is double. The use Deleuze makes of 
linguistics here is elaborated in an early, crucial series from The Logic of Sense, “Third Series of the 
Proposition”: 
On the one hand, [sense] does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it; what is 
expressed does not exist outside its expression. This is why we cannot say that sense exists, but 
rather that it inheres or subsists. On the other hand, it does not merge at all with the proposition, 
for it has an objectity [objectité] which is quite distinct. What is expressed has no resemblance 
whatsoever to the expression. Sense is indeed attributed, but it is not at all the attribute of the 
proposition, it is rather the attribute of the thing or state of affairs.
174
 
Deleuze is concerned with the relationship between an attribute (the proposition or 
expression), essence (sense) and substance (the state of affairs, or, the object of the proposition). 
His argument is that a proposition expresses a particular sense without the latter ever collapsing into 
the former. In other words, the proposition expresses a sense even though the sense never simply 
collapses into its expression and even though the sense does not exist outside of this expression. 
This is what Deleuze means when he says that sense “subsists” in its expression. At the same time, 
by referring to a particular object, the sense that is expressed by the proposition is always said of an 
object that is not the proposition. And, while sense never collapses into its expression, it never 
collapses into its object either. Thus sense is expressed by one thing (the proposition) and expressed 
of another (the object) yet it is never reducible to either. 
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What is striking about this dynamic is the fact that the proposition cannot state its own sense. 
That is, the proposition can express the sense of the object but it cannot simultaneously state its own 
sense, the sense in which it is an expression of the sense of a designated object. However, as Durie 
observes, this further sense—the sense of the expression which expresses the sense of the object—
can itself become a further object for a subsequent proposition.
175
 In other words, the initial 
proposition, being unable to express the sense of the object at the same time as expressing the sense 
of expressing this sense as the sense of the object, engenders a new proposition which takes the 
sense expressed of the object as the object of its expression. What is crucial here is that, even 
though it is expressed as a new object with its own sense, this object is in fact the initial sense 
expressed of the initial object. What is occurring here is a relationship between a proposition and its 
object where the former expresses the sense of the latter. The generation of the second proposition 
is in fact a repetition of the first whereby the sense of the initial proposition is now the designated 
object. Of course, this process can be infinitely repeated by making the sense of the expression of 
the second proposition an object in its own right and so on.
176 
 
The logic of this linguistic relation informs the expressionistic logic of Deleuze’s ontology. 
To refer this process to the triad of substance, attribute and essence, we would say that the initial 
proposition is the attribute which expresses the sense, or essence, of a designated object: substance. 
The proposition expresses a sense which has no existence outside of its expression but it expresses 
this sense as the sense of an object. The generation of the second proposition is, in fact, the 
generation of modes as the re-expression of the proposition with a new object: the sense of the 
attributive expression. In both expressions the sense is ontologically the same sense. In the former 
expression the sense subsists in the attribute and is expressed as the essence of substance. In this 
expression the subsisting sense is said to constitute the essence of substance precisely because the 
expression gives it existence. In the latter expression the sense is expressed as the essence contained 
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in the attribute as the affection of substance. According to this logic, the second level of expression 
reproduces the first as the latter’s modification. Deleuze writes,  
[s]ubstance expressed itself in attributes, each attribute was an expression, the essence of 
substance was expressed. Now each attribute expresses itself, the dependent modes are 
expressions and a modification is expressed. It will be recalled that the essence they expressed 
had no existence outside the attributes, but was expressed as the absolute essence of substance, 
the same for all attributes. The same applies here: a modification has no existence outside the 
mode that expresses it in each attribute, but it is expressed as a modification of substance, the 
same for all modes differing in attribute.
177
 
Deleuze’s point is that each mode is generated as a modification of substance as it is 
contained in an attribute; therefore, the essence contained in the attribute, the modal essence, will 
differ across each and every mode. This operates as the second level of expression, where the first 
level—which is, in fact, the other side of the attributive expression that constitutes substance—
presents each different attribute as that which expresses a qualitative or intensive aspect of a 
substance which remains the same for all attributes. Neither object of attribution, substance or 
mode, can be conceived as existing independently of the relationship of attribution; however, as the 
attributes are either the constitutive expressions which attribute essence to substance or the 
modifying expression which contains the modal essence, neither substantial nor modal essence can 
be conceived as reducible to an attribute which exists in their absence. Furthermore, because each 
attribute refers to a single substance, even as it differs according to the substantial essence it 
constitutes and the modal essence it contains, Deleuze is able to claim “that we can conceive of 
several formally distinct senses which none the less refer to being as if to a single designated entity, 
ontologically one.”178 Thus a phrase which has been repeated continuously in this chapter—in the 
same sense—now has a more precise and more robust meaning. We can now see the extent of 
Deleuze’s use of univocity; insofar as we can say that through the constitutive expression of a single 
and same—though qualitatively heterogeneous—essence, attribution simultaneously generates 
numerically distinct modes. This is how Deleuze interprets Spinoza’s argument that God produces 
the world at the same time as he produces himself, or, as Deleuze puts it: “Things remain inherent 
in God who complicates them, and God remains implicated in things which explicate him.”179  
The expressive operation of attribution is double. On the one hand, it constitutes the essence 
of substance as a heterogeneous multiplicity. On the other hand, because substance is constituted 
heterogeneously, there is always a quantitative sense of these expressions; that is, the ratio of 
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attributes subsistent in substance. These quantitative senses are the objects of a series of expressions 
which produce actual, finite modes as expressions of the absolute infinity of substance under a 
determinate relation: the differentiation of the attributions. Insofar as these attributions express the 
constitutive ratio of God’s qualities, they express modifications of God’s power. Thus Deleuze 
argues that, for Spinoza, modes are characterised by the degree of power that is expressed by their 
existence. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
 
Modification as the Expression of Power. 
Deleuze argues that Spinoza’s identification of modal essences with degrees of power situates 
Spinoza’s account within long-running theological debates concerning the identity of power and 
action. Spinoza intervenes in this debate by setting out a correlation between power and actual 
capacity: 
[in place of] the distinction of power and act, potentiality and actuality, was substituted the 
correlation of a power of acting and a power of being acted on or suffering action, both actual. 
The two currents meet in Spinoza, one relating to the essence of substance, the other to the 
essence of modes. For in Spinozism all power bears with it a corresponding and inseparable 
capacity to be affected. And this capacity to be affected is always, necessarily, exercised. To 
potentia there corresponds an aptitudo or potestas; but there is no aptitude or capacity that 
remains ineffective, and so no power that is not actual.
180
 
At the beginning of this passage, Deleuze is referring to the power of the whole: the unlimited 
potential—potentia “as force or capacity”181—through which God exists necessarily. This power is 
identical with God’s essence, as Spinoza says “God’s power is his essence itself.”182 Thus God 
possesses an infinite power of existing insofar as “being able to exist is power.”183 Of course, even 
though this claim comes as part of his adaptation of the ontological argument, Spinoza is not 
suggesting that existence is a power of the things which exist. Rather, Spinoza’s point, claims 
Deleuze, is that “the capacity to exist (that is, the possible existence involved in the essence of a 
finite thing) is a power.”184 In other words, substance contains a power to exist insofar as a corollary 
of the power by which it is constituted is a capacity—potestas or “that which an individual body 
can do”185—expressed in the production of actual beings. This brings us to the other side of the 
                                                          
180
 Deleuze, Expressionism, 93. 
181
 Duffy, Logic of Expression, 6. 
182
 EIP34. 
183
 EIP11S. 
184
 Deleuze, Expressionism, 89. 
185
 Duffy, Logic of Expression, 6. 
64 
 
distinction in this passage; corresponding to the absolute power of God is a capacity that is 
expressed as the modal essences which characterise existent or individual beings as parts of the 
whole. In this sense, the power expressed by actual beings is an expression of the degree to which 
they are a function of the whole of nature. This is what Spinoza means when he says that “Man’s 
power, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature’s 
infinite power, that is, of its essence.”186 This does not efface the importance of actual modes or 
individuals; rather, it denies that individuals have a substantial life independent of the whole insofar 
as an actual mode is dependent on its interrelationship with the other modes that fill out its 
environment. The power of a finite mode is determined by its belonging to the whole of nature. 
Deleuze’s claim is that, for Spinoza, a being that does not exist of itself, that is, “has no power of its 
own except insofar as it is part of a whole, that is, part of the power of a being that does exist 
through itself.”187  
To see how modification—the expression of a modification of substance in an actual mode—
can be understood as an expression of power, we must continue with the linguistic reading of 
Spinoza offered by Deleuze.
188
 Deleuze begins by arguing that, 
Attributes … have an essentially dynamic role. Not that they are themselves powers. But, 
taken collectively, they are the conditions for the attribution to absolute substance of an 
absolutely infinite power of existing and acting, identical with its formal essence. Taken 
distributively they are conditions for the attribution to finite beings of a power identical with 
their formal essence, insofar as that essence is contained in this or that attribute.
189
 
A modal essence, then, is not a substance which is cause of itself. Rather, an essence is a 
power contained in an attribute and characteristic of a finite being, an essence is a degree of power 
in virtue of which the being exists. This is why Spinoza adopts the ontological argument and says 
that the object of this attribution—substance—necessarily exists. That is, when understood in their 
collective sense, the attributes are what attribute to substance the very power of existing which 
constitutes it as a single and same designated. However, if they are understood distributively, the 
attributes are the conditions under which a modification or variation of substantial power is taken as 
identical with the essence of the finite beings (potestas) which modify that substantial power 
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(potentia). In this case, modes are the expression of the sense of the attributes’ expression of the 
essence of God.  
From what has been described so far, we know that the existence and nature of substance is 
constituted through the attributive expression of the essence of substance. We also know that 
actually existing things, modes, are in fact the expression of the quantitative degree of the first level 
of expression, hence Deleuze’s claim that the modes express “a certain degree, a certain quantity, of 
a quality.”190 That is, where attributes constitute substance through their expression of substantial 
essence, the modal essences contained in the attributes express the intensity or degree to which a 
specific attribute expresses an essence at this moment or that. It is in this sense that Deleuze argues 
that “[m]odal essences are . . . distinguished from their attributes as different degrees of 
intensity.”191 This description does not mean that modes are constituted by attributes the same way 
the attributes constitute the essence of God. Deleuze is emphatic on this point: “Attributes constitute 
the essence of substance, but in no sense constitute the essence of modes or of creatures. Yet they 
are forms common to both, since creatures imply them both in their own essence and in their 
existence.”192 The existence of a mode is distinct from its essence, that is, the existence of a mode 
does not follow from its essence; however, both the existence and the essence of a mode imply an 
attribute. On the one hand, the existence of a mode implies an attribute insofar as each being is a 
mode of Being because it involves an attribute; for example, a body implies the attribute of 
extension insofar as it is a modified expression of a power of being extended. On the other hand, the 
essence of a mode implies an attribute insofar as it expresses the degree to which a body is a 
modification of a power of being extended. As such, the attributes are called containers of modal 
essences in the most literal sense since the modes are expressions of the degree to which an attribute 
constitutes a degree of essence within the configuration of substantial essence which all attributes, 
understood collectively, constitute. Summarising this dynamic doubleness of the attributes Deleuze 
says that 
[i]t is as though to each attribute there belonged two quantities, each in itself infinite, but each 
in its own way divisible in certain conditions: an intensive quality, which divides into intensive 
parts, or degrees, and an extensive quantity, which divides into extensive parts.
193
 
In the first case, Deleuze is describing the constitutive relationship between substance and 
attributes; the attributes are infinite in their kind insofar as they can be divided into intensive parts 
only. In the second case, extensive division and extensive parts, he is referring to Spinoza’s 
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conception of modal essences—the sense of the attribute’s expression—as those things which are 
infinite by virtue of their cause but when conceived abstractly are able to be viewed as finite and 
divisible.
194
 This dynamic raises a very specific issue though; under what conditions, according to 
what logic, does one infinite relate to the other? That is, how do the intensive parts of a qualitative 
infinity relate to the extensive parts of a quantitative infinity? 
Deleuze addresses this problem through his reading of modal essences. Modal essences exist 
independently of the mode’s existence precisely because they are contained in their respective 
attribute as the sense of the attribute’s expression of the substantial essence; thus Deleuze describes 
modal essence as “a pure physical reality”195 distinct from the mode to which it corresponds. It is in 
this sense that Deleuze reads Spinoza’s argument that modal essences constitute neither their own 
existence insofar as they are essences
196
 nor the existence of the mode to which they correspond.
197
 
Therefore, whenever we encounter an essence of this kind, the necessity of its existence comes from 
God and not from its own nature. In other words, the existence of the essence of a mode is caused 
not by its own nature but as the consequence of the necessary existence of the essence of substance. 
The nature of the cause of these essences produces them as intensive degrees within a total, actually 
infinite, system. Thus any distinction between modal essences operates only abstractly insofar as we 
conceive one essence independently of the system of intensities implied by this one, apparently, 
distinct degree.  
Playing on the tension between the two qualities he suggests belong to the attributes, Deleuze 
interprets modal essences as “intrinsic modes or intensive quantities.”198 In this case, an attribute is 
simultaneously qualitative and quantitative; in the former case its role is the predication of a quality 
or essence to substance. In the latter case it is this predication which designates the attribute as 
quantitative or modal precisely because it always poses the question of the degree to which the 
quality is expressed. Consequently, modal essences characterise the contingent existence of things 
or beings while remaining ontologically distinct from them. This is why Deleuze argues that, 
[o]nly a quantitative distinction of beings is consistent with the qualitative identity of the 
absolute. And this quantitative distinction is no mere appearance, but an internal difference, a 
difference of intensity. So that each finite being must be said to express the absolute, according 
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to the intensive degree that constitutes its essence, according, that is, to the degree of its 
power.
199
 
Modal essences are thus distinct from their corresponding attribute precisely because they are 
constituted quantitatively as the degree to which the attribute expresses the essence it constitutes. 
Returning to EIID7, it is clear that, for Deleuze, when Spinoza describes individuals “concurring” 
in one action to the extent that their cooperation constitutes a mode which is itself singular, he is 
describing a process that is intensive, that is “quantitative and intrinsic.”200 There is a quantitative 
distinction of modal essences insofar as they are distinct from each other as well as from the 
attribute that contains them. However, the modal essence is intrinsic precisely because it is always 
contained within an attribute and thus cannot be considered extrinsic. Modal essences are thus 
constituted as infinite series corresponding to the intensive quantities of the attribute which contains 
them. In this vein, Spinoza argues that “[e]very mode which exists necessarily and is infinite has 
necessarily had to follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some 
attribute, modified by a modification which exists necessarily and is infinite.”201 Even though each 
modal essence is characterised as an infinite series, it is only infinite because of the status of another 
thing, namely the intensive quantity characterising the attribute which contains it. For Deleuze, this 
is also the sense in which modal essences are divisible. As essences they are not divisible into 
extensive or extrinsic parts; however, each essence can, if conceived as an intrinsic modality, be 
conceived as distinct, singular and particular. What is more, even though the essences form part of a 
concrete system where each is involved in the production of every other, “each essence is,” as 
Deleuze puts it, “produced as an irreducible degree, necessarily apprehended as a singular unity.”202 
In brief, we have established here that, on the one hand, modal essences are expressions of the 
degree to which an attribute expresses or constitutes the essence necessary to the existence of 
substance. In other words, a modal essence is always constituted as a degree of power intrinsic to 
univocal being. On the other hand, modal essences also express the qualitative distinction within 
substantial essence, that is, the distinction carried out by the process of attribution, as a quantitative 
distinction. That is, insofar as “[e]ach substantial quality has intensive modal quantity,”203 we can 
say that, in producing himself, God produces the things in the world as quantitatively distinct 
expressions of his own power.  
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Conclusion. 
There are two key themes in this discussion that are crucial to the account of Deleuze’s 
ontology that I am developing. First is the simultaneity of substance and modes. The modal 
universe is produced at the same time substance is produced. Of course, substance does not produce 
the modes. The attributes, insofar as they are expressions through which essence is attributed to 
substance, constitute substance. Because the modes follow necessarily from the essence of 
substance so constituted, what actually exists is produced simultaneously as another level of the 
event through which substance is constituted. The second theme involves the phrase that has been 
repeated throughout this chapter: in the same sense. Deleuze argues that for the attributes to 
successfully express essence to substance, these expressions must be apprehended as such. Thus 
Deleuze invokes Spinoza’s claim that God possesses an infinite power of understanding. The sense 
in which the attributes express the essence of substance is apprehended by this infinite power of 
understanding as the idea of an essence. The idea of God is the “objective formal distinction” that 
correlates necessarily with the real formal distinction that occurs in the constitution of the essence 
of God.
204
 The understanding of the idea of God is thus not a view point on the idea but the formal 
being of the idea of God.
205
 But it is precisely the successful apprehension of the idea of God that 
determines the quantitative degrees that characterise actual modes. These essences do not cause the 
existence of the modes to which they correspond; however, they only determine an assemblage of 
material parts as a particular mode if they express the essence of substance as a sensible 
proposition. 
From this follows the only substantive criticism Deleuze makes of Spinoza. In Spinoza, the 
modes are produced through differential relations and characterised by degrees of power that 
express these relations. However, insofar as the production of the modes follows necessarily from 
the constitution of substance they “are dependent on substance, but as though on something other 
than themselves.”206 In other words, while the modes are produced differentially, their 
differentiation follows from the constitution of the identity of substance. In chapter three I will 
explore how working through this problem is a crucial step in the transformation of Deleuze’s 
ontology. Chapter three, indeed, elaborates some of the tools Deleuze develops to enable him to 
present identity as a consequence of differentiation and the constitution of substance as reciprocal 
with the differentiation of the modes. In turning to consider these developments I raise a number of 
questions that remain underdeveloped or implicit in this discussion: what is the ontological status of 
                                                          
204
 Ibid., 125.  
205
 Ibid., 122--123. 
206
 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 40. 
69 
 
a subsistent relation? how can we characterise concretely the relationship between the degrees of 
power and the actual, existing modes which express them? how does Deleuze flesh out his 
conception of “reciprocal determination” between actual beings and the powers they express 
without violating Spinoza’s argument that the relationship between an existing mode and its essence 
is not causal? and, finally, how does Deleuze treat duration, what Spinoza calls “an indefinite 
continuation of existing?”207  
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CHAPTER THREE 
On Deleuze’s Bergson: The Transformation of the Whole. 
 
In this chapter I argue that, in response to the apparent independence of the identity of substance, 
Deleuze reconceives Spinoza’s substance-attribute-mode dynamic in terms of living beings and the 
ontological conditions and status of their power. In order to achieve this, Deleuze must do two 
things. First, he must show how a mode and its essence are properly immanent to each other. 
Second, he must demonstrate how the existing being and the degree of power it expresses exist 
without reference to anything other than the structure of their reciprocity. This chapter outlines 
Deleuze’s transformation of the holistic ontology he finds in Spinoza into an ontology in which the 
whole—the univocal sense of Being—is conceived as generated by the degree of power expressed 
in an existing entity. I also explore a key claim that Deleuze makes with respect to the relationship 
between a mode’s essence and its existence, namely, that a “mode is just its own essence insofar as 
the essence actually possesses an infinity of extensive parts.”208 Reflecting on the ontology of 
Expressionism in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze sets himself a challenge: “[a]ll that Spinozism 
needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make substance turn 
around the modes - in other words, to realise univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal 
return.”209  
When Deleuze returns to Bergson and Nietzsche to develop his ontology beyond 
Expressionism, he renames substance and modes—the whole and actual lives, respectively—but he 
retains the challenge of making the differentiation of the modes the motor of the constitution of 
substance. This challenge can be only be faced with a renewed conception of time—eternal 
return—in which the expression of a degree of power in an actual, finite being is entirely a product 
of a differential relation—repetition. This chapter will explore the way that the more familiar 
elements of Deleuze’s philosophy are part of his response to this challenge. We will see that the 
pairing of the virtual and the actual is how Deleuze, following Bergson, reconfigures the ontological 
status of a being and its power; that finite beings are not produced as expressions of the constitution 
of “something other than themselves” but as moments in the dialectical reciprocity of individuals 
and the whole; that the whole is a multiplicity constituted by the association of the many as such; 
and that “repetition in the eternal return” is a complex series of simultaneous syntheses—the 
famous “three syntheses of time.” Where chapter two showed how Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza 
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produced a form of holism where finite beings are expressions of the constitution of a 
heterogeneous whole, and chapter four will argue that the Bergsonism of the Cinema books has at 
its heart a holism where the heterogeneous whole is constituted through the differentiation of actual 
lives in the course of affective encounters, this chapter systematically examines the crucial concepts 
that enable Deleuze to make this transition. In order to understand these concepts, we must begin 
with a reflection on the criticism Deleuze makes of Spinoza—the criticism that leads to the 
aforementioned challenge. 
 
Deleuze’s Nietzschean Critique of Spinoza. 
In the course of his discussion of Nietzsche in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze develops 
the only substantive criticism he makes of Spinoza and, although this criticism receives a mere two 
pages of explicit attention in Difference and Repetition, I argue that it is central to understanding 
Deleuze’s subsequent arguments for the reciprocity of the virtual and the actual. Deleuze’s criticism 
of Spinoza concerns the determination of the identity and essence of the finite modes; although 
substance is constituted heterogeneously and through differential relations, the determination of the 
degrees of power which characterise modes proceed through the expression of the constitution of an 
identity which is not of the modes. That is, he objects to a monism that prioritises the identity of the 
one over the differentiation of the multiple; as such, I take Deleuze to be arguing for a strict 
reciprocity between the virtual and the actual. The determination of the virtual whole must be 
reciprocal, in the strongest sense, with the differentiation of actual beings. It is, thus, impossible to 
overstate the importance of Deleuze’s objection to a monism that privileges the identity of an ideal 
unity over an actual plurality. The criticism he offers in no way constitutes a rejection of Spinoza; it 
does, however, represent an acknowledgment that the demands of a philosophy of difference go 
beyond the resources that Spinoza’s monism can provide. Deleuze’s claim is that Spinoza allows 
substance to retain an independence from the modes insofar as the modes only have existence 
through their reference to substance while substance exists solely through the expression of its own 
essence. Deleuze turned to Spinoza in search of an ontology that would drive his Bergsonian 
project; an ontology, that is, that would make it possible to think difference as a generative 
principle. In doing so, Deleuze was able to thoroughly describe modes as expressions of degrees of 
power that participate univocally in the constitution of an active, common sense of being. Being is 
active and common precisely because everything that the modes express is expressed of substance’s 
univocal attributes. Unfortunately, however, this prize is won at the cost of a metaphysical system 
in which the modes are dependent on a prior identity that remains ontologically distinct from them. 
72 
 
Deleuze criticises Spinoza because substance—that of which the modes are said—remains 
independent. In Deleuze’s own words, as expressions of substance, “the modes are dependent on 
substance, but as though on something other than themselves.”210  
Making substance turn around the modes will, Deleuze contends, require “a more general 
categorical reversal according to which being is said of becoming, identity of that which is 
different, the one of the multiple, etc.”211 This categorical reversal confronts the asymmetry of 
substance and modes by foregrounding a relationship of reciprocal determination between a mode 
and the degree of power it expresses. Insofar as it is the expression of a relational degree, a mode 
can only be considered the transitory description of a set of relations which constitutes its ground. 
That is, as a being, a mode can only be said of that which becomes. Difference and Repetition’s 
invocation of the Nietzschean concept of the eternal return represents the introduction of a new way 
of thinking about time that turns on the repeated expressions of degrees of power. Deleuze’s 
complaint about Spinoza is that modes—as expressions of that which differs (degrees of power)—
are always said of an identity that remains consistent through all its changes. In other words, we 
could always say that the degrees of power are degrees of God’s power. Within the Nietzschean 
categorical reversal, Deleuze wants the very identity said of the modes to be said only of the 
differences in power expressed by the modes; this reversal is the beginning of the form of time 
Deleuze calls repetition: “an identity, produced by difference, is determined as ‘repetition.’”212 In 
order to explicate the workings of this form of time, the remainder of this chapter will focus on 
Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, beginning with a discussion of how future events relate to the 
conditions of their actualisation.  
 
Bergson’s Critique of the Possible and the Real and The Genesis of Novelty. 
Deleuze develops the categorical reversal of difference and identity through a return to 
Bergson and the retrieval of a conceptual coupling that will allow him to redefine the ontological 
status of powers and modes: the virtual and the actual. As well as emphasising a difference between 
powers and modes, the use of the concepts of the virtual and the actual also allows Deleuze to 
affirm that powers and beings are fully real: 
[t]he virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real insofar as it is 
virtual … Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly part of the real object - as though the 
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object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective 
dimension. … The reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and the relations 
along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of the virtual is structure. 
We must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they 
do not have, and withdrawing from them a reality which they have.
213
 
Deleuze affirms this coupling of virtual and actual against the more common coupling of the 
possible and the real on the grounds that thinking in terms of the realisation of possibilities denies 
the reality of the possible and then attempts to describe the passing into reality of possibilities 
through a subtractive process. This subtraction occurs because the possible is supposed to be ideally 
infinite—that is, it contains everything whose idea does not contain logical contradiction—and the 
process of realisation is one whereby “some possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, 
while others ‘pass’ into the real.”214 In this scenario, what actually occurs is a diminished realisation 
of what is possible insofar as the real contains less than the possible. Against this, Deleuze argues 
that because of the difference between the actual and the virtual, the virtual has a reality of its own 
that is neither diminished nor represented in the actual: 
the virtual cannot proceed by elimination or limitation, but must create its own lines of 
actualization in positive acts … [because] the actual does not resemble the virtuality it 
embodies. It is difference that is primary in the process of actualization—the difference between 
the virtual from which we begin and the actual at which we arrive, and also the difference 
between the complementary lines according to which actualization takes place.
 215
 
In setting out the opposition of these two conceptual pairs, (virtual and actual, possible and 
real), Deleuze glosses an early article by Bergson on the problems of thinking in terms of possibility 
and reality. In “The Possible and the Real,” Bergson affirms that “reality is created as something 
unforeseeable and new”216 and argues that the processes by which possibilities are realised are, by 
virtue of being “subtractive,” unable to account for this novelty. Bergson’s first point is that the 
possible has only ever been conceptualised in terms of a retrospective representation of the real 
such that, when we describe what might be possible in the future, we trade on an error in how we 
conceive the past. Bergson’s claim is that when we conceive the past as a representation of the 
present we construct a series of images of what must have been possible given what is currently 
real: 
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[a]s reality is created as something unforeseeable and new, its image is reflected behind it into 
the indefinite past; thus it finds that it has from all time been possible, but it is at this precise 
moment that it begins to have been always possible, and that is why … its possibility, which 
does not precede its reality, will have preceded it once the reality has appeared.
217
 
For Deleuze this is the first of two rules to which the process of realisation is subject: the rule 
of resemblance.
218
 Where Bergson contends that a concept of the possible as something that 
resembles the real cannot account for the novelty of life, Deleuze is even more emphatic and 
suggests that this rule violates a robust conception of difference and consequently renders actual 
existence the arbitrary occurrence of an idea in space and time. Deleuze asks, “[w]hat difference 
can there be between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, 
already included in the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers upon it as 
a possibility?”219 Insofar as the possible refers to “the form of the identity in the concept”220 since, 
“from the point of view of the concept, there is no difference between the possible and the real,”221 
Deleuze suggests that “it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the concept when all it 
does is double like with like.”222 Deleuze echoes Bergson when he says that the possible is 
“retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it.”223 By contrast, the relationship between 
the virtual and the actual is the expression of difference; insofar as it is the actualisation of a power, 
actuality must differ from the virtual. That is, actualisation must proceed by differenciation. The 
second rule that follows from the first is the rule of limitation. When we ask after the future as 
though its potential events were aligned with possibilities subsisting in the present, we project our 
mistake about the past and the possible into our conception of the future. If, as Bergson suggests, 
the possible is generated through the retrospective reflection of reality, the possible must, 
accordingly, be generated as more than the real. There is a common illusion regarding possibilities 
and realisation, Bergson contends, and it consists in the assumption that the real adds something—
namely existence—to the possible. Contrary to this illusion, Bergson contends that realisation is, in 
fact, a subtractive process. The conception of possibility criticised by Bergson and Deleuze 
construes the passage from possibility to reality as subtractive insofar as it requires the real in order 
to generate an idea of what is possible. Thus possibility necessarily consists of more than the 
existence that realises it.
224
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In his Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, Keith Ansell-Pearson takes up this issue in 
the context of a broader reading of the history of ideas regarding biology, evolution and natural 
selection. Ansell-Pearson notes that this conception of possibility leads to the belief that there is a 
reservoir of sorts—a store of possibilities—that supplies the particular possibility that passes into 
reality as that present becomes past and is supplanted by a new present. Accordingly, the current 
present is assumed to consist in a similar store of possibilities and the future to consist of one of 
these possibilities, which is selected and realised. This conception of duration as the repeated 
selection of images of past realities according to a mechanistic selection process—a process that is 
wholly given and indifferent to the images upon which it operates—is, Ansell-Pearson claims, 
precisely the target of Bergson’s critique.225 This process of selection is also Deleuze’s target when 
he describes the rule of limitation at work on realisation: “realization involves a limitation by which 
some possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while others ‘pass’ into the real.”226 
Overturning such an illusion is precisely what Deleuze wants to achieve through the virtual and the 
actual. In addition to being actualised through a differenciation, processes of actualisation must 
involve genuine creation. If actualisation is the expression of difference then it will render existence 
genuinely new and not the merely arbitrary realisation of a possibility: “[a]ctual terms never 
resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense, actualisation . . . is always a genuine 
creation.”227  
Rather than describing the movement from past to present to future as a straight line whereby 
each implies a storehouse of ideal possibilities from which an idea is selected and brought into 
existence, Deleuze conceives the relationship between the virtual and the actual dialectically. 
Virtual and actual respond to, and are determined by, each other. The virtual, on his account, is a set 
of conditions which subsist in the actual world and constitute a problem to which an instance of 
actualisation is a response or solution. That is, the actual is a plane composed of events of 
actualisation which do not add existence to an idea but which “solve” a virtual problem. This 
dialectic is the heart of Deleuze’s ontology and it is to this discussion that we now turn. 
 
The Dialectic of Problems: the Virtual and Actualisation.
 
 
When he develops his conception of the virtual and the actual, Deleuze calls it a dialectic of 
problems; however, he is careful to distinguish his use of the word dialectic from Kantian or 
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Hegelian senses of the concept when he notes that “we do not mean any kind of circulation of 
opposing representations which would make them coincide in the identity of a concept.”228 The 
dialectic in this case is inspired by the work of Albert Lautman, an early twentieth century 
philosopher of mathematics. Lautman’s conception of dialectic concerns the relationship between 
problems and solutions, which remain distinct. As Deleuze explains in Difference and Repetition:  
a problem has three aspects: its difference in kind from solutions; its transcendence in relation 
to the solutions that it engenders on the basis of its own determinant conditions; and its 
immanence in the solutions which cover it, the problem being the better resolved the more it is 
determined.
229
  
The use of the term transcendence, while requiring explanation, does not present a problem 
for Deleuze’s ontology of immanence. In a study on Lautman’s influence on Deleuze, Simon Duffy 
notes that transcendence is used in a common sense way to describe the fact that the problems 
themselves are “posed … relative to the connections that are [only] likely to be supported by certain 
dialectical concepts.”230 In other words, within a dialectic of problems and solutions, the problem is 
transcendent because it is given to the solution which must respond to it. It must be emphasised, 
however, that this transcendence of the problem does not imply an anteriority of the problem 
relative to its solution. As with the case of an attributive expression of sense which subsists in its 
expression without being reducible to either the attribute that expresses it or the substance of which 
it is said, the problem subsists in a solution that explicates it. That is, a problem cannot be reduced 
to its determination in a corresponding solution precisely because it is the conditions of the problem 
which engender a solution. However, it is not until a solution is actualised that the reality of the 
problem is made explicit. At the same time, the problem is immanent in the solution because the 
extent to which it is able to be resolved hinges upon the terms of the solution’s actualisation. Since 
the problem as such only has reality insofar as it is explicated by a solution, it is said to be 
immanent in the solution even though it is given to the solution that explicates it and is determined 
by conditions that go beyond the particular solution—i.e., it is transcendent. For Deleuze, it is this 
dialectic of problems which governs the appearance of everything which makes up the world.  
Deleuze takes on Bergson’s rejection of the traditional conception of the realisation of 
possibilities as a way of describing the relationship between a being and what that being can 
become. By appropriating Bergson’s critique of the possible and the real, Deleuze argues against 
the concept of asymmetry between possibility and reality. He affirms an equality between beings 
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and what they can become insofar as the actual state of an existing being and the subsistent 
conditions of its becoming are equally real. The difference between a being and the conditions of its 
becoming—between the actual and the virtual—is a difference in kind. Together their interaction 
accounts for the genesis and becoming of the world: 
[i]t is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place in time not between one actual term, 
however small, and another actual term, but between the virtual and its actualisation - in other 
words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases 
of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and 
diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. This is a genesis 
without dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a static genesis 
which may be understood as the correlate of the notion of passive synthesis, and which in turn 
illuminates that notion.
231
 
Deleuze argues against the assumption that actual events follow each other sequentially. 
Actual events follow each other but their relationship is one of association, not causation.232 The 
association of actual events proceeds dialectically and progresses through a virtual problem. This is 
an important argument to the extent that it reinforces Deleuze’s claim that repetition produces 
novelty.
233
 As this chapter progresses, we will see that the progression from one actual event to 
another proceeds via a complex process that Deleuze calls different/ciation: the determination of a 
virtual problem proceeds through differentiation and the actualisation of a solution proceeds 
through differenciation. Because the dialectic of problems has these differential expressions driving 
it, and because the virtual and the actual are defined by their qualitative difference, neither the 
concept of the present, nor the conditions it determines as the ground of the future, are sufficient to 
provide the idea of a future, actual event. Indeed, even when actual events resemble each other, this 
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resemblance is always grounded in difference. Thus ‘new’ events are generated as ontologically 
novel. However, in order to confront these complex issues, we must first understand what Deleuze 
means by multiplicity, given that it is the structure of the problem and the way that Deleuze is able 
to describe the logic of the association of sets as immanent.  
 
Multiplicities.  
In reading Spinoza, Deleuze persistently characterises substance as an intensive multiplicity; 
it is always a heterogeneously generated system which remains numerically one. As outlined above, 
however, even though Spinoza’s metaphysics delivers a conception of substance as multiplicitous, it 
contains a pitfall insofar as the multiplicity remains independent of the very modes which give it its 
existence. To avoid this pitfall, Deleuze suggests that, “instead of using the one and the multiple as 
adjectives, one substitutes the substantive multiplicities in the [genesis of] form: there is nothing 
that is one, there is nothing that is multiple, everything is multiplicities.”234 As with Lautman and 
the dialectic of problems, Deleuze foregrounds a figure in the history of mathematics, Bernhard 
Riemann, in order to rethink the concept of multiplicity (or manifolds).
235
 Riemann’s geometry 
takes up the issue of the constitution of space as such. As Arkady Plotnitsky describes it, a manifold 
is a conglomerate of local spaces which can be mapped infinitesimally through a Cartesian or 
Euclidean map—that is, by a single, consistent co-ordinate map—while the map itself cannot be 
accounted for by Cartesian or Euclidean space.
236
 In other words, every point in a space has a local 
neighbourhood that can be treated as Euclidean; however, because the sites of the syntheses of these 
local spaces are themselves mappable spaces, the overall manifold cannot be treated as Euclidean. 
The significance of Riemann’s work is clearly stated in A Thousand Plateaus: “[i]t was a decisive 
event when the mathematician Riemann uprooted the multiple from its predicate state and made it 
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into a noun, ‘multiplicity.’”237 Deleuze and Guattari write that “Riemannian space at its most 
general thus presents itself as an amorphous of pieces that are juxtaposed but not attached to each 
other.”238 ‘Multiplicity’ does not denote a given system that would unify the one and the many, it 
describes the generation of a system from the organisation of the many as such. 
In his reading of Bergson, Deleuze foregrounds a particular conception of multiplicity: 
continuous multiplicities. A continuous multiplicity is a space that finds the principle of its metric 
in the phenomena that occur across its surface. This idea of a space determined by the events that 
occur across its surface is of particular interest to Bergson; however, where Bergson diverges 
significantly from Riemann is, as Miguel de Beistegui points out, in the insistence that continuous 
multiplicities belong primarily to the order of duration and not space in virtue of the fact that the 
terms by which one would map an ongoing duration are continually encroaching on and dissolving 
into one another in a way that resists the kind of quantification and division possible with an 
elapsed duration.
239
 The question of time and duration is an issue we will defer until later in this 
chapter; however, it is important to emphasise that Deleuze’s and Bergson’s respective interests 
converge on this idea of multiplicities which cannot be quantified and submitted to an abstractly 
generated metrical principle. As Deleuze stresses in the passage above, it is crucial to conceptualise 
the system of the multiple in such a way that it is the multiple as such which generates its own 
principle. Indeed, the final clause of the passage could be read as a direct response to Expressionism 
insofar as Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza allows an external term—God or nature—to determine the 
unity of the modes. The project for Deleuze now is to generate that term from the relationship of the 
modes understood as a multiplicity.  
The concept of multiplicity enables Deleuze to address this problem by making it possible to 
move from the dialectic of problems to the conception of time as the repetition of actualisations. 
This is because lived time for Deleuze is constituted precisely by repetitions in the actual world and 
yet these actualisations do not occur from one actual term to another but through the movement 
from the generation of a problem or Idea as a response to a set of actual terms, to the generation of a 
new set of actual terms as a response to the problem. Multiplicity is an important concept precisely 
because it is the structure of the problem: a “structure or an Idea is a ‘complex theme’, an internal 
multiplicity - in other words, a system of multiple, non-localisable connections between differential 
elements which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms.”240 This concept is crucial to the 
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conception of time that drives so much of his work, and so Deleuze is careful to establish the 
conditions under which ideas or multiplicities are generated.
241
 Of course, multiplicities have no 
modal existence. In describing the generation of a multiplicity, one is in fact describing the 
conditions under which actual terms determine the formulation of a problem to which a later 
actualisation is a response.  
Deleuze tells us that for a multiplicity to emerge three conditions must be met; first, the 
multiplicity’s constitutive elements must retain no assignable function. That is, as the virtual side of 
the actually existing term, these elements must be stripped of sensible form or signification and 
must lose all similarity to the actuality to which they correspond. Indeed, it is this first condition 
that leads to what Deleuze, in the Cinema books, calls a centre of indetermination precisely 
because, bearing no similarity to the actual term, the virtual term as such does not presuppose a 
prior identity which defines its form. The second condition concerns the reciprocal determination of 
the elements of the multiplicity and the relations in which it participates. This is the aforementioned 
importance of the continuous multiplicity; the relations between the elements of a multiplicity 
which, “whether they characterise the multiplicity globally or proceed by the juxtaposition of 
neighbouring regions,” generate the metric of the multiplicity.242 Yet, at the same time, the elements 
of the multiplicity must be defined intrinsically. That is, the elements of the multiplicity are only 
relevant to the multiplicity by virtue of their participation in the determination of the multiplicity. 
Deleuze insists upon this exhaustive reciprocity so as to resist any independence either on the part 
of the multiplicity or its elements. Finally, the third condition for the emergence of a multiplicity is 
the event of the actualisation of a differential relation. These, then, are the three conditions that 
must be met in order for an Idea—a problem—to be defined structurally. We see in all three 
conditions the interaction of the actual term and the problem to which it responds—first through 
their difference and then through their reciprocal determination—and, indeed, the final condition is 
precisely the grounding issue for the final section of this chapter. The multiplicity is not prior to the 
existence of actual objects; rather, the pair virtual-problem/actual-solution are simultaneous. For all 
that their respective reality is formally distinct, the virtual and actual are existentially 
indistinguishable. In other words, the multiplicity does not exist in the absence of the terms that 
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actualise it, nor can an actual term exist in the absence of the “differential elements” and “ideal 
connections” that condition and constitute it. Deleuze’s summary of the issue drives at precisely this 
interactive simultaneity: 
For a potential or virtual object, to be actualised is to create divergent lines which correspond 
to - without resembling - a virtual multiplicity. The virtual possesses the reality of a task to be 
performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and 
engenders solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the problem. ... Difference and 
repetition in the virtual ground the movement of actualisation, of differenciation as creation. 
They are thereby substituted for the identity and the resemblance of the possible, which inspires 
only a pseudo-movement, the false movement of realisation understood as abstract limitation.
243
 
So far in this chapter I have argued that the more familiar terms of Deleuze’s vocabulary—
virtual, actual, multiplicity—are elements of his attempts to transform his Spinozist inheritance into 
a robust philosophy of difference. We saw in chapter two that Deleuze inherits from Spinoza a form 
of holism in which the one and the many are generated dynamically as the forms and objects of 
attributive expressions. By virtue of this dynamism, the whole is conceived as a virtual multiplicity 
with no existence outside or beyond the many by which it is expressed. However, Deleuze still 
considers Spinoza’s ontology problematic because it conceives the production of the modes as the 
expression of the constitution of the essence of something other than themselves. Consequently, the 
differentiation of the modes is reduced to the arrangement of diversity and this diversity is always 
referred to an external identity. Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, however, demands that 
substance correspond to an actuality that expresses it without resembling it. In other words, Deleuze 
wants differential relations to drive his ontology—the genesis of beings and identities must be 
expressions of difference—and so the whole and individuals must be qualitatively distinct. This is 
why Deleuze characterises the relationship between the virtual and the actual as a dialectic of 
problems: the constitution of a virtual multiplicity—a problem or an Idea—is a step in a dialectical 
relationship wherein neither term resembles the other. This is why we must turn at this point to 
examine Deleuze’s famous three syntheses of time; the simultaneity of the past and future, and their 
synthesis in a complex process of different/ciation, enables Deleuze to conceive the actual present 
as the “disjunctive synthesis”244 of two movements of differentiation. 
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The Three Syntheses of Time and Correspondence Without Resemblance. 
In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that “[t]he essence of things produced by God does not involve 
existence.”245 Spinoza is here referring to the ontological argument which he had deployed earlier to 
argue that the existence of God follows necessarily from his essence; this time, however, insofar as 
the things produced by God are the finite modes, existence does not follow from their essence—that 
is, the degree of power that characterises them does not cause their existence. We saw in chapter 
two that this was an important part of how Deleuze argued that God’s self-causation was 
simultaneously the production of a modal universe, and it is an insight that continues to be 
important as his ontology transforms. This is why, when Deleuze recasts a mode and its essence as 
a solution and a problem he argues that the two correspond, and respond to and determine each 
other, in a dialectical relationship even though their correspondence never entails causation. That is, 
actual solutions respond to virtual problems, but the problems never cause their solutions. Thus, 
Deleuze attempts to account for their reciprocity in a way that portrays their correspondence as a 
dialectic driven by differentiation. When he challenges himself to conceive time as a series of 
repetitions that would realise univocity, he does so in an effort to carry out the categorical reversal 
necessary to transform Spinoza’s ontology. Of course, working out this concept is also crucial to the 
reciprocity of individuals and the whole in the Bergsonism of the Cinema books; this dialectic of 
problems enables Deleuze to characterise individuals as the expression of a differential relationship 
which simultaneously generates a whole. 
Deleuze begins his formulation of this correspondence in Difference and Repetition when he 
grounds the three syntheses of time in the present understood as a concrete particular that assumes a 
power of thinking in a living body that functions as the site of temporal syntheses. With this move, 
Deleuze reformulates the degrees of power of Expressionism as the folding of immanent powers 
into the constitutive events of living bodies. The way Deleuze proceeds in this reformulation of the 
Spinozist image of the whole owes significantly to his claim in Expressionism that the attribution of 
an essence to substance must be apprehended as such by substance; in other words, attribution must 
not only be an attribution to substance, it must also be an attribution for substance. The way 
Deleuze deploys this duality of to and for bears a remarkable similarity to his description of the first 
synthesis in terms of the anticipatory behaviour of the imagination. The deduction of this 
anticipatory behaviour is suggested in his early reading of Hume’s anti-Cartesian view of the mind 
and its faculties—the first chapter of Empiricism and Subjectivity—and this influence reappears in 
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the second chapter of Difference and Repetition. Deleuze begins his reflections on time with the 
Humean suggestion that repetition is not a case of change undergone by a thing but, rather, a 
transformation brought about in the mind which contemplates the thing.
246
 Deleuze names the first 
synthesis habit even though it is not a situation where a mind is in the habit of doing something. 
Rather, this habit is constitutive of the mind that contemplates. We must not make the mistake of 
assuming the priority of a mind that contemplates. Deleuze argues that the necessary precondition 
of a lived present is a passive synthesis of previous experiences into an anticipation that is geared 
towards the future. It is this synthesis, this contemplation, that earns the name habit.
247
 Habit gives 
time its direction from the past to the future. As Deleuze says, “Passive synthesis or contraction is 
essentially asymmetrical: it goes from the past to the future in the present, thus from the particular 
to the general, thereby imparting direction to the arrow of time.”248 
When Deleuze describes this synthesis as contraction he means it quite literally. The 
imagination is defined as a “contractile power.”249 Deleuze reads Hume as saying that similar cases 
(cases similar to the one at hand in the present) are grounded in the imagination that “like a 
sensitive plate, . . . retains one case when the other appears. It contracts cases, elements, agitations 
or homogeneous instants and grounds these in an internal qualitative impression endowed with a 
certain weight.”250 Deleuze’s claim here is appropriately concrete: given the traces of previous 
experiences that remain within the imagination, there will be the anticipation that future cases of 
similar events will be consistent with previous experiences. Deleuze calls the contraction of these 
traces into an anticipation passive because it is an automatic synthesis that makes the contemplative 
mind possible, not an anticipation that is generated by an already existing contemplating mind. This 
synthesis, however, has numerous levels and, as such, goes beyond the mere passive contraction of 
past events into an anticipation of the future. Deleuze argues that, 
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[w]e must … distinguish not only the forms of repetition in relation to passive synthesis but 
also the levels of passive synthesis and the combinations of these levels with one another and 
with active syntheses. All of this forms a rich domain of signs which always envelop 
heterogeneous elements and animate behaviour. Each contraction, each passive synthesis, 
constitutes a sign which is interpreted or deployed in active syntheses.
251
 
The first synthesis accounts for the passive contraction in the imagination of previous 
sensations into an anticipation of a future state of affairs. At the same time, this synthesis also 
accounts for the ways in which levels of contraction are themselves synthesised in a series of signs 
that determine the problem to which actions respond. Deleuze offers a preliminary description of 
active syntheses at this point: the manner in which sensation and perception—as well as all the 
traits of an entity that are superimposed onto a given passive synthesis: “need and heredity, learning 
and instinct, intelligence and memory”252—combine in the generation of an action that the entity in 
question enacts as a response to a certain problem arising from a contemplation or habit. This 
connection between the first synthesis of time and the determination of problems is crucial. In 
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze suggests precisely this direction: “To contemplate is to 
question. Is it not the peculiarity of questions to ‘draw’ a response?”253  
The second synthesis concerns the passive synthesis of the whole of the past that has no 
immediate importance to the synthesis of habit. Deleuze claims that in order for the synthesis of 
habit to occur, there must also be a simultaneous synthesis of the entirety of the past such that the 
past retains its reality while remaining distinct from the contraction that occurs in the imagination. 
It is only by virtue of this distinction of the whole of the past from the passive synthesis of habit 
that the elements synthesised in habit are themselves differentiated from all of the other virtual 
sensations from which the present contraction must distinguish itself. Put simply, the past, as a 
dimension of the present, must go unattended and the present must pass in order for time to have a 
direction more proper than that established by the anticipatory contractions of the first synthesis: 
It is not that the present is a dimension of time: the present alone exists. Rather, synthesis 
constitutes time as a living present, and the past and the future as dimensions of this present. 
This synthesis is none the less intratemporal, which means that this present passes.
254
  
The second synthesis is concerned with the limits of a present present and the way the 
conditions of a passive synthesis relate to the needs and power of a being: “The present extends 
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between two eruptions of need, and coincides with the duration of a contemplation.”255 Deleuze 
claims that “we must distinguish the foundation from the ground”256 and so, while this originary 
synthesis of habit “constitutes the life of the passing present,” it is still grounded by another, 
“fundamental,” synthesis which “constitutes the being of the past” and in so doing causes the 
present to pass.
257
 This, of course, is the notorious discussion of “a ‘past in general’ that is not the 
particular past of a particular present but that is like an ontological element, a past that is eternal and 
for all time, the condition of the ‘passage’ of every particular present”258 that appears in all of 
Deleuze’s discussions of time from Bergsonism on. Where the first synthesis is concerned with the 
operations of habit, the second concerns the passive synthesis of memory against which habit 
distinguishes itself. This issue is grounded in an element of Deleuze’s reading of Bergson; in order 
for the present to pass—if the present is to become past—then there must be an element to its 
characteristic relations which constitute it as having already passed. In other words, if the present is 
to pass it must already contain its past as a dimension of itself. Deleuze notes in Bergsonism: “of the 
present we must say at every instant that it ‘was,’ and of the past, that it ‘is.’”259 If the present is the 
site of activity and of pure becoming then the past is impassive and does nothing, but it subsists—
with all the reality proper to that which subsists—in the present as the being of the present: 
the present is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its 
proper element is not being but the active or the useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased 
to act or be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full 
sense of the word: It is identical with being in itself. It should not be said that it ‘was,’ since it is 
the in-itself of being, and the form under which being is preserved in itself.
260
 
The meaning of the past in general is then to give a milieu in which the present expresses 
itself as past present (representation) or present present: 
it is as if the past were trapped between two presents: the one which it has been and the one in 
relation to which it is past. The past is not the former present itself but the element in which we 
focus upon the latter.
261
 
Thus, when Deleuze conceives the second synthesis of time, he characterises it as the passive 
synthesis of the whole of the past in general such that it constitutes the milieu of the being of the 
present becoming. We expect then that the third synthesis—for all its infamous difficulty—must 
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deal with a very specific problem; how is it that a contraction of the past corresponds to a future 
oriented action? In other words, the first and second syntheses address two indissociable issues; the 
past must be contracted as what persists and subsists in the present (second synthesis) and 
simultaneously must be organised in such a way that certain elements of the past are contracted into 
an anticipation of the future (first synthesis). For Deleuze there are then two levels or two 
repetitions, the first being “a repetition of successive independent elements or instants” (habit) and 
the second “a repetition of the Whole on diverse coexisting levels” (memory).262 And with these 
two syntheses Deleuze continues to develop his conception of active synthesis: “Active synthesis, 
therefore, has two correlative - albeit non-symmetrical - aspects: reproduction and reflection, 
remembrance and recognition, memory and understanding.”263 
How then do these syntheses relate to each other and generate an action? No answer to this 
question will yield the ground for predicting which actions will come about. The actions to come 
are indeterminate in the sense that the determination of a future is, in fact, the actualisation of that 
future. Consequently, the third synthesis does not concern a specific determined action; it concerns, 
rather, an action’s determinability and it is for this reason that the third synthesis can only be 
described in terms of the conditions it gives to the first and second syntheses such that their 
correspondence or association is expressed in an action. This is why Deleuze emphasises that 
“Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection.”264 Certainly, this third 
synthesis—the “empty form of time”265—concerns the necessary openness of the future with regard 
to habit and memory. James Williams notes that the openness characteristic of the third synthesis of 
time is a necessary presupposition precisely because it is the condition for generating the genuinely 
novel,
266
 and so the third synthesis turns on a radical cut, a “caesura”, between past events that are 
representable and a future that is not given.  
Deleuze describes this synthesis as having three characteristics. The first is the caesura that 
has just been described. The second characteristic of this cut is the need for all the events 
synthesised in the pure past to be cut from all the events that can become the future. In other words, 
the caesura must affirm the difference between the actual past—its image and representations—and 
the virtual in response to which the future will emerge. Deleuze describes the cut as generating a 
movement towards the genuinely new by invoking metaphors—the explosion of the sun, patricide 
or deicide—that describe the genesis of time’s direction in virtue of the way “the symbolic image . . 
                                                          
262
 Ibid., 84. 
263
 Ibid., 80. 
264
 Ibid., 90. 
265
 Ibid., 88. 
266
 James Williams, Gilles Deleuze's 'Difference and Repetition': A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 102. 
87 
 
. draws together the caesura, the before and the after.”267 But this image is so radical that it is 
incomprehensible—“‘too big for me’”268—and consequently the calling forth of a future which 
cannot be given. Indeed, Deleuze says that it “matters little whether or not the event itself occurs … 
so long as [those involved] experience the image of the act as too big for them.”269 It is not the 
radicality of the event that matters in some objective sense; it is the experience, the apprehension 
and comprehensibility of the caesura that is crucial. 
Finally, the third characteristic of this synthesis is that time is synthesised into two series with 
respect to the caesura. What is synthesised in the genesis of these series is the ordering of the events 
that, on the one hand, cannot return; that lack the power to be of any consequence to what is to 
come. And, on the other hand, there is the series of events that return; the events that, in virtue of 
being relived in the cut are affirmed by it. These moments, whether they return or not, are events 
both of the past (memory) and of the future (anticipation) but they must not be confused with the 
past and future events of a historical time. Rather, what returns, whether it is the memory of 
something actual or what subsists virtually, is that which expresses a power of difference.  
To understand why Deleuze affirms degrees of difference as the criteria for selection in 
repetition we must return to his discussion of Ideas and the virtual and the actual. Of course, this is 
difference as it has always been discussed and therefore must be designated not as something which 
is affirmed but as a set of relations affirmed by the third synthesis. Difference in this case is the 
complex process of different/ciation: “[w]hereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the 
Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of 
solutions.”270 When Deleuze describes the virtual and the actual—the differentiated and the 
differenciated—he does so by describing an object as double and characterised by asymmetrical 
“images” that do not resemble each other.271 On the one hand, differentiation—the determination of 
the Idea insofar as it is virtual—is complete but acts only on the existence and the distribution of the 
singular points that constitute the Idea. The nature of these points is determined by the shape and 
distribution of actual beings. On the other hand, the progression and determination of the virtual 
determines the form of an already operative actual side of the object whose constitutive parts are 
differenciated to express a response to a given Idea. What is differenciated then connects with other 
differenciated objects and generates a higher order being:  
complete determination carries out the differentiation of singularities, but it bears only upon 
their existence and their distribution. The nature of these singular points is specified only by the 
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form of the neighbouring integral curves - in other words, by virtue of the actual or 
differenciated species and spaces … every structure has a purely logical, ideal or dialectical 
time. However, this virtual time itself determines a time of differenciation, or rather rhythms or 
different times of actualisation which correspond to the relations and singularities of the 
structure and, for their part, measure the passage from virtual to actual. … Each differenciation 
is a local integration or a local solution which then connects with others in the overall 
solution.
272
 
It is with this logic of different/ciation, and the deduction of these three passive syntheses that 
are implicit in the dialectic of problems, that Deleuze discovers that underneath historical, linear 
time lies a profound notion of cyclical time. This cyclical time, in virtue of its Nietzschean heritage, 
is called eternal return. However, this is not return in the sense of a repetition of what has come 
before, it is an expression of power insofar as it is an affirmation of difference (different/ciation). 
But, of course, this is not “merely” a philosophy of time, it is a description of what and how beings 
become in an ontology that always implies a differentiated whole: “In this manner, the ground has 
been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding which turns upon itself and causes 
only the yet-to-come to return.”273 
While there are many ways of approaching this discussion of time that I have necessarily 
excluded from this discussion,
274
 I will close this chapter with a brief discussion that enables us to 
anticipate a move to the Cinema books. The ontological issue which unites the concerns of this 
thesis is Deleuze’s changing conception of the reciprocity of individuals and the whole. And so, we 
must consider how this chapter’s discussion of some well-known Deleuzian concepts—the virtual, 
multiplicity, and a philosophy of time—transform Spinozist concepts—essence, univocity, 
substance—in order to enact a categorical reversal of being and becoming. 
 
Conclusion: Syntheses and the Renewal of Holism. 
Given that substance can no longer be conceived as a univocal being that is independent of 
the expressions that modify it, how must we describe the whole? Deleuze argues that the answer is 
multiplicity provided that we understand it in its “substantive form”:  
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In this Reimannian [sic] usage of the word ‘multiplicity’ (taken up by Husserl, and again by 
Bergson) the utmost importance must be attached to the substantive form: multiplicity must not 
designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organisation belonging to the 
many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system.
275
 
If there is anything to justify this comparison between multiplicity and substance it is a 
moment in Bergsonism where Deleuze, echoing Spinoza, claims that “duration is like a naturing 
nature (nature naturante), and matter a natured nature (nature naturée).”276 Deleuze characterises 
the second synthesis (the past in general) as an active sense of the world, or the world described in 
terms of the infinite attributes. That is, the attributes of substance that express an eternal and infinite 
essence. On the other hand, by comparing matter with nature understood as passive, Deleuze 
identifies matter with the modes that correspond to the sense of these attributive expressions of the 
essence of substance. This is to say that, Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson employs a distinction 
between duration and matter that is comparable to the conception of the distinction between an 
actual mode and the degree of relational power that characterises it that is at the heart of his reading 
Spinoza. This comparison is instructive because it suggests that, just as a mode expresses a degree 
of power in an actual state of affairs, we should read matter as the determinate expression of 
duration. However, there is an important difference as well; in reading Spinoza, Deleuze has the 
univocity of the attributes to guarantee the correspondence between modal essences and existing 
modes. Conversely, with the schema he adapts from Bergson, Deleuze turns to the logic of 
multiplicities to develop the third synthesis that guarantees the correspondence between matter 
(habit) and duration (memory). 
If matter and the whole are equivalent to the correspondence between existing modes and 
their essences, we must bear in mind Deleuze’s comment in Difference and Repetition where he at 
first seems to dismiss talk of essences when he says that “[i]deas are by no means essences. In so far 
as they are the objects of Ideas, problems belong on the side of events, affections or accidents rather 
than on that of theorematic essences.”277 However, Deleuze quickly qualifies this remark by 
redefining the work essences must do in the ontology he seeks to develop:  
[t]he events and singularities of the Idea do not allow any positing of an essence as “what the 
thing is”. No doubt, if one insists, the word ‘essence’ might be preserved, but only on condition 
of saying that the essence is precisely the accident, the event, the sense; not simply the contrary 
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of what is ordinarily called the essence but the contrary of the contrary: multiplicity is no more 
appearance than essence, no more multiple than one.
278
 
This passage does not undermine the importance of essences to this schema. What it does, 
rather, is gesture towards how the constitution of a modal essence—a degree of power—is itself an 
event. That is, the degree of power expressed in an actual mode—the problem as such—is not given 
but rather is the expression of a degree of a becoming. The juxtaposition of a virtual becoming of 
the degree of power with the actual becoming of the mode requires repeated emphasis if we are to 
understand how the renewed conception of the whole collaborates happily with the categorical 
reversal of being and becoming that Deleuze undertakes in light of Nietzsche. “The whole,” 
Deleuze states, “constitutes a virtuality” and, understood as such, the whole—being neither one nor 
multiple—is a multiplicity.279 Or, to be more precise, the whole is both one and multiple because 
the whole is an indefinite, yet wholly determinate, structure: “the many is a multiplicity; even the 
one is a multiplicity. That the one is a multiplicity … is enough to reject back-to-back adjectival 
propositions of the one-many and many-one type.”280 The description of the whole as a virtuality 
recalls chapter two’s invocation of a form of distributive holism wherein the whole was described 
as lacking unity—a whole that concerned the “the ‘each’ rather than the ‘all,’”281 to borrow 
Christian Kerslake’s phrase—in order to suggest a universality that was concerned more with the 
distribution of particulars than with a supervening collectivity. Deleuze argues that “a monistic field 
is indeed a field inhabited by multiplicities … there is nothing that is one, there is nothing that is 
multiple, everything is multiplicities.”282  
To put it another way, when Deleuze read Spinoza he extracted a concept of the whole—
substance, or, God or nature—that was constituted in the same event and in the same sense as the 
modal universe was produced. But, as we have seen, the problem with this conception is that the 
identity of the whole determines the differentiation of the modes. He returns to Hume, Nietzsche, 
and Bergson in Difference and Repetition—for he had written on all three before writing 
Expressionism—in order to confront the challenge of reversing this categorical hierarchy of identity 
and difference. I have argued in this chapter that he undertakes this reversal through the conception 
of a being and its power as reciprocal—the virtual and the actual; association as the juxtaposition of 
events that determine the structure of the space of their association in the event of their 
association—multiplicity; and the association of the whole and individuals as occurring through 
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complex processes of different/ciation—repetition in the syntheses of time. This means that the 
identity of the whole is determined as the distributive systematicity that is immanent to the 
differentiation of its parts. In the Cinema books, Deleuze characterises the immanence of the whole 
as the reality of the relations that subsist in the affective continuum differentiated by actual lives. 
Indeed, from the point of view of the Bergsonism of the Cinema books, the definite article in the 
whole is misleading. In his reading of Bergson’s theses on movement, Deleuze argues that the 
distinctions between actual beings are “artificial”283 and that the whole is the subsistence of the 
reality of the relational nature of these artificially delineated beings that stops their separation from 
each other ever becoming too robust. He argues that the whole 
is not a closed set, but on the contrary that by virtue of which the set is never absolutely 
closed, never completely sheltered, that which keeps it open somewhere as if by the finest 
thread which attaches it to the rest of the universe.
284
 
That is, in the Cinema books, Deleuze takes the subsistence and immanence of the whole to 
the point of arguing that it is not a closed set which contains all but is an element or sense of the 
reality of a set that guarantees its attachment to the sets around it, the sets with which it is always 
already in a relationship. In Cinema, Deleuze talks about bodies as relatively closed systems, or, 
more correctly, he describes relatively closed systems as bodies; a body in an ontological sense is 
any set of affective relations expressed—embodied—empirically in a relatively closed system. The 
whole is the virtual side of a body which guarantees that its delineation is relative and never 
absolute. The argument Deleuze makes in Cinema is that bodies are the site of the interaction and 
reciprocal determination of virtual and actual relations: on the one side is the determination of a 
degree of power and on the other is the actualisation of this degree in a set of sensible relations. To 
make more sense of these ideas, chapter four will explore how affection replaces attribution in 
Deleuze’s horizontal holism. Central to this discussion will be an elucidation of how affection 
connects a degree of power with an empirical body.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Cinema and Affect. 
 
The Cinema project undertaken by Deleuze in the 1980s introduces a concreteness to his 
metaphysics by grounding this step in the progression of his ontology in an account of the affective 
relations of finite beings. What is uniquely significant about the Cinema books is that, through the 
turn to cinema, Deleuze offers descriptions of his ontology from the point of view of the particular 
beings who inhabit the world described by his ontology. Cinema 1 focuses on sensible relations that 
are presented in terms of the continuity of perception, affection and action. From the point of view 
of the evolution of Deleuze’s ontology, affection is presented as doing the work attribution did in 
his reading of Spinoza. Whilst coming out of his work on Spinoza, however, this chapter explores 
the ways in which the ontology of the Cinema books deepens and extends Deleuze’s reading of 
Bergson. Indeed, the following discussion turns on one of the most crucial concepts Deleuze adopts 
from Bergson: images. Bergson begins Matter and Memory with praise for George Berkeley who 
“proved … that the secondary qualities of matter have at least as much reality as the primary 
qualities.”285 Bergson praises Berkeley for arguing against the habit of assuming that the secondary 
properties of matter—the sensible properties that are “immediately perceived by sense”:286 heat and 
cold, taste, odour, sound, colour, etc.—are properties of objects and are independent of the subject 
of experience. Berkeley’s mistake, according to Bergson, was to think this led to the denial of 
material objects, per se. The concept of images that Deleuze inherits from Bergson was originally 
developed in response to this precise problem; that is, the problem of how to conceptualise the 
nature of an “existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’”287 As such, 
Bergson’s concept of images is crucial to the conversion of Deleuze’s ontology into a project 
concerned with a relationality grounded in sensibility.  
This is a significant step because it brings this narrative about his transforming ontology 
back into contact with the ethical side of the ethological project that interests this thesis. In chapter 
three, we saw how Deleuze qualified his holistic ontology by developing the conceptual tools to talk 
meaningfully about the whole as a multiplicity constituted as the expression of the degrees of power 
determined by the differentiation of the individual lives that participate in the whole. In other 
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words, Deleuze developed the conceptual tools to, as he put it in Difference and Repetition, “make 
substance turn around the modes.”288 In the reading of Bergson in the Cinema books, Deleuze takes 
this further and his ontology continues to resemble the one he argues for in Spinoza by retaining the 
logic of a doubly expressive operation. In Spinoza’s case, it was the attributes that were doubly 
expressive—they simultaneously constituted the essence of God and contained the essences of the 
modal universe that was produced as an expression of the degree of the constitution of God. In the 
Cinema books, affection takes centre stage and constitutes the whole by expressing the affects that 
occupy the interval between perception and action. The other side of this expression is that, 
expressed as affects as such—that is, as affects per se rather than the experience of an event tied to 
a subject—they are expressed as degrees of power which subsist in the differentiation of actual lives 
and, taken together, these degrees of power constitute an immanent, heterogeneous multiplicity. 
Because this conversion of his ontology into a form of holism where the whole is the immanent 
systematicity of the degrees of power that subsist in the affective relations of actual individuals, the 
Cinema books’ return to Bergson constitutes a necessary, final step in the development of Deleuze’s 
ontology. Consequently, each element of this chapter is focussed on either explicating the sensible 
elements developed in this conversion—that is, the elements that make this a concrete ontology of 
sensible relations—or in elaborating how they are deployed in order to achieve this conversion. The 
fundamental element of this conversion is the image and, to understand how the image functions in 
this project, we need to begin with the way Deleuze develops a Bergsonian conception of division 
and continuity. This conception is developed in Deleuze’s reading of Bergson’s analysis of 
movement because it is here that Deleuze sets out the context for conceiving the continuity and 
relationality that underpins his entire ontology.  
 
Movement and Distinction. 
Deleuze’s engagement with Bergson echoes his treatment of Spinoza. His concern in 
relation to both philosophers is to conceptualise the nature of the qualitative variation of a virtual 
whole, the quantitative division amongst actual things, and the reciprocity between the two. In 
Bergson, Deleuze finds a theory of divisions that is similar to Spinoza’s theory of distinctions. His 
reading of Bergson emphasises the concept of images developed in Matter and Memory because it 
provides a conceptual vocabulary for describing the actual world as an affective continuum. 
Deleuze appropriates Bergson’s conception of images as a tool that enables him to argue that the 
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division between actual objects is quantitative but not real—“artificial”289—because these existents 
presuppose a relational, continuous whole whose transformations they express. The similarity 
between Deleuze’s Spinozism and his Bergsonism is that, in both cases, ostensibly distinct actual 
existents presuppose a qualitatively heterogeneous whole and express the relational degrees of this 
whole’s constitution. In order to understand how images give him this conception of a transforming 
affective continuum, we must begin with the theory of divisions that Deleuze finds in Bergson’s 
analyses of movement in the final chapter of Creative Evolution. In the first chapter of Cinema 1, 
Deleuze presents these analyses as three theses which together set out an initial formulation of the 
reciprocity of individuals and the whole that grounds the ontology of images that he adapts from 
Matter and Memory. 
Bergson’s first thesis on movement is in fact the initial formulation of a problem that follows 
from a critical response to what Bergson sees as “the absurd proposition, that movement is made of 
immobilities.”290 Bergson argues that movement is poorly understood when it is conceived as the 
accretion of discrete units in space. Movement is not, for Bergson, “a mere instantaneous 
juxtaposition in space.”291 Rather, he claims that movement must be conceived continuously, as the 
“transition” between the points which express this transition.292 The second thesis follows directly 
from this discussion and appears as part of Bergson’s confrontation with the historical and 
contemporary conceptions of system and their relationship with this inadequate conception of 
movement. For Deleuze, the crucial moment here is Bergson’s massaging of the critique of 
movement that constituted the first thesis in order to identify two illusions. On the one hand, 
classical philosophy gives us a conception of movement that “refers to intelligible elements … 
Forms or Ideas which are themselves eternal and immobile.”293 These elements are then more or 
less accurately actualised in the entities in the world. As Deleuze puts it: “Movement … will thus be 
the regulated transition from one form to another, that is, an order of poses or privileged instants, as 
in a dance.”294 On the other hand, modern science gives us movement that is still composed from 
abstract intervals; however, “it[is] no longer recomposed from formal transcendental elements 
(poses), but from immanent material elements (sections).”295 Deleuze calls this immanent material 
section an any-instant-whatever and argues that, where antiquity had conceived movement as a 
synthesis of poses, modern science infers movement, qua recomposition, from an in-principle 
infinitesimal analysis of moving-matter. The illusion in both cases is to think that movement occurs 
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in the juxtaposition of these points or sections. For Deleuze these two illusions amount to much the 
same thing and are fraught with the same problem: 
[i]n fact, to recompose movement with eternal poses or with immobile sections comes to the 
same thing: in both cases, one misses the movement because one constructs a Whole, one 
assumes that ‘all is given’, whilst movement only occurs if the whole is neither given nor 
giveable. As soon as a whole is given to one in the eternal order of forms or poses, or in the set 
of any-instant-whatevers, then either time is no more than the image of eternity, or it is the 
consequence of the set; there is no longer room for real movement.
296
 
The word “eternity” is a reference to a discussion in Creative Evolution. In an illusion 
Bergson calls cinematographical, “the forms … are … only snapshots of the changing reality”297 
which are conceived by virtue of a process of abstracting forms from their duration—distinguishing 
“agents” from “processes,” to use Boundas’ terms—such that “past, present and future shrink into a 
single moment, which is eternity.”298 In other words, because this cinematographical illusion 
abstracts movement from the objects which move, it reduces time to a single moment without 
duration. This reduction leads to either of the two illusions Deleuze describes. On the one hand, the 
classical illusion conceives movement as composed through the juxtaposition of privileged poses 
and, on the other hand, in the modern illusion movement is composed from the accretion of 
“immanent material elements.” Insofar as each illusion takes the respective poses and sections as 
given and thus overlooks the whole’s variation every time there is a translation in space, they lead 
us into the error of taking the whole to be a consequence of the actual and to be like the actual. 
In Deleuze’s reading, the whole cannot be given, “because it is the Open”299 and, because it is 
open its nature is constant change, or the production of the new. Hence Deleuze’s presentation of a 
third and final thesis on movement; movement is double insofar as it is simultaneously the 
translation or rearrangement of parts in space and the openness of these parts to a whole which 
changes qualitatively. In Cinema 1, Deleuze conceives movement as facing in two directions, or 
rather, as a process that has two elements: “it is the relationship between parts and it is the state of 
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the whole.”300 On the one hand, movement involves a communication—an interaction and 
translation in space, a “rapport”301—between parts; on the other hand, movement also entails the 
relationship of this spatial translation to the whole. Since Deleuze defines the whole as relational
302
 
and, since the divisions between sets are artificial, the translation in space is not the reality of 
movement, even though it is its actual expression. The reality of movement is the qualitative change 
in the relational whole in which the translation of parts participates and which it explicates. Still, 
even though Deleuze is fond of saying that relations are external to their terms, this whole does not 
exist outside or independently of the sets that express it. To explain the subsistence of the virtual 
whole in actual being, Deleuze adapts the Bergsonian vocabulary of images. His discussion of the 
relationship between movement and images and, ultimately, affection, focuses on how the actual 
and the virtual are immanent to the sensible relationality of images. 
Bergson’s theses on movement enable Deleuze to transform the ontology he develops through 
his reading of Spinoza by converting it into a discussion of objects, movement and the 
transformation of the plane across which they move. This transformation turns on an identity of 
movement and continuous multiplicities insofar as the former, as Constantin Boundas observes,  
require[s] that the distinction between movement (the process) and moving (the agent or 
patient) be abandoned. Movement affects both space and the bodies moving through it. To 
move is not to go through a trajectory which can be decomposed and recombined in quantitative 
terms; it is to become other than itself, in a sense that makes movement a qualitative change.
303
  
Boundas’ identification of the logic of continuous multiplicities is vital because, as Deleuze 
argues, movement is not a relation that occurs between abstract, autonomous objects; it is not a 
reconstitution of “movement with the space covered, that is, by adding together instantaneous 
immobile sections and abstract time.”304 Just as with continuous multiplicities, the composition of 
the space through which bodies move is not really distinct from the bodies themselves. As such, the 
spatial translation of a body contributes to the composition of the whole of the space which contains 
the moving body. At the same time, the moving body is a function of the composition of the space 
through which it moves and, as such, it does not merely move from one point to the next unaffected 
by the transformations of the space across which it moves. The moving body becomes, as Boundas 
puts it, “other than itself” insofar as it undergoes continual transformations reciprocally with the 
transformations of its milieu. To understand how Deleuze converts the problematic of sections and 
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poses into one of centres within a relational, continuous universe we must unpack the pivotal 
Bergsonian concept to which Deleuze appeals: images. 
 
Images and Representation. 
The term “image” might initially seem strange insofar as it evokes some sort of distinction 
between the objects of perception and objects as they actually are. In appealing to the notion of the 
image, Bergson and Deleuze are in critical dialogue with the traditional philosophical distinction 
between external objects and mental representations. As Bergson puts it at the start of Matter and 
Memory, an image is more than a “representation” and less than a “thing”; it is “an existence placed 
half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’”305 In section XII of his An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, Hume famously articulates the problem by noting that even 
“the slightest philosophy” assumes that “nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or a 
perception.”306 Hume is interested in the peculiar problem that arises when we realise that, though 
the object of our perception changes as we continue to relate to it, the object itself, we presume, 
remains constant. Thus there arises a peculiar problem and an “extreme embarrassment” to 
philosophy: that the natural instinct to believe that the external world causes, and is present in, our 
perceptions is naïve and untenable, and yet equally untenable is the rationalist belief that the images 
born of our senses are distinct from an external world with which they cannot be reconciled.
307
  
There have, of course, been many, varied attempts to negotiate this problem, but here I am 
interested in the way Deleuze, in his reading of Bergson, defends a nuanced version of a belief that 
Hume takes to be an immediate consequence of “a natural instinct or prepossession.” For Hume, we 
“always suppose the very images presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never 
entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but the representations of the other.”308 Bergson 
begins Matter and Memory by considering this natural instinct. He asks his readers to rise above the 
habitual assumption of a substantial distinction between the object and our perception of it and to 
inhabit a “point of view of a mind unaware of the disputes of philosophers.”309 This does not mean 
Bergson is guilty of any special pleading when it comes to accepting the hypotheses he puts forward 
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in Matter and Memory. On the contrary, he suggests that the hostility that will arise with respect to 
his hypotheses is a product of our habitual deference to the idea that the contents of the mind are in 
some sense representations of some external object. Bergson’s obvious frustration in the first 
chapter of Matter and Memory is directed at this representationalist thesis insofar as it seeks to 
conjure the external world from the mind’s ideas or vice versa. In spite of this frustration, Bergson 
concedes that states of affairs in the world cannot help us decide between these theses, especially 
since pure perception—that is, perception idealised and considered without memory—“bears, by 
definition, upon present objects … and because everything always happens … as though our 
perceptions emanated from our cerebral state.”310 While he grants the intuition that the objects of 
our perceptions are dependent in some way on our perceptions (the point that motivates both 18th 
century Idealism and 20th century phenomenalism), Bergson argues that his thesis regarding the 
continuity of mind and world is to be preferred to the representationalist hypothesis on the grounds 
of its “greater intelligibility.”311 The problem for Bergson is that, even if experience operates as 
though our perceptions emanate from within us, representationalism remains unintelligible because 
it will inevitably run into the problem of how, if our perceptions do spring from our minds, the 
content of our minds ever coincides with the world intuition tells us we inhabit. 
The most immediate point of connection between Deleuze’s Spinoza and his reading of 
Bergson, is their respective attempts to outmanoeuvre particular species of dualism, whether post-
Kantian dualism, in Bergson’s case, or Cartesian dualism, in Spinoza’s case. Similar to Spinoza’s 
conception of body and mind as different systems of reference for the same event—that is, parallel 
modifications of substance—Bergson describes an image as being equally able to be understood 
from an objective point of view where, “related only to itself,” it contains an absolute value, or, 
from a subjective point of view, “the world of consciousness, wherein all the images depend on a 
central image, our body, the variations of which they follow.”312 On the one hand, following 
Descartes, Spinoza endeavours to provide an objective description of mind and body where the 
body is the modal expression of the constitution of substance and mind is an idea of the body. On 
the other hand, Bergson argues that the problem is to understand how images operate for a 
subjective world—consciousness—and how images also operate for an objective world; in this 
case, the problem is how these worlds are correlative expressions of a sensible continuum. For both 
Spinoza and Bergson, matter and mind are expressions of degrees of change in a relational whole in 
which there is no substantial gap between the material and ideal that has to be bridged. Each world, 
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ideal and material, is a different system of reference for expressing a whole undergoing constant 
modification. 
Bergson describes images as emerging from the gap between pictorial representations and 
their objects: “by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist 
calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing,—an existence placed half-
way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’”313 Bergson uses this term to flatten his ontology 
so that my body, the ‘external object’ and the affects which mediate their relations, are all the same 
type of thing. This is why the relational world Deleuze articulates throughout his project is here 
described as a universe of continual movement, and this continual movement is equivalent to a 
universe of images: “We find ourselves … faced with the exposition of a world where 
IMAGE=MOVEMENT. Let us call the set of what appears ‘Image.’”314 Thus, in talking of images, 
Deleuze is not referring uniquely to cinema; rather, he is building upon Bergson’s conception of a 
universe that constitutes the subjects and objects of perception by virtue of a series of continuous 
sensible relations. Bergson, indeed, begins Matter and Memory by describing images in terms of the 
mise-en-scène of the field of our perceptions: “images perceived when my senses are opened to 
them, unperceived when they are closed.”315 Images describe what Bergson takes to be primitive: an 
experience of being immersed in a world of representations (and here Bergson is playing on the idea 
of images in the mind) and corresponding external objects. The way Bergson describes it, there are 
images which are referred to me and which vary with the modifications of my being, and there are 
images which refer to themselves and vary occasionally in their relations with other images but do 
not change for my sake. Such images do not form distinct series but constitute distinct systems of 
reference for the same order of images:  
the same images can enter at the same time into two distinct systems, one belonging to 
[material] science, wherein each image, related only to itself, possesses an absolute value; and 
the other, the world of consciousness, wherein all the images depend on a central image, our 
body, the variations of which they follow.
316
 
Bergson does not defend his starting position; rather, by starting from what he takes to be a 
fact about existence—that we constantly find ourselves “in the presence of images”317—he begins 
in media res and aims to show that such a beginning puts the lie to the split between consciousness 
and external things. Bergson wants to show that, by starting with the immediate presence of images, 
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we will understand the world in such a way that the rift between materialism and idealism will 
never be opened. Bergson thus proposes a plane of images within which our bodies constitute a 
variable centre and, consequently, the fulcrum of relations—what Bergson calls a “centre,” itself an 
image– is neither privileged nor derided relative to the position it maintains on the plane on which it 
appears. As Suzanne Guerlac notes, Bergson talks in terms of images so as to “interrupt our usual 
habits of thought”;318 he wants us to stop considering sensory information in terms of a more or less 
fallible epistemological engagement (à la Descartes) and think in terms of perception’s relationship 
with action. For Deleuze, this means developing a model of the universe in which perception and 
movement  
would be ... a state of things which would constantly change, a flowing-matter in which no 
point of anchorage nor centre of reference would be assignable. On the basis of this state of 
things it would be necessary to show how, at any point, centres can be formed which would 
impose fixed instantaneous views.
319
  
The determinism of Bergson’s description of this universe initially appears almost Laplacean; 
if we are content to describe them from the point of view of perception then all these images seem 
to act and react upon each other in consistent ways, according to constant laws and, if we had 
perfect knowledge of these laws, we could predict all future states of these images.
320
 This being the 
case, it would seem that the future states of images consist of nothing that is not already contained 
in their present state. However, there is an image which I can take from a different point of view: 
my body. This image, claims Bergson, can not only be known from an external point of view, it can 
also be known “from within by affections.”321 For Bergson, my body can be viewed in two ways, 
from the point of view of its external relations or from an internal point of view in terms of how 
those external relations are enfolded into affective states: 
The distinction between the inside and the outside will then be only a distinction between the 
part and the whole. There is, first of all, the aggregate of images; and then, in this aggregate, 
there are ‘centres of action,’ from which the interesting images appear to be reflected: My body 
is that which stands out as the centre of these perceptions; my person is the being to which these 
actions must be referred. ... My body, then, acts like an image which reflects others, and which, 
                                                          
318
 Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 112. 
319
 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 57--58. 
320
 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 2--3. 
321
 Ibid., 1. 
101 
 
in so doing, analyses them along lines corresponding to the different actions which it can 
exercise upon them.
322
 
Bergson’s claim seems clear, if counterintuitive; if I am to distinguish between the inside and 
outside of my body then I will do so by virtue of a distinction between the parts of a system and that 
system as a whole. Deleuze’s understanding of this Bergsonian concept of the image leads to an 
affirmation of the equivalency of the object and the image, which entails that the object and the 
representation are distinct only by virtue of the set of relations to which they are referred. The 
image called perception is not a representation of the object, nor is it some Ideal mental content 
derived from the object, it is the object/image related to a particular image which frames it, selects 
out particular information and reacts to it mediately. Thus we can provisionally say that the body, 
my body, is the special image to which the object relates mediately. Bergson emphasises the fact 
that the body is not an impersonal object; when objects are referred to it, their relation is mediated 
by the being of the special image. This is why he says that “my person is the being to which these 
actions must be referred.”  
Even though Deleuze argues that moving bodies are indistinguishable from the executed 
movement, he still needs to carry out a deduction of the various degrees to which the affective 
continuum can be differentiated. Just as his Spinozism has its way of describing the expression or 
actualisation of modifications of the whole, Cinema has its own way of describing the elements of 
an actual set. In this sense, Deleuze talks about three types of image, the avatars of the movement-
image,
323
 that express degrees of the whole’s transformation in actual occurrences. 
 
The Movement-Image and Its Avatars. 
I argued in the previous chapter that Deleuze invokes the non-Euclidean geometry of 
Bernhard Riemann and his concept of a continuous multiplicity—a space determined by the events 
that occur across it—as a way of articulating Bergson’s formulation of durée. The reciprocal 
determination between a space and the events that populate it is, both for Deleuze and Bergson, a 
way to conceive the one and the many such that they are no longer opposed to each other. For 
Bergson this means understanding the two terms (many and one, part and whole) as points of view 
on the folding of continuous processes into the actions characteristic of bodies. Deleuze takes up 
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this theme in Cinema 1 when he describes movement in terms of the relationship between 
Bergson’s bodies—now renamed “relatively closed system[s]”324—and the plane of immanence —
the set of what appears, the manifold of relations, or, the mise-en-scène of perception—that 
animates them. If we return to a passage from Cinema 1, we can see that what interests Deleuze is 
how Bergson’s extension of the discussion of images makes possible an ontology wherein the 
movement of an object is inseparable from the object itself: 
[w]e find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a world where IMAGE = 
MOVEMENT. Let us call the set of what appears ‘Image’. We cannot even say that one image 
acts on another or reacts to another. There is no moving body which is distinct from executed 
movement. There is nothing moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every thing, 
that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions: this is universal 
variation. Every image is merely a road by which pass, in every direction, the modifications 
propagated throughout the immensity of the universe. Every image acts on others and reacts to 
others, on all their facets at once and by all their elements.
325
 
Deleuze takes up Bergson’s ontology of images in order to critically reformulate the relation 
between objects and movement. The type of image around which Deleuze formulates his affective 
ontology is the movement-image. Insofar as the objects that fill out the universe are sections cut 
from a continuum, Deleuze, like Bergson before him, wants a way to refer to these objects that 
recognises the fact that they were always already in motion. It is the concept of a movement-image 
that makes this possible: “cinema does not give us an image to which movement is added, it 
immediately gives us a movement-image. It does give us a section, but a section which is mobile, 
not an immobile section + abstract movement.”326 
In Matter and Memory, Bergson suggests “that the movements of matter are very clear, 
regarded as images, and that there is no need to look in movement for anything more than what we 
see in it.”327 Deleuze cites this remark in his discussion of Bergson’s critique of the traditional 
distinction between objects and the movements they execute.
328
 In that context, Deleuze offers an 
insight that will be key to understanding how perception and action fit into the universe he 
describes. He begins by citing Bergson: 
‘You may say that my body is matter or that it is an image.’ The movement-image and 
flowing-matter are strictly the same thing. … The plane of immanence is … therefore a section; 
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but, … it is not an immobile and instantaneous section, it is a mobile section, a temporal section, 
a temporal section or perspective. The material universe, the plane of immanence, is the 
machine assemblage of movement-images
329
 
In this passage the universe is described as a composite of movement-images; that is, of 
mobile sections of duration. The entities that inhabit the universe presuppose a relationality that 
they express. Everything we see is an image but it is not a representation by which an object is 
apparent to consciousness. It is a perception of the objects around us; the objects of our perceptions 
are the movements—flowing-matter—of the world and both the perceptions and the movements are 
images. There are no entities as such but rather, as Deleuze puts it in Difference and Repetition, 
“being[s] of becoming.”330 This idea appears in Cinema 1 when Deleuze employs Bergson’s 
vocabulary of a system of double references: 
An essential consequence follows—the existence of a double system, of a double régime of 
reference of images. There is firstly a system in which each image varies for itself, and all the 
images act and react as a function of each other, on all their facets and in all their parts. But to 
this is added another system where all vary principally for a single one, which receives the 
action of the other images on one of its facets and reacts to them on another facet.
331
 
Consequently, moving bodies cannot be distinguished from the movements they execute, nor 
can affected entities be distinguished from what affects or moves them. This appropriation of 
Bergson allows Deleuze to be more forceful about the relational nature of the entities that fill out 
his ontology. Fundamental to this appropriation is Bergson’s articulation of the universe as a plane 
of immanence with movements that run “from the periphery to the centre, and from the centre to the 
periphery.”332 This description appears in the context of Bergson’s discussion of the continuity of 
perception and action and, as such, it is perception that travels from the periphery to the centre and 
action that travels from the centre to the periphery.
333
 In both cases we are dealing with movement-
images, the difference is the status of the centre to which the movement-image is referred. This 
continuity of perception and action and the status of the centre, what Deleuze will call an affection-
image, leads Deleuze to describe the movement-image as composed of—as differentiated into—
three avatars, three types of image: 
movement-images divide into three sorts of images when they are related to a centre of 
indetermination as to a special image: perception-images, action-images and affection-images. 
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And each one of us, the special image or the contingent centre, is nothing but an assemblage of 
three images, a consolidate of perception-images, action-images and affection-images.
334
 
In the discussion of the three avatars in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze is explicit about 
the way that the perception-image—“the degree-zero in the deduction which is carried out as a 
function of the movement-image”335—grounds the continuity of the other avatars and is the 
condition of the genesis of a whole. This is why Deleuze argues that the avatars “are not simply 
ordinal—first, second, third—but cardinal: there are two in the second to the point where there is a 
firstness in the secondness, and there are three in the third.”336 These avatars, moreover, are types of 
images that in their relationships constitute a “movement-image [that] gives rise to a sensory-motor 
whole.”337 These types are an affection-image (firstness), an action-image (secondness), a relation-
image (thirdness) and respectively they constitute “something that only refers to itself, [a] quality or 
a power ... that refers to itself only through something else ... and something that refers only to itself 
by comparing one thing to another.”338  
If the movement-image is the continuity of a thing and its relations this is because it is the 
relationality which folds from an exteriority of objects into a centre of indetermination by virtue of 
a selection amongst virtual actions and the actualisation of movement. Deleuze devotes much of 
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image to discussing the components of the movement-image, and to 
showing that the movement-image is not a set of relations between pre-constituted components. In 
doing this he again follows Bergson who suggests that “because of the invincible tendency to think 
on all occasions of things rather than movements”339 we misinterpret this relationship; we think of 
one agent passively receiving impressions from another and are thus unable to reconstruct the 
passage by which the impression, or image, travels from one point to another. In this sense, Bergson 
is concerned to highlight the operations of the faculty for receiving impressions: perception. Indeed, 
its importance and primacy as the ground of the subject of perception is what leads Deleuze to 
describe perception as the “degree zero” in the cardinal relationship of the avatars.340 Bergson 
describes a particularly tight relationship between perception and action such that “perception, … is 
… entirely directed towards action, and not towards pure knowledge.”341 Thus, perception does not 
reflect upon an object in order to know it, but sifts relevant data from irrelevant data en route to the 
determination of action. To appreciate why Deleuze sees the avatars of the movement-image as 
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expressing qualitative changes to the whole, we must consider the way in which Bergson’s 
understanding of perception as posing a question to my body is taken up by Deleuze in his effort to 
characterise the relationship between perception and action as progressing dialectically through 
affection. 
 
Perception and Action,
 
Problems and Solutions. 
Perception is, for both Bergson and Deleuze, so bound up in its relationship with action that 
the best way to describe it is in terms of how it operates. Indeed, it is the reciprocity of perception 
and action that leads Bergson to offer provisional definitions of matter and the perception of matter 
as, firstly, “the aggregate of images” and secondly “these same images referred to the eventual 
action of one particular image, my body.”342 Deleuze takes this to mean that the only difference 
between the perception of an object and the object as such is the point of view—the system of 
reference—to which it is related. In this cinematic ontology, the image is the material object and, as 
such, the only distinction between an object and the idea of the object concerns our method of 
understanding the relation. When referring to the image in itself, “as it is related to all the other 
images to whose action it completely submits and on which it reacts immediately,”343 we can say 
that the image is the object. When we refer the image to another image which frames it, it is a 
perception-image. For example, when I look at the tree outside my window, there is a point of view 
from which the tree is a thing amongst other things and, insofar as it is an object, the tree is 
submitted entirely to the other images/objects around it, relative to which it reacts immediately. In 
this case, the tree is referred to as an object. Conversely, when I describe the tree insofar as it 
induces certain behaviours on my part, I call it a perception of the tree. In both cases there is only 
one image; on the one hand, we can refer to it objectively, in its immediate and complete relations 
with other images and, on the other hand, we can refer to it as relative to a special image which 
frames it, a special image by which the reactions are mediated. Both Deleuze and Bergson argue 
that, defined this way, perception escapes the peculiar problem of representation. By defining 
perception as a process of framing and mediation it is a fundamentally subtractive process; that is, 
there is strictly less in the perception than in the object per se: 
[f]rom the point of view which occupies us for the moment, we go from total, objective 
perception which is indistinguishable from the thing, to a subjective perception which is 
distinguished from it by simple elimination or subtraction. It is this unicentred subjective 
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perception that is called perception strictly speaking. And it is the first avatar of the movement-
image: when it is related to a centre of indetermination, it becomes perception-image.
344
 
Within the context of the Cinema project, the notion of perception as a process of elimination 
or subtraction is central to Deleuze’s formulation of the dialectic of problems. What Deleuze calls 
“the image as it is in itself”345 is the world Bergson describes as posing challenges to my body. That 
is, Bergson offers a conception of perception as the posing of a problem when he claims that,  
[a]s many threads as pass from the periphery to the centre, so many points of space are there 
able to make an appeal to my will and to put, so to speak, an elementary question to my motor 
activity. Every such question is what is termed a perception.
346
 
Insofar as Bergson considers perception to be a subtractive process, he argues that, if we 
conceive living beings as centres of indetermination, and if “the degree of this indetermination is 
measured by the number and rank of their functions, [then] we can conceive that their mere 
presence is equivalent to the suppression of all those parts of objects in which their functions find 
no interest.”347 From the objects that transmit the data that finds a response in the centres, only part 
of what is reflected from their surface is relevant to the responses the centre can formulate. The 
information that is not relevant passes by unacknowledged and what is relevant is subtracted and 
converted into action. The centres of indetermination “allow to pass through them ... those external 
influences which are indifferent to them; the others isolated, become ‘perceptions’ by their very 
isolation.”348  
For Bergson, the body, or, rather, the nervous system that characterises it, is “a mere 
conductor” which is lodged between the objects that affect it and those it can influence, thus the 
nervous system works to transmit, reflect or inhibit movement.
349
 Deleuze suggests that, from the 
point of view of this influence and transmission ,“[w]e are still in the perception-image, but we are 
already entering the action-image as well. In fact, perception is only one side of the gap, and action 
is the other side. What is called action, strictly speaking, is the delayed reaction of the centre of 
indetermination.”350 If we refer to what Bergson calls a special image—what Deleuze variously 
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calls a “special image,” “my body,” “a centre of indetermination” and “an interval”—we can see 
why Deleuze’s ontology does not go far enough if it is limited to an “objective” account of the 
world. The subject—the being of the special image—stands out precisely because, insofar as I am a 
subject, I am able to take a more nuanced point of view on the being of the special image. In the 
most concrete terms, the special image is my body and I am able to view it internally; that is, 
subjectively. For Bergson this issue is clear; when we consider action in these subjective terms we 
see an indetermination which is implied in the structure of the nervous system—“an 
indetermination to which this system seems to point much more than to representation.”351 This 
indetermination is why, for Deleuze, the interval between perception and action, between incoming 
information and an outgoing response, is not empty:  
the interval is not merely defined by the specialisation of the two limit-facets, perceptive and 
active. There is an in-between. Affection is what occupies the interval, what occupies it without 
filling it in or filling it up. It surges in the centre of indetermination … between a perception 
which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action.
352
 
The interval that generates action is characterised by a series of affections, and we know from 
the cardinal interrelationship of images that affection does not so much precede action as ground it. 
Every action is grounded in an affection, and action contains the affections that form it. This is why 
Deleuze says that affection “surges in the centre of indetermination ... between a perception which 
is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action. It is a coincidence of subject and object ... It 
relates movement to a ‘quality’ as lived state.”353 Because affection occupies the interval between 
the received perception and the reflected action, it suggests a coincidence of subject and object. As 
Ronald Bogue explains, to say that subject and object coincide is to say “that the object of 
perception is felt in conjunction with a bodily sensation.”354 So, when Bergson says that affection is 
“that part or aspect of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies,”355 he 
affirms that we are “embodied perceivers”356 insofar as the affection-image is the coupling of an 
object with a body—my body—that responds to the perception of the object. This Bergsonian 
conception of affection offers a way to approach what Deleuze calls “the second part of 
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difference”357—differenciation—insofar as it constitutes solutions to the questions posed by 
perception. Thus the importance of the action-image consists in the way it “expresses the 
actualisation of this virtual”358 through the coincidence of an object and a subject in a living image.  
When Bergson turns to consider the nature of affection he does so in order to address the 
hypothesis that “affection must, at a given moment, arise out of the image.”359 Bergson is interested 
in how affection operates in our bodies as the reduction of the distance between the object to be 
perceived—where perception remains the measurement of our “possible action upon things, and ... 
[their] possible action ... upon us”360—and our own body. For Bergson, the issue is the selection or 
actualisation of an action from a series of possible actions; as the distance between the object and 
my body approaches zero, the number of possible actions diminishes and an actual action is 
expressed.
361
 However, we can formulate this same issue in Deleuzian terms by describing the 
reciprocity of the problem and the solution. Bergson describes this reduction of distance in terms of 
the way an imminent danger becomes increasingly urgent for an organism or the way a promise 
between object and subject becomes immediate.
362
 This is precisely the type of situation Deleuze 
refers to when he describes “the organism as a biological Idea”363 insofar as it “is nothing if not the 
solution to a problem.”364  
Affection in this case occurs at the horizon—affection is the threshold—where the diversity 
of sensory data is reduced to the degree that perception is formulated as a problem that is relevant to 
the body, and the body is the expression of a solution as an action. Of course, insofar as the action-
image and the perception-image it transforms are both actual, the continuity of the movement-
image does not move from one term to another. In this sense, the objects of perception are not the 
problem: the problem is formulated and expressed virtually as the object enters into a relationship 
with a special image. The actions my body expresses can resemble the actions of the object; 
however neither can resemble the problem that is formulated by the relationship between the object 
and my body. There is thus an intensive transformation in the interval between perception and 
action such that the transformation of the flow of moving-matter corresponds to a transformation of 
power. The last section of this chapter will explore how affection functions as a doubly expressive 
process that is common to both problem and solution.  
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Affection and the Reciprocal Presupposition of Individuals and the Whole. 
The deeper connection between the ontology developed in the Cinema books and Deleuze’s 
early work can be seen in his description of the affection-image in terms of intensive series and 
individuation.
365
 The interrelationship between intensive series and individuating events is first 
elaborated in Expressionism where Deleuze presents Spinoza’s individual as the actualisation of a 
degree of power.
366
 In this analysis, Deleuze responds to the problem of internal difference that he 
first formulated in his 1956 essay on Bergson.
367
 This problem
 drives Deleuze’s interpretation of the 
reciprocity of substance and modes, of the whole and its expression in individuating events, and it 
returns in Cinema 1’s description of the affection-image. For Deleuze the affection-image is 
synonymous with the close-up and the close-up is synonymous with the face. It would be a mistake 
to interpret ‘the face’ in human, or even subjective, terms, however. For Deleuze, the face or the 
close-up is a bi-polar process of “faceification.”368 On the one hand, the face is, as Deleuze puts it, a 
sacrifice of the centre’s movement. That is, the centre, or some facet of it, becomes immobile and 
instead functions as a unified, receptive surface on which the perception-image is etched. Deleuze 
calls this a “receptive plate of inscription.”369 In a phrase that recalls the first synthesis of time’s 
anticipatory contraction of the past, this first pole is also called a site of “impassive suspense.”370 
The affection-image also has a second pole: the constitution of an intensive series or “a pure Power 
... which carries us from one quality to another.”371 This is why Deleuze says that “[t]here is no 
close-up of the face. The close-up is the face, but the face precisely in so far as it has destroyed its 
triple [individuating, socialising and communicating] function—a nudity of the face much greater 
than that of the body, an inhumanity much greater than that of animals.”372  
While there seems to be a striking similarity between the way attribution works and the way 
affection works, affection does not mediate the perception/action dynamic in the way that 
attribution mediates the dynamic between substance and modes. Difference and Repetition’s 
criticism of Spinoza would seem to amount to the discovery of a vertical organisation of substance 
and modes—where modes turn on an already given identity that is mediated by the doubly 
expressive operations of attribution. However, while affection has a similar, doubly expressive 
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operation that relates the virtual whole to actual entities, it does so by flattening the relationship 
such that there is a horizontal, reciprocal relationship between the whole and particulars. It is just 
this double expressivity Deleuze refers to he when sets up a distinction between “pure singular 
qualities or potentialities - as it were, pure ‘possibles’ ... [and] the state of things, which are, as it 
were, [the] causes [of these singularities].”373 And yet, in reference to Béla Balázs, Deleuze still 
affirms a Humean scepticism about causation: “however much the precipice may be the cause of 
vertigo, it does not explain the expression it produces on a face.”374 That is, however much the two 
poles of the face reciprocally determine each other, their relationship is not causal: “the precipice 
above which someone leans perhaps explains his expression of fright, but it does not create it.”375  
 This conception of the affection-image as bi-polar enables Deleuze to convert the double 
expressivity of attribution into a doubly-expressive operation of affection. The description of 
affection as bi-polar is problematic, however, because it too often invokes the idea of a spectrum 
along which one moves; in this case the idea would be of a spectrum with affection alternating 
between the expression of a power for itself and a state of affairs in which the power is actualised. 
Instead, affection is bi-polar insofar as it is an image with two distinct but interrelated senses. My 
body, insofar as it is the special image that is constituted as an interval between perception and 
action, is “filled out and extended”376 by an affection-image that is simultaneously actual—that is, it 
is the actual state of my body to the extent that it is entangled in an affective encounter—and it is 
virtual—it is the sense of this state of affection, abstracted from the actual encounter and expressed 
for itself. Following on from his Humean scepticism, these two senses of the affect, the two poles of 
the affection-image, obviously do not cause one another. To say they do not cause each other does 
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not, however, necessitate claiming that these two poles do not interact. Even though it is virtual, the 
expression of the affect as such is still the sense of the encounter and describes the encounter as an 
actual occurrence, and thus the virtual pole of the affect is determined by the actual. Similarly, the 
actual pole of the affect is determined by the virtual to the extent that the interval, my body, is not 
merely the site of passive reaction and, as such, its eventual action is determined by the degree to 
which its power makes—that is, produces—sense. 
With this in mind, we can see why Deleuze describes the two poles of the affection-image as 
the two sides of the expression of a “power-quality.”377 It is not merely the case that the interval is 
occupied by an image which is alternatively an immobile receptive plate and then the expression of 
a power in its passage from one quality to another. There is one side of the affection-image that is a 
receptive facet of the centre but its relationship with the production of an action is a complex, 
double expression. The close-up abstracts its object, the affect, “from all spatio-temporal co-
ordinates, [and] raises it to the state of Entity”378 and, by virtue of this abstraction, the affect is also 
the generation of an actual state of things. When the affect is taken as an entity torn from spatio-
temporal coordinates, the “affection-image is power or quality considered for themselves, as 
expresseds” and, although its existence is not independent of the state of affairs in which it is 
actualised, “it is completely distinct from it.”379 It is in this sense that the second pole of the 
affection-image is expressed as “ideal singularities and their virtual conjunction.”380 In other words, 
the virtual side of the affect circulates within a multiplicity of ideal events that is distinct from the 
actual states of affairs that respond to it. The discussion of the actual side of the affection-image 
takes us into the action-image. The action-image is, after all, the actualisation of a power-quality “in 
an individuated state of things and in the corresponding real connections (with a particular space-
time, hic et nunc, particular characters, particular roles, particular objects).”381 Insofar as it is the 
expression of a power-quality for itself, abstracted from an actual, individual state of things, it is 
clear how affection is doubly expressive. Expressed for themselves, affects are “ideal singularities”; 
that is, the singularity of problems distinct from the actualities that express their solution and these 
ideal singularities constitute the whole.  
When Deleuze outlines the interrelationship between two forms of pluralism that 
characterises the constitution of monism in Bergsonism,
382
 he anticipates how the Cinema project 
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will reformulate the third thesis on movement by confronting the relationship between the infinity 
of actual entities and the virtual whole onto which the entities open. An important consequence of 
talking in terms of images is that Deleuze is finally able to concretely describe actual beings as 
points within a continuous becoming. Thus, it is hardly surprising that in Cinema 1’s elaboration of 
Bergson’s critique of movement, Deleuze describes “movement [as having] two facets … it is the 
relationship between parts and it is the state of the whole.”383 What is telling in this passage is the 
appearance of affection in the original: “il est rapport entre parties, et il est affection du tout.”384 In 
his reading of Spinoza, Deleuze describes affection as “a state of the affected body that implies the 
presence of the affecting body.”385. We can distinguish between three senses of affection in 
Spinoza: modes are the affections of substance; affections are what happens to a mode; and, finally, 
affections are “transitions … or variations of perfection,”386 that is, actual changes in a mode. These 
affections are just what Deleuze calls images; “images are the corporeal affections themselves, the 
traces of an external body on our body.”387 When we return to a basic point of Deleuze’s—that 
“Movement is a translation in space [and that] each time there is a translation of parts in space, 
there is also a qualitative change in a whole”388—we see an emphasis on the relationship between 
the parts and the whole. Affection does a double job; on the one hand, it is the interaction between 
actual bodies (the traces of an external body on my own), and, on the other, it is the participation of 
the actual bodies in the whole they modify (the modification of substance as it moves to a different 
degree of perfection). From Bergsonism, through his work on Spinoza, and into the first volume on 
cinema, Deleuze retains a strikingly consistent conception of part/whole relations insofar as actual 
beings undergo constant reorganisation relative to each other and simultaneously express the 
transformation of the whole. 
  
Conclusion. 
It is the process of affection that drives the dialectic at the heart of Deleuze’s ontology. On 
the one hand, affection is the immobilisation of some facet of my body such that this surface 
functions as the point of communication between my body and the “external” world. That is, 
affection is also the process of enfolding these external relations into the composition of my body. 
On the other hand, affection also refers to the abstraction of this relation. That is, affection separates 
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the relation from its terms and context, and expresses it for itself, as an intensive degree. What is the 
object of this expression? What is it a degree of? It is a degree of the constitution of a whole, of a 
multiplicity—a system that is numerically unique but qualitatively heterogeneous and is constituted 
as a whole of relations. Insofar as the sense of these expressions—i.e., what they express of their 
object—is a degree of power, the whole thus constituted, turns around actual lives. In other words, 
the whole is constituted through the expression of power, but that power is always the power that 
subsists in the differentiation of the movement-image into its avatars. To the extent that this 
differentiation of the movement-image is an ontological formulation of a discussion that concerns 
actual beings, the transformation of power, and modes of life, it is one side of a discussion that is 
ethological. This means that, correspondent to this chapter’s ontological formulation, the 
philosophy of the Cinema books can also be rendered as an ethical discussion that proceeds in terms 
of the bodies that are constituted as centres of indetermination between the formulation of the 
perception-image as a problem and the expression of the action-image as the actualisation of a 
solution. Indeed, in order to understand the significance of their articulation of Deleuze’s ontology 
to this thesis’ argument that an individual’s power is transformed by her experience of her 
wounds—the ruptures in her embodiment—we must engage with this ethical rendering of the 
Cinema books’ ontology. 
Elizabeth Grosz argues that Bergson’s attitude to ethics and the sense in which humans are 
constituted by their freedom changes across his project: “In his later works, Bergson focuses less on 
freedom as the exclusive attribute of a self, concentrated on only the one, conscious side of the 
distinction between the organic and the inorganic, as he did in his earlier Time and Free Will, and 
more on the relations between the organic and the inorganic, the internal constitution of freedom 
through its encounters with the resistance of matter.”389 This is to say that Bergson ultimately 
affirms a freedom that is not a predicate of a self—in the sense of a free agent—but is located in 
actions that relate or respond to a material environment. Deleuze adapts this theme in Bergsonism, 
when he identifies freedom with the constitution of problems. Deleuze works to shift the discussion 
of freedom away from aspiring to conditions in which an agent would be freed to act more 
voluntarily, more wilfully and characterises it as the degree to which an individual participates in, 
as Paul Patton explains, “the critical points at which some state or condition of things passes over 
into a different state or condition.”390 The sense in which we might meaningfully describe an 
individual as free depends on how she makes sense of her embeddedness in the relationality of the 
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world—does she affirm this embeddedness, or does she resent it? —and the degree to which this 
sense leads her to participate in the events that transform the whole of which she is a part. This is 
why Deleuze argues that “[t]rue freedom lies in a power to decide, to constitute problems 
themselves.”391 The “power to decide” is not the appearance of a wilful agency that makes 
conscious decisions; it is the selection and affirmation of the elements that constitute problems. In 
the next and final chapter, I will argue that the Cinema project presents a conceptualisation of how 
the conditions of freedom, that is, the conditions of participating more actively in the constitution of 
problems, are immanent to experience. This chapter has argued for an interpretation of the 
Bergsonism of the Cinema books as a crystallization of Deleuze’s ontology as one in which actual 
lives constitute the whole of which they are a part by virtue of the degree of power that subsists in 
their affective relations. Following on from this, chapter five will argue that a sophisticated 
conception of how individuals participate in the determination of problems illuminates the sense in 
which the conditions for the enhancement of their power are immanent to experience and affective 
relations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
On Cinematic Subjects, Experimentation Beyond the Action-Image  
and an ‘Art of Living.’ 
 
Discussions of the ethical in Deleuze often centre on issues of thinking differently, of 
transforming modes of life and enhancing power.  Indeed, Deleuze himself tends to describe ethics 
as a matter of formulating new problems. In Bergsonism, Deleuze identified the constitution of 
problems with a power to decide,
392
 and he returns to this theme in Cinema: “[i]t is characteristic of 
the problem that it is inseparable from a choice … when the problem concerns existential 
determinations … we see clearly that choice is increasingly identified with living thought, and with 
an unfathomable decision. Choice no longer concerns a particular term, but the mode of existence 
of the one who chooses.”393 To make his point, Deleuze refers to Blaise Pascal’s infamous wager 
concerning the existence of God. He argues that the significance of the wager is not its terms—
belief, non-belief, or abstention—but the mode of life entailed by the affirmation of particular 
terms: “[i]t is as if there was a choice of choice or non-choice. If I am conscious of choice, there are 
therefore already choices that I can no longer make, and modes of existence that I can no longer 
follow - all those I followed on the condition of persuading myself that ‘there was no choice.’”394 In 
other words, the question is not the terms of the wager, nor which one you ought to affirm, but that 
each term implies a mode of life that follows from the sense I make of the possibility of choosing. 
As Deleuze says, “I choose to choose, and by that I exclude all choice made on the mode of not 
having the choice.”395 The significance of Deleuze’s argument is that the ethical problem does not 
lie with the choice one makes between the terms of the wager, but the mode of life that follows 
from how one relates to, that is, makes sense of, the power to choose. In anticipation of discussions 
in this chapter, we can phrase this differently. The ethical situation is not about the elements of a 
particular problem, as though these elements exist outside their formulation in a problem; rather, the 
ethical is about the way those elements are framed such that they formulate a problem that will 
generate a particular solution.  
                                                          
392
 Ibid., 15. 
393
 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 176--177. 
394
 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 114.  
395
 Ibid., 114. For discussions of the ethical significance of Deleuze’s interpretation of the wager, see Bogue’s and 
Rodowick’s respective contributions to Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy. 
116 
 
This conception of the relationship between choice and the formulation of problems makes 
sense in light of the Bergsonian conception of the continuity of perception and action discussed in 
the last chapter. The objects of a perception, that is, the elements of a problem posed to my body, 
are only quantitatively distinct from “nascent” action, the actions that my body will perform in 
response to the perception.
396
 In other words, the elements of a problem—the objects of perception, 
or the terms of a choice— are significant because of the actions and behaviour that follow from a 
particular framing of them. That Deleuze aligns the significance of this with situations which 
concern the existential determination of problems makes it clear that this is not merely ontological, 
but also ethical; that is, ethological. Accordingly, the ethical orientation of Deleuze’s analyses in 
the Cinema project can be expressed in terms of a properly ethological question: under what 
conditions does an individual participate in the constitution of problems, and thus the genesis of 
modes of life, that go beyond the clichés of the action-image? These clichés, as I will argue in this 
chapter, concern the determination of a problem according to a character’s belief that her actions 
have the power to disclose the truth of, or modify, a situation.  
In keeping with Deleuze’s insistence on immanence, the conditions under which an 
individual participates differently in the constitution of problems are immanent to experience as 
such. In other words, if there is to be any modification in how an individual participates in the 
determination of problems, the conditions of this modification must follow from the affective 
relations implied by her existence. This immanence of the conditions of change is vital to Deleuze’s 
steering ethics away from a conception of individuals who behave voluntarily. To the extent that the 
subjects of the cinematic universe are produced as expressions of the becoming of the whole, 
modifications to a subject’s power—even modifications that enhance her power—cannot come 
from the subjects’ spontaneous transcendence of the relational plane, the plane of immanence, of 
which she is a product. Modifications to her power must proceed from her relational embeddedness. 
As such, this chapter focuses primarily on the place and transformation of perception in the 
constitution of cinematic subjects. Because it concerns the determination of a problem through the 
differentiation of the movement-image, this attention to the subject as the product of perception will 
illuminate the sense in which the action-image is the actual expression, that is, the actual side, of the 
constitution of a problem as the synthesis of memories, expectations and multiple points of view on 
a set of relations. This entails a radical transformation in our conception of subjects and so we will 
start this discussion with a brief look at Deleuze’s ambivalence to phenomenology in order to 
maintain the anti-humanist context that we set out for Deleuze’s project at the very beginning of this 
thesis. By maintaining this context we will see how Deleuze’s ethics is able to develop a conception 
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of wounds, that is, ruptures in the laws which sustain the continuity between perception and action, 
that engenders experimentation with modes of life freed from the clichés of the action-image.  
 
Resisting the Privilege of a Human Point of View: Bergsonism Contra Phenomenology. 
Deleuze claims that the Bergsonism of the Cinema books is “the opposite of what 
phenomenology put forward.”397 Deleuze opposes the phenomenological presupposition of 
subjectivity as a point of anchorage for the deduction of empirical phenomena. He argues that, 
because consciousness is immanent to the processes and structures that determine experience, 
consciousness is an insufficient starting point for undertaking the challenge that Husserl’s reduction 
hoped to face.
398
 He turns to the conception of an anonymous viewpoint as a way of responding to 
phenomenology’s focus on the content of a first-person perspective.399 Deleuze takes 
phenomenology to task for its reinstatement of a dative to whom the plane of immanence is 
referred. This challenge is critical to an understanding of what Deleuze sets out to achieve in the 
Cinema books’ exploration of a subject’s status as a centre of indetermination. Insofar as a dative is 
a being “to whom things appear,”400 Deleuze’s issue with phenomenology is that, as Lawlor puts it, 
it “relates the plane of immanence back to a subject that constitutes the given.”401 Lawlor’s analysis 
highlights the problem we have continually returned to, the problem that Deleuze describes in 
Empiricism and Subjectivity: 
[w]e embark upon a transcendental critique when, having situated ourselves on a 
methodologically reduced plane that provides an essential certainty—a certainty of essence—we 
ask: how can there be a given, how can something be given to a subject, and how can the subject 
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give something to itself? … The critique is empirical when, having situated ourselves in a purely 
immanent point of view, … we ask: how is the subject constituted in the given?402 
The “methodologically reduced plane” to which Deleuze refers is the transcendental field 
accessed through Husserl’s famous reduction, his bracketing of the contingencies of experience in 
order to deduce the transcendental structures of consciousness.
403
 Deleuze argues that this 
methodology “makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness [and, 
consequently] Immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking 
subject.”404 For Deleuze, this inevitably violates an ontology of immanence insofar as it “discovers 
the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a 
One higher than everything … but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only 
attributed by belonging to a self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself.”405 
In this context it becomes clear why Deleuze outlines the Bergsonism of his Cinema project 
in terms of its opposition to phenomenology. Deleuze argues that the radically decentred 
immanence of Bergson’s ontology challenges phenomenology’s methodological fixation on a 
subjective centre of perception. The crucial passage comes in the course of his discussion of 
Bergson’s famous antipathy towards cinema—an antipathy grounded in cinema’s apparent 
repetition of the fallacy of movement and perception as composed of poses or frames: 
[Bergson’s ontological] model would be … a state of things which would constantly change, a 
flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor centre of reference would be assignable. On 
the basis of this state of things it would be necessary to show how, at any point, centres can be 
formed which would impose fixed instantaneous views. It would therefore be a question of 
‘deducing’ conscious, natural or cinematographic perception. But the cinema perhaps has a great 
advantage: just because it lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it 
makes would not prevent it from going back up the path that natural perception comes down. 
Instead of going from the acentred state of things to centred perception, it could go back up 
towards the acentred state of things, and get closer to it. Broadly speaking, this would be the 
opposite of what phenomenology put forward.406 
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Deleuze engages with Bergson’s ontology precisely because it enables him to challenge 
phenomenology’s resurrection of the transcendent. As Levi Bryant explains, from the point of view 
of the ontology Deleuze develops, “the human and its relation to the world can no longer be treated 
as a privileged starting point for philosophical investigation. Humans are among beings, rather than 
a privileged point around which being is organized.”407 It is only from within this context that 
Deleuze can approach the Humean problem of the subject’s constitution. For Deleuze, an 
exploration of the constitution of subjectivity cannot hinge on the view of the subject as a dative 
case to whom the plane of immanence is given. Deleuze’s response is, simply, that the installation 
of the subject as a dative, that is, as the indirect object of empirical processes, reduces the plane of 
immanence to its immanence to a subject. To reinstate immanence as immanent only to itself,
408
 
Deleuze builds an ontology in which the subject is understood as an event on the plane of 
immanence: the subject corresponds to a fixed point of view in a universe of flowing movement-
matter. Against the criticism Bergson offers in Creative Evolution, Deleuze argues that cinema does 
not merely reproduce the illusions of natural perception. Cinema, according to Deleuze, presents 
exactly this model of a universe of “flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor centre of 
reference would be assignable.”409  
In order to demonstrate how cinema forms subjects as “centres … which would impose fixed 
instantaneous views,” we must explore how Deleuze conceives the subjects of the cinematic 
universe as immanent to the world they experience and condition. Gregory Flaxman suggests this 
approach when, in his contribution to the seminal collection The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and 
the Philosophy of Cinema, he writes that  
the subject is the extraction, the process of drawing order from [the universe as an aggregate of 
images] as if through a sieve … this implies a “cooling down” of the universe, for the world of 
images has begun to settle into a semblance of “bodies” and “rigid lines.” … In a sense, the 
subject is a point at which the universe sees itself: the subject synthesizes the world from a 
particular point of view, but the subject also derives from that world, each perspective 
constituting a self-synthesis.410  
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Subjectivity is, then, the product of the synthesis which constitutes a point of view immanent 
to the processes of the flow of movement-matter. This requires an exploration of how Deleuze’s 
interpretation of cinematic techniques for composing and associating images entails the emergence 
of fixed, instantaneous points of view from a synthesis of differing points of view. In particular, this 
entails two questions; first, how does Deleuze understand an image as being composed—framed—
such that it has specific relevance to the point of view from which it is encountered? Second, how 
do different perspectives immanent to the same point of view constitute a form of subjectivity 
through their synthesis? These questions are closely related  to what Deleuze calls cinema’s “great 
advantage.” For Deleuze, cinema circumvents phenomenology’s privileging of the subject as a 
“centre of anchorage” in the relationality of the actual world. The cinematic composition of centres, 
intervals and sections of movement does not present the problems of natural perception which join, 
according to Bergson, “several clear images that represent states and which serve to distinguish all 
becomings from each other.”411 The great advantage of cinema is, for Deleuze, that it bypasses the 
illusion that movement is composed of immobilities because its specific techniques compose an 
acentred universe. The immobile elements of cinema, the sequence of frames that runs through the 
projector, implies a subsistent whole which associates the immobile elements and ensures that their 
closure—their apparent independence from each other—is only ever partial; the sequence of which 
they are parts always gestures towards the law of association—the subsistence of problems—that 
assembles them as this or that sequence. With this in mind, we will turn in the next section to 
Deleuze’s conception of the association and synthesis of images and how this association 
constitutes the “immobilities,” that is, the centres, of this universe of flowing movement-matter.  
 
Bi-Polar Perceptions: Analysis, Description & Semisubjectivity. 
For Deleuze, perception is bi-polar. That is, any particular perception consists of two 
elements or senses: it is double. The subject—the subject of an action, the being of the interval—is 
a process in which the two poles of perception are conjoined in the determination of a problem. To 
develop a vocabulary for this discussion, Deleuze appropriates the concept of a semisubjective (or 
“associated”) image from Jean Mitry’s classic The Aesthetics and Psychology of the Cinema. The 
semisubjective image is a total image, not in the sense that it provides the most total view of a 
scene—an objective or omniscient view—but instead in the sense that it produces the most meaning 
or, rather, the most total association between the viewer and the scene. This species of image 
emerges from the tension between two poles of the perception-image: an analytic image and a 
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descriptive image. These images would typically be called subjective and objective images, 
respectively; however, since Deleuze’s concerns are focussed on what it would mean for an image 
to be either subjective or objective, we need to be careful with such adjectives. Indeed, Mitry 
ultimately reserves the term “subjective” for images which create memory relationships, since an 
image of this type necessarily relates us to the experiences of a filmic subject.
412
 Since the 
subjectivity of this image is “merely visual” he prefers to employ the term “analytic.” An analytic 
image is so named because it is always in place to show us what a specific character sees and to 
analyse the set of relations from that character’s point of view. Opposed to this is a descriptive 
image through which we see the scene from outside and are privy to a point of view which has no 
particular investment in the set of relations it describes. Thus, “analytic” and “descriptive” denote 
respectively an analysis of the scene from a particular, internal point of view and a description of 
the scene from a general, external point of view. Following Mitry’s lead, we will use “analytic” and 
“descriptive” because they allow us to reserve the terms subjective and objective for those instances 
when we are discussing relations to or of subjects or objects. Compared to subjective and objective, 
analytic and descriptive are more accurate adjectives for the poles of perception. The former pair, 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective,’ always risk relating a perception to a subject who perceives or an 
object that is perceived. ‘Analytic’ and ‘descriptive,’ however, connote the role of perception in 
constituting its subject and object insofar as these adjectives describe the processes that occur at 
each pole. That is, they tell us whether a particular pole of perception presents us with a descriptive 
or an analytic point of view.  
According to Mitry, neither the analytic nor descriptive image provides total or exhaustive 
views on a scene; it is the semisubjective image which is a total image. Without this semisubjective 
image, film could not develop its stories and narratives because it would be limited to the 
opposition or juxtaposition of description and analysis. A dialectical juxtaposition of analysis and 
description presents an either/or proposition—a shot would be either analysis or description—and 
would thus preclude the possibility of seeing the reaction of a character to a situation at the same 
time as seeing the situation from the point of view of the character. And thus it needs a special kind 
of image to associate analysis and description. As Mitry puts it, in such a situation, “[i]t is not 
possible to see both object and subject simultaneously.”413 Limited to description and analysis, film 
cannot present a character’s reaction to an analysis of a description. Mitry finds a solution to this 
dilemma in the semisubjective, a species of image exemplified in a scene from William Wyler’s 
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Jezebel (1938). The scene is of a central character, Julie, in a cleaning frenzy and the camera, 
framing her in midshot, follows her as she works:  
in order to ‘experience’ the feelings of a given character, all the audience had to do is be with 
the character, alongside him. … Thus instead of the camera taking the place of the character, 
there were images framing the hero, either from head to toe or from the waist up, following him 
as he moved, seeing with him and at the same time as him. The image remained descriptive but 
shared in the character’s points of view. … Thus, as we see her acting, we feel as though we are 
acting with her; moreover, the agitation of the camera movements, prompted by the nervousness 
of her movements, conveys her agitation to the audience, which thereby experiences the same 
feelings of impatience and irritation and shares in her emotion.414  
The semisubjective is, for Mitry, a species of image that goes further than a typically 
subjective or analytic image ever could. He argues that a shot which is ostensibly from a first person 
point of view does not itself carry the information necessary to relate its content to any particular 
character and, as such, a subjective image is so only insofar as the image is referred to a character 
already established in the film. In this way, a subjective image is only “a complement to another 
image … [and] has meaning only insofar as it relates to a character already objectively described 
and placed.”415 The semisubjective image is therefore an image which conveys to the audience the 
character’s various affective states and engagements—that is, an analysis of a set of relations from 
the character’s point of view—while simultaneously tracking, or, describing, the relative position 
and movements of the character within the relevant set.  
There is, however, an important difference between Deleuze’s use of this concept and Mitry’s 
presentation. Mitry is interested in the semisubjective image because of its capacity to create an 
affinity between the character and the viewer whereas Deleuze, true to his Bergsonian heritage, is 
interested in the synthesis of analytic and descriptive points of view in the interval between 
perception and action. For Mitry, the affinity created between a character and an audience through 
the semisubjective image allows the audience to “project onto [the character] feelings which might 
have been ours in similar circumstances.”416 Deleuze, meanwhile, is concerned with cinema’s, or 
more precisely, the camera’s, capacity to show us an internal point of view on the set without that 
point of view belonging to a specific character, even though it tracks the character’s movements 
within the set. Even with this difference in mind, Deleuze’s use of Mitry’s concept bears an 
important mark of its origin in the latter’s work. For Mitry, the purpose of the semisubjective image 
is not to represent the psychological reality of the character, but to give “the audience … the 
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impression that it is seeing or feeling ‘as though’ it were the character in the drama.”417 While Mitry 
presents this image as facilitating a rapport between characters and viewers, Deleuze’s attention is 
focussed elsewhere; for him, the semisubjective image is the synthesis of two points of view that 
are both immanent to the field of relations framed by the screen. The semisubjective image is not its 
content as such; it is, rather, the cinematic mode constituted in the syntheses of ostensibly distinct 
points of view. Deleuze sets out from this apparent distinction between two points of view and sets 
up provisional definitions of subjective/analytic images—“the thing seen by someone ‘qualified’, or 
the set as it is seen by someone who forms part of that set”—and objective/descriptive images—
“the thing or the set … seen from the view point of someone who remains external to that set.”418 
Deleuze stretches these definitions and argues for a situation in cinema wherein the distinction 
between descriptive and analytic is overcome in favour of “a pure Form which sets itself up as an 
autonomous vision of the content.” It is a situation in which “we are caught in a correlation between 
a perception-image and a camera-consciousness which transforms it.”419 
To explain this correlation, Deleuze turns to Albert Lewin’s Pandora and the Flying 
Dutchman (1951). The film’s establishing shot exemplifies an objective shot: a wide shot of groups 
of people running along a beach towards a fishing boat that has run aground. But the camera 
withdraws and progressively expands the shot of the beach to take in a telescope on the balcony of a 
nearby house and then a character watching the beach scene through the telescope. Even though this 
shot never offers an analytic point of view—that is, we never see from the point of view of someone 
within the set—it is not a strictly objective point of view either because the inclusion of the 
character in the shot gives the scene significance to the viewer, especially when the camera follows 
the character inside her house where she discusses the fishing boat with her uncle. Deleuze, too, is 
interested in the determination of significance; however, his interest is not in the significance of the 
scene for a viewer as it was for Mitry. Rather, it is in the relationship between the analysis of the 
scene from the point of view of the character and the point of view of the camera itself; a point of 
view which accompanies the character but is not attributable to it.  
Because this situation has no analogue in natural perception, Deleuze turns to linguists Pier 
Pasolini and V.N. Vološinov to provide tools for analysis. Vološinov argued for a phenomenon 
called “Reported speech”: “speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time 
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also speech about speech, utterance about utterance.”420 Deleuze focuses here on what he calls an 
assemblage of enunciation: 
there is not a simple combination of two fully-constituted subjects of enunciation, one of 
which would be reporter, the other reported, it is rather a case of an assemblage of enunciation, 
carrying out two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously, one of which constitutes a 
character in the first person, but the other of which is present at his birth and brings him on to the 
scene. There is no mixture or average of two subjects, each belonging to a system, but a 
differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system which is itself heterogeneous.421 
The importance of this phenomenon in language is, Deleuze argues, that “this differentiation 
of the subject” also occurs in thought. He argues that the cogito as “an empirical subject cannot be 
born into the world without simultaneously being reflected in a transcendental subject which thinks 
it and in which it thinks itself.”422 At this point, Deleuze turns to Pasolini who argues for a formal 
common ground between linguistics and cinema. In reading Pasolini, Deleuze contends that the 
significance of free-indirect discourse (Pasolini’s name for reported speech) is that it presents a 
situation in which the 
character acts on the screen, and is assumed to see the world in a certain way. But 
simultaneously the camera sees him, and sees his world, from another point of view which 
thinks, reflects and transforms the view point of the character. … But the camera does not 
simply give us the vision of the character and of his world: it imposes another vision in which 
the first is transformed and reflected.423 
When we first considered the nature of the image in the previous chapter, it turned on a 
distinction between the image as object—a universe in which “all the images vary in relation to one 
another, on all their facets and in all their parts”—and the image as a subjective perception of the 
                                                          
420
 V.N. Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislay Matejka and I. R. Titunik (New York: 
Seminar Pres, 1973), 115. Given Vološinov’s involvement in the Bakhtin Circle—a group of Soviet intellectuals in the 
early 20th century—there have been habits of attributing works published under Vološinov’s name to Mikhail Bakhtin. 
There is some debate around the issue and Deleuze for his part attributes the work to Bakhtin. However, it seems easy 
to account for this discrepancy in Deleuze’s case; the second footnote to chapter five of L’Image-mouvement suggests 
that Deleuze was working from the French text Le marxisme et la philosophie du langage: Essai d’application de la 
méthode sociologique en linguistique—published by Les Éditions de Minuit in 1977. Deleuze, Cinéma 1,  228; Cinema 
1 107. Le marxisme … was primarily attributed to Bakhtin and only parenthetically to Vološinov. 
421
 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 73. Given this turn to Vološinov, it goes without saying that Deleuze’s arguments in this field 
stretch much wider than just Mitry. Besides Mitry, two of his major influences are Vološinov and essays in Pier Paolo 
Pasolini’s Heretical Empiricism, particularly “The Cinema of Poetry.” In this chapter I focus on Mitry for the sake of 
clarifying the image constitutive of cinematic subjectivity; however, this will hopefully not undermine the importance 
of Vološinov on reporting and reported speech, and quasi-direct discourse, and Pasolini on free-indirect discourse. The 
genealogy of Deleuze’s influences on this topic are much more complex than I can present here; see Louis-George 
Schwartz, “Typewriter: Free Indirect Discourse in Deleuze's Cinema,” SubStance 34, no. 3 (2005). 
422
 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 73. 
423
 Ibid., 74. 
125 
 
object, the situation where “the images vary in relation to a central and privileged image.”424 More 
than merely recapitulating Bergson’s concept of the image, however, Deleuze’s conception of 
semisubjective images allows him to emphasise that, far from object and subject being distinct types 
of image, the distinction between the objective and subjective senses of the image provide “a real 
definition of the two poles, or of the double system” of perception.425 This definition of the 
objectivity and subjectivity of the image as poles of perception highlights the possibility of moving 
between the objective and subjective. Deleuze characterises this diffuse form of perception as a 
liquid perception. In this case, perception is, as Bogue puts it, “no longer constrained by bodies”;426 
it is the image “in the process of becoming liquid, which [flows] through or under the frame.”427 In 
this case, then, there are three moments within the perception-image; two—the two poles, objective 
and subjective—which express the composition of specific perceptions, and a third, unique to 
cinema, that presents a third sense of the perception-image, a liquid form which expresses the 
genesis of perception.
428
 In other words, the perception-image is generated as the mixing of the two 
poles but when it is actualised as this or that perception it is expressed as a specific ratio of analysis 
and description.  
To move from this discussion of the bi-polar composition of the perception-image to the 
determination of the perception-image as problematic, we must turn to the discussion of framing 
that Deleuze undertakes early in Cinema 1. ‘Framing’ is a name for the unconscious, or passive, 
processes that make perception possible and it provides the context for Deleuze’s analysis of 
contemplation and its role in the genesis of a uniquely cinematic subjectivity. Contemplation here is 
not a subject’s reflection on an object; it is the passive process by which previous experiences are 
contracted into an anticipation of the future,
429
 and so any discussion of perception necessarily 
presupposes a discussion of framing.
430
 That is, insofar as an image is only an image to the extent 
that it is demarcated from the flux of which it is a part, an image is always framed.  
 
Framing, and the Determination of Problems. 
Framing is the technique by which a body selects out relevant data from the flux of 
movement-matter. As Deleuze puts it, “framing is limitation. But, depending on the concept itself 
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the limits can be conceived in two ways, mathematically or dynamically: either as a preliminary to 
the existence of the bodies whose essence they fix, or going as far as the power of existing bodies 
goes.”431 Framing is a crucial component of the determination of problems because it defines the 
boundaries of the image to which a body responds. But there is also a second reason contemplation 
is significant to Deleuze’s understanding of the determination of problems. The framed image 
comes into contact with an opaque screen.
432
 This is why Bergson, in Matter and Memory, argues 
that the body is not an indifferent recipient of sensation. In other words, the power and capacities of 
a body direct it towards action, and the sensations of memory—that is, the affects  which 
characterise the body’s relationship to the whole—“tend to bring about, within the body, all the 
corresponding sensations.”433 Bergson’s point is that an individual does not merely receive 
information, as though the body has no vested interest in the content and form of the information 
with which it is presented. Rather, the power and capacities of a body contribute significantly to the 
framing of the information it receives. This is why Deleuze calls the body an opaque screen; the 
structure and content of facet of the body which receives information from the world—the screen 
on which the perception-image is reflected—determines the sense in which the perception-image is 
problematic insofar as it frames it. This is the meaning of Bergson’s argument that sensory 
modifications are not the cause of the sensations which affect the body, even though they determine 
the form of the action that follows from the body’s transformations. Just as Deleuze was sceptical 
about the precipice causing the character’s vertigo, Bergson argues that “modifications in the 
centres called sensory … are, then, less the real cause of the sensation than the mark of its power 
and the condition of its efficacy.”434 Contemplation—the contraction of previous experience into an 
anticipation of the future—is vital because it determines the boundaries of the frame. Taken 
together, contemplation and framing determine the extent to which a particular perception 
constitutes a problem for a living image.  
All of this is to say that Deleuze’s conceptualisation of cinematic subjectivity is actually an 
elaboration of the determination of centres of indetermination within a continuum of moving-
matter.
435
 ‘Indetermination’ here describes the centre as a being for whom the response to the 
problem presented by perception is not yet given; as D.N. Rodowick puts it, indetermination “is the 
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range of responses available for selection as the appropriate response or action with respect to 
analysed stimulus or perception.”436 Subjectivity emerges from the interval between stimulus and 
response, between perception and action; however, the interval, the special image, insofar as it is an 
image which can be viewed from the inside, is not merely reactive in the ways sometimes implied 
by the vocabulary of stimulus and response. While it is not the case for every image, perhaps even 
the majority of images, the interval which generates a subject constitutes a rupture in which the 
content of a moving image is constituted as a perception-image. It is framed in particular ways, its 
content is contemplated, apprehended and sifted such that it poses a problem for the being of the 
interval. These operations couple with the synthesis of points of view on the image and constitute a 
subject at the same time as they determine its action.  
To understand the difference between Deleuze’s Bergsonian 
model and a deliberative model of action, we need only turn to the 
famous cone that appears in the third chapter of Matter and 
Memory.
437
 While he never develops the vocabulary in as robust a 
way as Deleuze, Bergson is still concerned with a “conversion from 
the virtual to the actual.”438 Bergson’s discussion centres on “the 
clearly defined form of a bodily attitude” at the point S, and the base 
of the cone, AB, as “the aspect, no less defined, of the thousand individual images into which its 
fragile unity would break up.”439 Simply put, at the base of the cone, AB, is the multiplicity of 
images, memories, sensations, and affects, which together constitute the virtual background which 
determines the problems faced by my body. At the summit, S, is the contraction of these images 
into the determination of an action. Of course, the movement from perception to action, from AB to 
S, is infinitely divisible: A’B’, A’’B’’, etc. The base of this cone, or, rather, its determination, is not 
actual and neither are the slices excerpted from the passage from AB through S. These sections are, 
as Deleuze notes, virtual;
440
 the only element of this image that represents something actual is S, the 
contraction of all images into the determination of an action. This is the crucial distinction between 
Deleuze’s model and a deliberative model of action; a deliberative model of action would want to 
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empower a subject, given at S, to choose between equally viable, equally possible, alternatives 
given at AB.  
In Difference and Repetition’s interpretation of Bergson’s essay “The Possible and the 
Real,” Deleuze repeatedly emphasises that the actual cannot resemble the set of possibilities it 
actualises.
441
 Consequently, the sections AB, A’B’, A’’B’’, etc. do not present as collections of 
possibilities with greater or lesser chance of being realised at S. Instead, these sections are virtual 
multiplicities; assemblages of virtual elements undergoing progressive framings, descriptions and 
analyses en route to the formulation of a problem. Of course, it is not the problem itself which is 
framed at AB, etc.; the elements of the multiplicity are framed and reframed until, at S, they are 
formulated as a problem. This problematic formulation, however, occurs simultaneously with the 
expression of the solution to the problem. In other words, the specific determination of the problem 
and the expression of its solution as “the clearly defined form of a bodily attitude” occur 
simultaneously. This is what Deleuze means when he says that “the virtual must be defined as 
strictly a part of the real object.”442 Deleuze’s model of the constitution of action is distinguished 
from a deliberative model by virtue of the fact that the specific conditions of a specific action are 
determined simultaneously with the expression of the action itself. While the elements of the 
multiplicity are not subordinate to their status as elements of a problem which corresponds to what 
actually occurs, talk of possibilities or options amongst which an agent can choose is nonsensical 
precisely because what is possible, in the sense of a virtual power, is determined at the same time as 
its expression in an actual occurrence.  
Importantly, the sheets of the cone are sheets of the past; that is, of memory.
443
 This is not 
the past of a particular individual but the past in general—the past as the ontological condition for 
the present. When Deleuze discusses this issue in Cinema 2, it echoes a theme that is present 
throughout his œuvre: the production of subjectivity is a process that is internal to time. In this case, 
the constitution of a subject of action at S is internal to time insofar as it is actualisation of the 
organisation of the whole of durée. To the extent that the organisation of the past as such is the 
ontological condition for the passing present, the action which characterises this or that particular 
present is an intrinsic mode of the whole. Importantly, the sense in which the constitution and 
transformation of a subject is internal to time is how Deleuze conceives the passive contraction of 
the past, that is, habit, as a condition for the subject’s action. As such, in the next section we must 
explore the sense in which the dialectic of problems is temporal. The significance of this temporal 
                                                          
441
 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 211-212.  
442
 Ibid., 209. 
443
 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 64. 
129 
 
sense of the dialectic of problems is that, insofar as the particular, actual present is the actual 
expression of the whole of durée, it gives us a more sophisticated view of the reciprocity of the 
individual and the whole of which it is a part. 
 
Memory, Perception, and Temporal Series. 
Against Kant, who argues that time is an ideal category imposed on things by a transcendental 
subjectivity, Deleuze argues that the subject is constituted in time as a function of the whole of 
durée: 
That we are in time looks like a common-place, yet it is the highest paradox. Time is not the 
interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and 
change. … Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. The 
actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we 
experience in time; then time itself, pure virtuality which divides itself in two as affector and 
affected.
444
 
This passage gives us a provisional hypothesis: the Whole is temporal—indeed, it is time 
itself—and the bodies which both constitute and express the Whole are internal to time. As Deleuze 
notes, this whole is virtual, and we are internal to it in the sense that it is the reality of the relations 
that give content to our lives. The final section of this passage, however, illuminates the deceptive 
simplicity of this hypothesis. Deleuze’s claim is that our experience shifts so that a new image—the 
time-image, time itself—becomes the object of experience. This is what he means when he says that 
the actual is objective and that the virtual is subjective; when our experience is directed at our 
affective relations, our being affected correlates with actual objects that do not cause the affects. 
However, as experience undergoes this transition, the object of experience changes, and time 
itself—virtuality or the being of relations—becomes the object of experience, the “affector,” even 
as we continue to be intrinsic expressions of time; therefore, time itself is simultaneously the subject 
of experience, the “affected.” 
What does it mean to say that “[t]ime…is the interiority in which we are”? To answer this 
question we need to elaborate the sense in which the sections of Matter and Memory’s cone are 
temporal, that is, the sense in which they are “sheets of the past.”445 For Deleuze these sheets are 
contracted into an actual present and so, to understand how the past—embodied habits born of 
previous experiences, memories, etc.—are contracted into something actually occurring in the 
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present, we must turn to a model of time that envisions paradoxes of simultaneity as the conditions 
for chronological or serial time. Deleuze provides us with a model of this when he writes:  
[i]t is true that these regions … appear to succeed each other. But they succeed each other only 
from the point of view of former presents which marked the limit of each of them. They coexist, 
in contrast, from the point of view of the actual present which each time represents their 
common limit or the most contracted of them. … These are the paradoxical characteristics of a 
non-chronological time: the pre-existence of a past in general; the coexistence of all the sheets of 
past; and the existence of a most contracted degree.446 
In his reading of Bergson, Deleuze argues that “the ‘present’ that endures divides at each 
‘instant’ into two directions, one oriented and dilated toward the past, the other contracted, 
contracting toward the future.”447 These two hypotheses clearly echo the first two syntheses of time. 
On the one hand, the second synthesis outlined in Difference and Repetition concerns the passive 
synthesis of the whole of the past that has no direct importance to the synthesis of habit; the model 
offered in Cinema 2 is, on the other hand, concerned with a past-oriented dilation of time that 
Deleuze calls memory. Deleuze had discussed Bergson’s concept of memory in Bergsonism and he 
returns to it here to conceptualise the ontological conditions of the passing of the present. Following 
Bergson, these conditions are called memory; however, they must not be confused with 
psychological recollection. In cases when the past is actualised in us, it is actualised as 
recollections; however, the past is not its actualisations. Memory, or the past, for Deleuze treats 
them as synonyms, is the in-itself, “l'en-soi,” of being; it is the ontological condition of our lives.448 
As Deleuze puts it, “[m]emory is not in us; it is we who move in a Being-memory, a world-
memory.”449  
The argument Deleuze presents here is structurally similar to the arguments for the second 
synthesis in Difference and Repetition. As Williams argues, this synthesis is grounded in an effort 
to make sense of why it is that the passing present passes at all.
450
 In order for the present to pass, 
Deleuze argues, it must be grounded in a past that subsists in it. However, this subsistent past is not 
a prior present, it is a form of time that exists for itself and as the condition for the serial time we 
experience. Thus, when Deleuze calls it past, he does not mean it in the same sense that a former 
present is past. On the one hand, it is the past in the sense that it is our relationship to what has 
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been, the potential for our recollection and, therefore, memory. On the other hand, it is the condition 
under which the present passes in order to become this or that particular past. He writes that 
[t]he past is ‘contemporaneous’ with the present that it has been. If the past had to wait in 
order to be no longer, if it was not immediately and now that it had passed, ‘past in general,’ it 
could never become what it is, it would never be that past. If it were not constituted 
immediately, neither could it be reconstituted on the basis of an ulterior present. The past would 
never be constituted if it did not coexist with the present whose past it is.451 
This is why Deleuze says that the present “divides” at each instant. The present is not a 
divisible quantity, it is, rather, an occurrence that is double. On the one hand, it is the actual 
presence of the images with which we engage;
452
 and, on the other hand, it is invested in a 
continually dilating and transforming past in general. In other words, the past in general that 
Deleuze describes is the virtual, expanding history of actual occurrences such that it functions as a 
set of heterogeneous conditions for the actual.  
This leaves us with Deleuze’s other hypothesis; the present is not merely dilated towards the 
past in general, it is also contracted toward the future. This hypothesis bears a marked similarity to 
the first synthesis of time, concerned as it is with habit or the imagination’s passive contraction of 
previous sensations into an anticipation of a future state of affairs. The future towards which the 
present is contracted is, as Williams argues, constituted through anticipation.
453
 That is, the genesis 
of the future is the contraction of past particulars into an anticipation that something will happen. 
However, the constitution of this anticipation is passive and, as such, has no object; being passive 
there is no mind or consciousness which anticipates and so the anticipation has no content to attach 
it to an object. The focus of Deleuze’s second hypothesis is thus the aspect of the living present 
which synthesises or contracts the past into the anticipation that constitutes the future. “An 
activity,” Williams argues, “must synthesise earlier movements and later ones.”454  
Clearly, then, Cinema 2 returns to a model of time that has its origins in Empiricism and 
Subjectivity and appears more or less explicitly in every subsequent work. However, one element 
that initially seems absent from Cinema’s presentation of time is a version of the third synthesis of 
time, the empty form of time that brings the first two syntheses together such that the heterogeneous 
assemblage of series of virtual events determines the actual instantiation of a mode of life. Even 
though Deleuze does not signpost it as such, there is a concept in the Cinema books which does this 
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work. Deleuze talks about the present as the shortest circuit between an actual image and its virtual 
image: “The actual image and its virtual image thus constitute the smallest internal circuit, 
ultimately a peak or point, but a physical point which has distinct elements. … Distinct, but 
indiscernible, such are the actual and the virtual which are in continual exchange .”455  
 By appealing to an illustration that Bergson offers in Matter and Memory, 
Deleuze argues that the actual present is not simply an actual object, action or 
image; it is the minimally contracted circuit between the object and its virtual 
image. In other words, the living present is the locus of two tendencies, past-
oriented dilation and future-oriented contraction.
456
 Consequently, the question of 
the third synthesis of time can be given in cinematic terms: why do the circuits of the actual image 
and its virtual image expand and contract? Deleuze’s claim is that it is a sensory-motor schema that 
is the affective motor of the contractions and dilations of these circuits between an actual image and 
its virtual image. In other words, the sensory-motor schema is the motor by which particular signs 
differentiate and specify the movement-image as this or that particular sequence of perceptions, 
affections and actions. This is not to suggest that Cinema presents a model of time with a repetition 
of the first two syntheses and the sensory-motor schema as a replacement for the complexity of the 
third synthesis. Rather, this Bergsonian concept allows Deleuze to emphasise the role played by 
sensory-motor linkages and interactions in synthesising the two tendencies of the living present 
such that something actually occurs.
457
 As such, in classical cinema’s treatment of the movement-
image, montage entails action. The sensory-motor schema is not a prescriptive rule for how the 
movement-image is to be differentiated into the coupling of perception and action; it is, rather, a set 
of conditions that must be met in order for the double expressivity of affection to connect a 
perception with an action. 
Deleuze does not say a lot about the sensory-motor schema in itself; in fact, he devotes more 
space to its breakdown, and I will discuss this in the final section of this chapter. For now, however, 
there are still inferences to be made once we treat it as the condition of the immanent logics that 
determine an action on the basis of the relationship between perception, memory and affection. In 
Cinema 2, Deleuze couples his broader discussion of semiotics with a critique of the standard view 
that film is primarily a narrative medium, and, on the back of his conception of semiotics as the 
system of signs which associate types of image, Deleuze describes montage as the condition which 
determines narrative: 
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narration is only a consequence of the visible images themselves and their direct combinations 
- it is never a given. So-called classical narration derives directly from the organic composition 
of movement-images [montage], or from their specification as perception-images, affection-
images and action-images, according to the laws of a sensory-motor schema. … Narration is 
never an evident [apparent] given of images, or the effect of a structure which underlies them; it 
is a consequence of the visible [apparent] images themselves, of the perceptible images in 
themselves, as they are initially defined for themselves.
458
 
Before it is anything else, the universe is, for Deleuze, the composition and arrangement of 
movement-images.
459
 And so, when he claims that Matter and Memory’s presentation of the 
universe as an assemblage of images is a description of the universe as a “cinema in itself,” Deleuze 
names this assemblage montage. Narration, the narrative sequence of events, is then a consequence 
of montage because it is only the surface effect of images being cut together and assembled 
according to a logic that is not grounded in the film’s narrative. Accordingly, Deleuze argues that 
classical cinema is concerned with sensory-motor situations. Action-images have two possible 
concerns; on the one hand, a situation is either deduced or disclosed through an action or, on the 
other hand, a situation is transformed through an action.
460
 In any case, all of these concerns involve 
the passive retention and contraction of past particulars into future-oriented anticipations; that is, the 
generation of the action-image always entails contemplation. Thus, Deleuze argues, “[t]he action-
image … was inseparable from acts of comprehension through which the hero evaluated what was 
given in the problem or situation, or from acts of inference by which he guessed what was not 
given.”461 In this context, Deleuze borrows a phrase from Spinoza, spiritual automaton, to, as 
Bogue puts it, “stress the involuntary nature of thought’s response to the moving image.”462 As 
Deleuze argues, “[a]utomatic movement gives rise to a spiritual automaton in us, which reacts in 
turn on movement. The spiritual automaton … designates … the circuit into which [thoughts] enter 
with the movement-image, the shared power of what forces thinking and what thinks under the 
shock.”463 Deleuze’s point is that thought is as determined as action. Action, insofar as it develops 
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according to a sensory-motor schema, is determined by how a character makes sense of the situation 
in which she finds herself. That is, action is determined according to the way that elements of the 
past—recollections, habits, the portion of history and memory accessible to the character—interact 
with new information such that the movement-image is specified as a perception or a problem: “the 
cinema of action depicts sensory-motor situations: there are characters, in a certain situation, who 
act … according to how they perceive the situation. Actions are linked to perceptions and 
perceptions develop into actions.”464  
Serial or chronological time is thus an expression of a collection of virtual elements 
assembled and arranged according to a logic whose specific content is determined immanently to its 
actual expression. Deleuze’s use of cinema’s vocabulary makes it clear which element is 
epiphenomenal. The flux of movement matter is differentiated relative to my body, a centre of 
indetermination, such that part of it corresponds to a determined problem, and the remainder passes 
by unattended. According to an immanent logic—the laws of a sensory-motor schema—this virtual 
problem corresponds to the determination of an action-image. This process, the differentiation of 
the movement-image into its avatars, and the assemblage into this or that particular assemblage, is 
what Deleuze calls montage. The superficial expression, the narrative, the sequence or chronology 
of occurrences, is epiphenomenal in the most literal sense of being a by-product of montage. 
However, to understand the means and consequences of the transition from a perception of objects 
to a direct experience of time, we need to understand how the movement-image is differentiated 
relative to my body and for that we must turn to Deleuze’s semiotics. 
 
Signs and the Differentiation of the Image. 
As opposed to interpretative methods which treat film as a symbolic language, the semiotics 
of Cinema is concerned with the relations between the elements that compose images; as Deleuze 
says, “the various types of image don't already exist, they have to be created. A flat image or, 
conversely, depth of field, always has to be created or re-created … all images combine the same 
elements, the same signs, differently.”465 However, this creation of images through the relations 
amongst signs is not a creation ex nihilo. In Cinema 2, Deleuze argues that, insofar as distinct types 
of image appear when the movement-image is referred to an interval, the components of the 
movement-image together form a “plastic mass … [that] is formed semiotically, aesthetically and 
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pragmatically.”466 This plastic mass undergoes a constant process of specification and 
differenciation. From this point of view there is a “signaletic material”467—an entire ecology of 
signs, of “modulation features”—which, relative to an interval, differentiates and specifies the 
movement-image as a perception, an affection, an action, etc. In this sense, signs are the 
compositional elements of the image.
468
  
However, signs do not merely compose and differentiate images; they also facilitate their 
relations. This is why Deleuze at first offers a sympathetic presentation of C.S. Peirce’s 
understanding of the sign; on Deleuze’s account, signs, for Peirce, “make relations efficient.”469 
According to Bogue, signs generate this efficiency insofar as they make possible associations 
between images.
470
 However, Deleuze ultimately criticises Peirce for subordinating images to their 
linguistic sense insofar as this efficiency is grounded in knowledge; that is, the referential function 
through which signs associate images is essentially cognitive. For Deleuze, this means that Peirce 
occasionally finds “himself as much a linguist as the semiologists … [insofar as] he would have 
given up trying to make semiotics a ‘descriptive science of reality’ (logic).”471 Instead, Deleuze 
defines the sign as “a particular image that refers to a type of image, whether from the point of view 
of its bipolar composition, or from the point of view of its genesis.”472 Importantly, then, the 
legibility and eventual problematic structure of images are not issues of interpreting semiological 
references; Deleuze’s semiotics treats signs as the objects of affective encounters. It is in this sense 
that John Mullarky argues that “this ‘signaletic’ material has direct, sensory affects on the brain, not 
the symbolic imagination.”473 This is why Deleuze argues that “[s]omething in the world forces us 
to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. … It is not 
a quality but a sign.”474  
Cinema’s semiotics is significant because it foregrounds the importance of contemplation. 
As Williams argues, “even in activity the present is contemplation, that is, passive absorption and 
transformation of retained particulars beyond the set considered in an action.”475 Crucial to 
Deleuze’s ontology here is a claim that any action will exhibit various general and particular 
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selections and these selections presuppose the continuum of moving matter from which they are 
drawn. This, Williams argues, leads to the argument that conscious action is grounded in passive, 
unconscious processes of retention and expectation.
476
 In this sense, the semiotics described by 
Cinema sets out the role of understanding, of the agent’s making sense of its milieu,477 in the 
differentiation of images and the determination of problems. This issue takes us straight to the 
significance of the philosophy of time as Deleuze presents it in Cinema 2, which exhibits the same 
concern with the role of different/ciation in the determination and actualisation of time as a series of 
repetitions as Deleuze’s encounter with Bergson in the Sixties. However, in Cinema 2, Deleuze 
foregrounds the ethological sense of his philosophy of time by emphasising that the past is the 
virtual subsistence of memory and that the present is the world which gives content to conscious 
experience. The processes by which the sensory-motor schema determines expansions and 
contractions in the circuit between an actual image and its virtual image are essentially semiotic. 
We have discussed the sensory-motor schema, or more accurately, its clichés, as habit, that is the 
contemplative process which grounds the determination of action in the contraction of the whole of 
the past. However, the issue that concerns this thesis, the issue that I contend is ethologically 
significant, is the sense in which the failure of the sensory-motor schema is the derailing of this 
habit, the shattering of its efficacy, insofar as new actions, ones not informed by clichés, become 
possible. As such, we must turn to an exploration of the sense in which the failure of the sensory-
motor schema is also semiotic. 
 
On the Failure of the Sensory-Motor Schema and an Art of Living. 
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Post-war cinema, Deleuze argues, entails a transition from affects to time as the object of 
experience. In Cinema, Deleuze is interested in sensible experiences; that is, experiences which 
have as their object the ways in which an external body interacts affectively with my own. Deleuze 
is interested in the way that, in cinema’s post-war transition, there are particular types of sensible 
experiences that are too great for habit to synthesise into a coherent idea. When this occurs, 
imagination, the faculty in which these syntheses occur, is taken to its limit by an experience which 
Deleuze, following Kant, calls sublime. In the experience of the sublime, reason intervenes, and 
produces a new idea, a new problem, with the Whole itself as its object. What follows when our 
actions, our modes of life, are determined by new types of ideas? To respond to this question, we 
will need to explore the type of existential experimentation that Deleuze presents as the 
consequence of contemplation failing to generate an expectation of the future, of habit being unable 
to make sense of an experience. Deleuze argues that post-WWII European cinema is the site of a 
crisis in the production of action-images, and so in genres such as Italian Neo-Realism and French 
New Wave, there appear characters who,  
hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give rise to an action which is capable of 
modifying it [anymore] than [they] believe that an action can force a situation to disclose itself. 
The most ‘healthy’ illusions fall. The first things to be compromised everywhere are the linkages 
of situation-action, action-reaction, excitation-response, in short, the sensory-motor links which 
produced the action-image.478  
What breaks or compromises the sensory-motor links is a loss of faith in the power of an 
action to disclose or transform a situation. Unsurprisingly, this phenomenon first appears in Italian 
Neo-Realism with characters who are trapped and unable to make sense of war-ravaged cities. 
However, with later contributions to Italian Neo-Realism, and later genres, cinema further develops 
the crisis of the action-image and, as such, Deleuze’s description of these circumstances goes 
beyond the historical contingency of the war. There are deeper aesthetic conditions which were 
actualised in WWII and these conditions gave rise to a new species of image, the crystal image. 
This image emerges in the circuit between an actual image and its corresponding virtual image, and 
disrupts their discernibility by reflecting each in the other, and reversing their roles. Where the signs 
of an image usually facilitate the relations between images by referring them to each other, the signs 
of the crystal image, opsigns and sonsigns, refer only to the images as optical and auditory 
situations thus rendering the virtual and the actual sides of a circuit indiscernible. From this, 
Deleuze develops the theme of time as the object of experience. Time is not objectified; rather, the 
actual object cannot be distinguished from its virtual image and so experience takes the multiplicity 
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of indeterminate meaning as its object and is unable to extract an intelligible, actual image. Deleuze 
argues that,  
indiscernibility constitutes an objective illusion; it does not suppress the distinction between 
the two sides, but makes it unattributable, each side taking the other's role in a relation which we 
must describe as reciprocal presupposition, or reversibility. In fact, there is no virtual which does 
not become actual in relation to the actual, the latter becoming virtual through the same 
relation.479 
The emergence of the crystal-image does not necessarily require conditions as violently 
traumatic as a global war: “[w]ithout recourse to violence, and through the development of an 
experimentation, something will come out of the crystal, a new Real will come out beyond the 
actual and the virtual.”480 In one of his more explicit appropriations of a Kantian theme, Deleuze 
characterises the conditions of this breakdown in terms of the sublime; as Valentine Moulard puts 
it: “when we are confronted with an excess of beauty or horror in images, with the sublime or the 
unbearable, our sensory-motor mechanisms jam.”481 In the Critique of Judgement, Kant describes as 
sublime those experiences which have as their object something that is “absolutely great”; that is, 
the objects we can rightly judge as sublime are those whose greatness is without quantitative 
magnitude and beyond all comparison.
482
 At this point, Kant sets out an argument that is crucial to 
Deleuze’s argument that time’s rupture is grounded in a subjective experience; with regard to the 
object of the judgement of the sublime, Kant argues that “it is the disposition of soul evoked by a 
particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective judgement, and not the Object, that 
is to be called sublime.”483 Kant argues that, because the greatness of the sublime is such that “in 
comparison … all else is small,”484 the objects of the senses cannot be called sublime. The 
magnitude of any object of sensation is measurable relative to some other object and, thus, there 
will always be some thing relative to which the magnitude of the initial object is smaller or larger. 
For Kant this argument is applicable to any object whose magnitude is subject to mathematical 
estimation. However, there are also objects which are beyond my capacity to experience completely 
in a single instant, and here Kant offers as an example the pyramids of Egypt. I cannot view the 
pyramids as a totality; by the time my eye moves to take in the summit, it will have lost sight of the 
base. However, as it is the task of the imagination to synthesise these sensations into a total image, 
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this does not present a problem because “the power of numbers extends to infinity”485 and so there 
is nothing given or givable to the senses which could be called sublime. Contrary to this, it is the 
object’s provocation of the judging subject which Kant calls sublime: “for the aesthetic estimation 
there certainly is [a greatest possible], and of it I say that where it is considered an absolute measure 
beyond which no greater is possible subjectively (i.e. for the judging Subject), it then conveys the 
idea of the sublime, and calls forth that emotion which no mathematical estimation by numbers can 
evoke.”486 
In the “Analytic of the Sublime,” Kant divides the operations of the imagination into either 
apprehension or comprehension. In his reading of Kant, Deleuze argues that apprehension is “the 
successive apprehension of parts”; it is the synthesis of parts that is the condition for a future-
oriented anticipation (contemplation).
487
 According to Kant, there is no difficulty in extending such 
apprehension to infinity; however, the expansion of this operation takes comprehension to its limit. 
Once the imagination takes in so much information, adding further information corresponds with a 
loss. Consequently, while apprehension—the accretion of “representations of sensuous 
intuition”488—can proceed to infinity, comprehension reaches a limit that the imagination cannot 
overcome. An important question follows from this: if the imagination reaches the limit of its power 
of comprehension in the experience of the sublime, what is it that pushes it to this limit? What is it 
that forces the imagination to extend its reach in an attempt to unite and comprehend the immensity 
of the world? It is reason’s Ideas—Ideas produced by the faculty of reason—that can be thought but 
not known or imagined.
489
 As Kant says, “the sublime must in every case have reference to our way 
of thinking”;490 when we enlarge imagination, reason inevitably appears and “compels us 
subjectively to think nature itself in its totality as a presentation of something supersensible, without 
our being able to effectuate this presentation objectively.” The imagination concerns itself with 
nature as a phenomenon through which is presented a nature-in-itself. This nature-in-itself is the 
idea of reason which we cannot determine any further and which cannot be given objectively to the 
imagination. The idea can only be thought as such, it cannot be cognised or comprehended in its 
presentation as empirical phenomena.
491
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Deleuze takes an important lesson from this; as Daniel Smith argues, between these two 
faculties, imagination and reason, which initially suffer a sharp discord, a pleasure arises.
492
 By 
confronting its limit, the imagination can, at least negatively, go beyond this limit insofar as it can 
represent to itself the inaccessibility of reason’s Idea. Deleuze writes, 
[a]t first sight we attribute this immensity, which reduces our imagination to impotence, to the 
natural object, that is to sensible Nature. But in reality it is reason which forces us to unite the 
immensity of the sensible world into a whole. This whole is the Idea of the sensible, in so far as 
this has as a substratum something intelligible or suprasensible. Imagination thus learns that it is 
reason which pushes it to the limit of its power, forcing it to admit that all its power is nothing in 
comparison to an Idea.
493
 
 Deleuze argues that the imagination presents to itself the fact that an unpresentable exists and 
“it exists in sensible nature.”494 This lesson allows us to refine our earlier description of the sign. 
The disjunctive relationship between the faculties discloses a sensibility that receives and 
apprehends signs; however, these signs are not themselves sensible objects, they are the being of the 
sensible–sensibility’s raison d’être. This is what it means to talk about signs as the genetic and 
compositional elements of images. From an empirical point of view, signs per se are not sensible 
precisely because the sign constitutes the limit of the faculty of sensibility (the imagination); 
however, from a transcendental point of view, the sign can only be experienced sensibly because it 
is accessible only to the faculty of sensibility in its transcendental exercise.
495
 The sign is not a 
sensible object nor is it even a component quality of such objects and so, even though each species 
of image has corresponding signs, we must not conflate the image with its signs. Signs are, 
however, always presupposed by the image, they are conditions of the genesis and composition of 
the image, and to this extent are accessible only to the specialised facet on the surface of my body 
that receives information or has a sensory relationship with the image. 
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In the experience of the sublime, reason is forced to think nature as a totality; that is, as the 
syntheses of imagination become increasingly incomprehensible, the imagination presents to itself 
the fact that some element, some sense, of the field of sensible phenomena cannot be given 
objectively. In this case, however, a question remains; if reason, or, more accurately, its Idea, is 
present between imagination’s crisis and epiphany, how does imagination experience this idea as 
such? Imagination experiences signs of the intensity of an experience, of “pure” optical or sound 
situations (opsigns and sonsigns). The joy that arises in this instance is to be found in the crystal 
image to which these signs give rise: 
[t]he crystal reveals a direct time-image, and no longer an indirect image of time deriving from 
movement. It does not abstract time; it does better: it reverses its subordination in relation to 
movement. … What the crystal reveals or makes visible is the hidden ground of time, that is, its 
differentiation into two flows, that of presents which pass and that of pasts which are preserved. 
Time simultaneously makes the present pass and preserves the past in itself. There are, therefore, 
already, two possible time-images, one grounded in the past, the other in the present. Each is 
complex and is valid for time as a whole.496 
Properly speaking, the crystal image is not an image in the sense that perception or action are 
images; the crystal has no actuality, no objectivity. It is a semiotic structure—a structure with its 
own relevant signs—where “the actual optical image crystallizes with its own virtual image.”497 
Deleuze argues that we see in the crystal a rupture wherein time is no longer subordinated to 
movement. That is, time ceases to be reduced to an indirect representation as the measure of 
movement. The crystal discloses time as such: as the relational conditions of actual existence with 
its differentiation into past- and future-oriented tendencies. The crystal is the point where the virtual 
and the actual are reflected in each other such that their distinction becomes indiscernible precisely 
because each always reflects the other: “The crystal-image is, then, the point of indiscernibility of 
the two distinct images, the actual and the virtual, while what we see in the crystal is time itself, a 
bit of time in the pure state, the very distinction between the two images which keeps on 
reconstituting itself.”498 Thus an actual object cannot be distinguished from the virtual event which 
characterises it. 
Setting out from a discussion of the cinema of Jean Renoir, Deleuze argues that this situation 
breaks with automatic movement and becomes the means for experimenting with new modes of 
life: 
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[w]ithout recourse to violence, and through the development of an experimentation, something 
will come out of the crystal, a new Real will come out beyond the actual and virtual. Everything 
happens as if the circuit served to try out roles, as if roles were being tried in it until the right one 
were found, the one with which we escape to enter a clarified reality. In short, the circuit, the 
round, are not closed because they are selective, and produce a winner each time.499 
This theme of experimentation is crucial to Deleuze. If the characters in his ontology want to 
escape the reciprocity of automatic movement and the clichés of the action-image, something novel 
must be produced. At the same time, however, if Deleuze were to suggest that the form and content 
of this novelty could be determined in advance, that it could be prescribed, he would be repeating 
the clichés of automatic movement—he would be suggesting that the action or attitudes of a 
qualified observer could disclose and transform a situation—and violating his own philosophy of 
difference by suggesting that novelty is an actualisation of an idea given in advance. Beginning with 
this idea of experimentation is crucial; in describing Renoir’s work, Deleuze argues that life emerges 
from the crystal precisely insofar as it gambles on a mode of life which takes shape in the crystal. 
Deleuze argues initially for the possibility of the reflection and circulation of the indiscernibility of 
an actual image and its virtual image persisting indefinitely; however, he comes to argue that it is 
only the gamble made on an experiment that brings this circulation to completion: “Now, in 
contrast, the dividing in two can come to completion, but precisely on condition that one of the two 
tendencies leaves the crystal, through the point of flight. From the indiscernibility of the actual and 
the virtual, a new distinction must emerge, like a new reality which was not pre-existent.”500 And so, 
it is through three moments that novelty is produced beyond the clichés of the action-image; first is 
an experience that is beyond the capacity of habit to represent comprehensibly; second, because it is 
this experience which disrupts the schemata according to whose laws the action-image is generated, 
this experience confronts us with an idea of the whole as such, instead of subordinating it to the 
spatial translation of its parts; and, finally, gambling on one of the roles glimpsed in the image 
disclosed by the new idea of the whole.  
 
Conclusion: The Breakdown of the Sensory-Motor Schema and Experimentation. 
In recounting the Bergsonian ontology of the Cinema books over chapters four and five, we 
have seen that the sensory-motor schema is Deleuze’s name for the immanent laws by which the 
doubly expressive processes of the affection-image determine an action in response to a problem 
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posed by perception. In other words, the sensory-motor schema is the immanent logic by which 
sensible experience relates to its ideal conditions through affection, and vice versa. Deleuze’s 
deployment of the Kantian conception of experiences of the sublime in the Cinema books allows 
him to suggest that there are experiences which disrupt this schema. These experiences are precisely 
those in which the faculty of imagination, in its habitual operation of synthesising previous 
experiences into an anticipation of the future, fails to produce a concept of the objects of experience. 
Deleuze argues that this failure confronts the imagination with its own impotence and also with a 
new idea of the whole of nature. Even though it is reason’s idea which exposes the imagination to 
the limits of its power, the object of the idea is sensible nature. That is, it is reason’s idea of sensible 
nature which disrupts the sense-making habits of the imagination precisely by presenting the 
imagination with its limits in the form of a sensible, yet unrepresentable object.  In the thesis 
conclusion I will continue this discussion of the rupture in the operations of the imagination and 
how it brings about a new idea, a new conception of the body’s relationship to its milieu. This 
discussion must be held over into another context because properly explicating the ethological 
significance of experiences of the sublime requires that we emphasise the nature of the relationship 
between the actual and the virtual—that is, the reciprocity between a being and its power, and I will 
do this in the first half of the conclusion. I will subsequently return to the twin themes of wounds 
and counter-actualisation presented in chapter one in order to explicate how and why the 
breakdown of the sensory-motor schema—experiences of the sublime—is a vital means for the 
transformative experimentation at the heart of Deleuze’s ethics. 
 
 
 
 
  
144 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Wounds of Indetermination. 
 
In life there is a sort of awkwardness, a delicacy of health, a frailty of constitution, a vital 
stammering which is someone's charm. Charm is the source of life[; however,] … Life is not 
your history—those who have no charm have no life, it is as though they are dead. But the 
charm is not the person. It is what makes people be grasped as so many combinations and so 
many unique chances from which such a combination has been drawn. … Thus through each 
fragile combination a power of life is affirmed with a strength, an obstinacy, an unequalled 
persistence in the being.
501
 
  
I have argued in this thesis that Deleuze’s metaphysical project undergoes a tremendous 
progression from his earliest works, published in the 1950s, to the two volumes of Cinema, 
published in the 1980s. The problem which drives this progression is an ecological concern with the 
relationship between an individual and her environment, and, at the heart of this progression is an 
effort to think through their reciprocity such that the whole—the individual’s environment or 
milieu—is constituted as the individual engages in relationships with the other members of her 
environment. It is, I suggest, these differential power relations and their actualisation as real objects 
that constitute the whole for Deleuze.  
Deleuze’s ontological project receives its first full articulation in his reading of Spinoza. 
However, while Deleuze learns and retains much from his engagement with Spinoza, he remains 
dissatisfied with Spinoza’s privileging of the identity of the whole, or substance, over the 
individuals that express its constitution and modification. This dissatisfaction leads him to return to 
Bergson who enables him to argue that the whole which subsists in particular lives is constituted as 
a heterogeneous multiplicity that is determined by the differentiation of actual lives. Thus, by the 
time of the renewed Bergsonian ontology of the Cinema books, Deleuze is able to present the 
constitution of the whole as turning around the differential relations that generate individuals. In 
Deleuze’s mature ontological vision, the universe is conceived as a sensible continuum that 
generates individuals as the differential expression of a degree of power from the point of view of 
an affective encounter. The assemblage of these degrees of power constitute a whole conceived as 
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the distributive unity of the reality of relations that subsist in actual individuals. At the same time, 
we have also seen how Deleuze undertakes a critique of moral codes and systems that emphasise a 
system of judgment based on transcendent rules. Against this, Deleuze argues for a conception of 
ethics focussed on the immanent conditions of the transformation of an individual’s power. Deleuze 
personifies the anti-humanism of his generation insofar as he rejects the idea of an individual as a 
free agent whose acts follow from her deliberations. Instead, he is interested in the passive 
processes—that is, the processes to which she, as a subject, is passive—which determine how an 
individual apprehends and makes sense of her past experiences and thereby constitute her. The 
salient feature of Deleuze’s ethics is how these sense-making processes contribute to the 
transformation of an individual’s powers and capacities. 
These analyses of the ontological and the ethical are an attempt to articulate a relationship that 
is at the heart of Deleuze’s project: ethology. This term, with its bipartite etymology, indicates the 
extent to which ethics and ontology are, in Deleuze’s project, necessarily bound up in each other. 
Ethology has two basic concerns: on the one hand it is concerned with the ontological question of 
how an individual fits into her environment and expresses the ongoing transformation of this 
environment; on the other hand, it is concerned with the ethical question that emerges from the fact 
that, within a philosophy of immanence, the ontological question is always posed from the point of 
view of a living being. To the extent that an individual is constituted relationally, the activity or 
passivity of the affections involved in the determination of the individual turn on the adequacy of 
the idea of the individual’s essence, the idea of the essence of individuals to whom she relates, and 
the idea of the whole of which they are all parts. If the formulation of the idea of the individual is 
confused and indirect in the way that it involves the idea of another individual, the affects 
undergone will be passions. To the extent that the idea of the individual “evinces the internal 
agreement of our essence, other essences and the essence of God … then the affects that arise from 
it are themselves actions.”502 Thus, the degree to which the affects involved in the determination of 
the individual are active or passive is determined by the intelligibility, the adequacy, of her idea of 
herself, the individuals with whom she relates, and the whole in which they participate. The 
determination of an idea is an ontological matter of sense-making and the formulation of problems, 
but it is simultaneously an ethical issue that complicates the ontological question because the idea 
presented to her body as a problem determines how she will act and interact with those around her, 
and this interaction will become fodder for the ongoing making of sense—contemplation—and 
determination of problems. This is to say that the ethical and ontological complicate each other 
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insofar as an individual’s mode of life gives content to the ongoing contemplation that informs her 
becoming, while her becoming is synonymous with her changing modes of life.  
By way of concluding this thesis, I wish to address two issues that crystallise and focus the 
significance of the Cinema books to Deleuze’s ethology. The first issue concerns a persistent and, in 
my view, problematic, reading of Deleuze as a philosopher who valorises the virtual and denigrates 
the actual. According to this reading, Deleuze denies the reality of the actual by reducing it to a 
mere epiphenomenal expression of the becoming of the virtual. I contend that this is a 
misrepresentation of Deleuze’s ontology. Addressing this criticism of Deleuze provides an 
opportunity to offer a summary of Deleuze’s ontological commitments and to reflect on the 
ethological significance of the reciprocity of the virtual and the actual. Whilst the critique 
undertaken here is potentially applicable to a number of readings of Deleuze’s project, I will limit 
the following discussion to a paradigm case of this problematic reading—Peter Hallward’s Out of 
This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation. I focus on Hallward’s reading of Deleuze, 
because, if correct, it would negate the interpretation of Deleuze offered in this thesis.
503
 Indeed, 
according to Hallward, Deleuze offers no means to think through the empowerment and 
transformation of actual lives because, for him, the virtual and the actual are asymmetrical.
504
 
Following Henry Somers-Hall, however, I argue that whilst the virtual is prioritised over the 
actual—that is, as I argued in chapter three, the problem transcends the actual occurrence to which 
it is given— this is not equivalent to saying that the virtual escapes the actual; rather, it is an 
argument that the virtual is not beholden to the habits of actual lives.
505
 Hallward, however, 
interprets this prioritisation of the virtual as an attempt to flee the actual and thus confuses the 
transformative power of the reciprocity of the virtual and the actual for an act of creation wherein 
what is created—the actual—is an epiphenomenal product of the process of creation—the virtual.  
This thesis has always been directed towards the idea that our capacity for action is 
transformed according to the sense we make of the wounds that subsist in the present, actual state of 
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our embodiment. If Hallward’s argument justifies his claim that it is futile to seek inspiration for a 
transformative ethics in Deleuze, then my criticism of this argument necessitates a direct 
engagement with a second issue. I suggest that this is because, if we can criticise the claim that 
Deleuze’s project is ethically insignificant, we cannot avoid the corresponding need to consider the 
possible content of whatever ethical significance Deleuze’s project might have. That is to say, 
Hallward’s attempt to highlight Deleuze’s ethical impotence by criticising his metaphysics, affirms 
the deep interconnection of ethics and ontology in Deleuze’s project and it is this affirmation that 
leads us to the challenge with which this thesis will conclude: the ethological significance of 
experiences, the counter-actualisation, of our wounds.  
 
The Reciprocity of the Virtual and the Actual. 
In Out of This World, Hallward suggests that Deleuze’s emphasis on the counter-actualisation 
of the event leads to a subordination of the actual to the virtual. Hallward initially seems to describe 
counter-actualisation as a simple “reversal of the movement from virtual to actual”;506 however, he 
nuances this description by arguing that “counter-actualisation involves something more than the 
mere reversal of this movement,”507 and he characterises this “more” as “extract[ing] a pure 
potentiality, a virtual creating from an actual creature, such that the former can be thought as wholly 
independent of the latter … because it serves to free a creating from its creatures.”508 Thus, for 
Hallward, counter-actualisation is the manner in which the virtual escapes or breaks free of the 
actual. The subsistence of the virtual is an issue that cuts straight to the heart of Deleuze’s reading 
of Spinoza, specifically the way in which God produces a modal world at the same time and in the 
same event as his essence is constituted by the expression of his attributes. Hallward acknowledges 
this context in his characterisation of the simultaneous, univocal constitution of substance and the 
production of modes: “both creatings and creatures are facets of a single order of creation. They 
both are in one and the same way.”509 Through a series of associations, Hallward suggests that this 
characterisation of univocity informs “the monotony of the underlying logic”510 that drives 
Deleuze’s metaphysics. Hallward claims that “Deleuze's work resounds with echoes of its univocal 
orientation” and then proceeds to cite Deleuze’s collaborations with Félix Guattari—Anti Oedipus, 
A Thousand Plateaus, Kafka, and What is Philosophy? —as works which are grounded in this 
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univocity.
511
 In reading Deleuze this way, Hallward develops a vocabulary in which becomings and 
beings—processes and entities, creatings and creatures—are opposing terms in a dual process of 
creation. Hallward then elides the subtle distinctions between the terms of Deleuze’s various 
projects—particularly the conception of substance, attributes and modes that he inherits from 
Spinoza, and the virtual and the actual that is developed in Difference and Repetition—as though 
the various terms of Deleuze’s transforming project simply restate, with trivial differences, the 
asymmetrical creativity that Hallward suggests characterises the relation between substance and 
modes.
512
 On his reading then, the actual world “can never itself be new or creative, regardless of 
how distinct it may be in relation to what has already been established.”513 This is because, while a 
creating is not transcendent, that is, “it doesn't operate upon the creature from a position external to 
it, like a transitive cause upon its effect,” there is still an important distinction between creatures 
and creatings. Hallward argues that 
[c]reation is precisely the immanent combination of both creature and creating: the creating is 
more ‘internal’ to the creature than any actual inside. Nevertheless, as the verbal forms suggest, 
only one of these two terms is active. It is only the creating that differs or produces, and it is 
only the creating as such that can claim to be properly new. However novel or impressive an 
actual work of art, for instance, it bears no resemblance to the process that created it, to the 
power of its working. However novel it might be in respect to other existent creatures, a newly 
created individual is never itself new.
514
 
In other words, an actual entity—what is created—is the sterile product of a fecund process 
and this process, in order to be continually creative, must escape the actual. This approach, 
however, overlooks the important legacy of Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s attributes; that is, it 
misconstrues the reciprocity (the implication and complication) of the constitution of substance and 
the production of the modes. Whilst Hallward does comment on Deleuze’s use of Spinoza, he 
argues that Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza amounts to the claim that “[a]n individual is only truly 
unique, according to this conception of things, if its individuation is the manifestation of an 
unlimited individuating power. More crudely: you are only really an individual if God (or 
something like God) makes you so.”515 If Hallward wanted to reduce Deleuze’s ontology to a 
“crude” presentation of the thesis of Expressionism—i.e., the metaphysical thesis that the modes are 
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expressions of the sense of the constitution of God, a substance whose identity is unaffected by the 
modes—this would be a fair characterisation of Deleuze. However, the problem with a such a 
reduction is clear in light of the criticism Deleuze offers of Spinoza in Difference and Repetition, 
and my own argument that affection determines the relationship between the virtual and the actual. 
Although the virtual is the transcendental condition of the actual, the form, content, and existence of 
the virtual is necessarily determined by its relationship with the actual. In other words, Deleuze 
works so hard at transforming his metaphysics precisely so that he can avoid the reduction of his 
ontology to this asymmetry, and so, once he has moved beyond the initial formulation of his 
ontology in Expressionism, the potential asymmetry of substance and modes is overcome by new 
concepts—the virtual, the actual and multiplicity. With these new concepts in motion, Deleuze 
argues that the whole of which actual lives are a part is a heterogeneous multiplicity constituted, 
that is, determined, as the distributive juxtaposition of intensities/degrees that subsist in the relations 
between actual individuals.  
The significance of this discrepancy between the respective readings I offer of Deleuze in this 
thesis and that Hallward offers in Out of This World, is that we both want to consider the extent to 
which Deleuze’s ontological project has anything to offer a meaningful ethical project; that is, I, 
like Hallward, contend that this ethical issue can only be addressed in terms of the coherence of 
Deleuze’s ontology. However, I, unlike Hallward, contend that a sophisticated reading of Deleuze’s 
ontology as a transforming project, affirms the ethical significance of Deleuze’s project. The 
potential ethical significance of Deleuze’s ethology is grounded in how we make sense of the 
whole’s production of the parts which express its constitution and transformation. As Hallward 
demonstrates, Deleuze’s œuvre is full of variants on the word create; however, the significance of 
this is mitigated by the fact that Deleuze, in reading Spinoza, explicitly distinguishes production 
from creation: 
How does God produce things, in what conditions? The very conditions of production render it 
different from a creation, and “creatures” different from creations. As God produces necessarily, 
and within his own attributes, his productions are necessarily modes of these attributes that 
constitute his nature.
516
 
This distinction is relatively straightforward; however, saying “God produces” is 
unfortunately misleading, at least at first, because the sense of production present in Deleuze’s 
reading is, as Hallward acknowledges, different to external causation. In Deleuze’s reading of 
Spinoza, the attributes constitute the essence, and thus existence, of God insofar as they are 
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expressed as his attributes. But this attributive expression is double; that is, expression not only 
constitutes God, it also expresses the intensive modifications of his essence. The production of the 
modes is the expression of these modifications of the essence of God. This is what Deleuze means: 
the expression of God’s essence, the expression from which his existence follows, is the same event 
in which the modal universe is produced. Still, God produces the modes insofar as the modes are 
expressions of the degree of his self-constitution, his status as causa sui. If we recall a theme that 
Deleuze inherits from both Spinoza and Hume—a distinction between causation and 
determination—this issue becomes clearer. In Spinoza, the existence of a mode cannot follow from 
its essence. In other words, the existence of a mode cannot follow from the degree of power—the 
degree to which it expresses the constitution of God—that characterises its existence. Later, with 
Hume, causation is conceived as the relation inferred from the conjunction of events given in 
experience. What Deleuze takes from both is a robust distinction between the determination of 
essence and the cause of existence. This means that when we talk of the reciprocity of the virtual 
and the actual, we cannot say that they cause each other; however, even though Spinoza 
distinguishes between the determination and causation, this does not mean that there is an absence 
of causation in the reciprocity of the virtual and the actual. As a response to the situation in which 
the production of the modes follows from the constitutive expression of the essence of substance, 
Deleuze undertakes a categorical reversal of identity and difference in Difference and Repetition 
and describes the virtual as a sense which subsists in the same real object that we also call actual. 
Insofar as they are distinct “sides” of the same object, the reciprocity of the virtual and the actual is 
a complex correlation wherein each determines the becoming of the other; however, to say that one 
causes the other is tantamount to saying that the sense which subsists in an expression is the cause 
of the existence of the expression.
517
  
Reflecting on Deleuze’s criticism of Spinoza, Jeffrey Bell suggests that Deleuze’s main 
objection is that the virtual “is not outside the actual … rather, it is the power of relations … that 
problematizes and intensifies the actual … while being inseparable from it.”518 This means that 
there is nothing apart from the actual and the relations that problematise and determine the actual. 
While Deleuze certainly claims that the distinctions amongst the virtual events which determine the 
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actual are real and that this reality does not extend to the actual, this does not entail the claim that 
actual entities are themselves artificial or epiphenomenal. Thus, contra Hallward’s hypothesis that 
actual lives follow from a virtual creating, I would suggest that actual lives exist because they 
participate in the constitution of a relational whole, the individuation or differentiation of which 
they express. The insistence on the subsistence of the virtual in actual objects affirms that the 
expression of a particular, virtual event of individuation as a particular, actual life follows from, is 
determined by, the relationships in which the actual object participates. This explains three moves in 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. First, it explains why Deleuze had to insist that God produces the 
modal universe at the same time and in the same sense as his attributes constitute his essence. 
Second, it explains why Deleuze had to interpret substance as a heterogeneous multiplicity, for in 
order for the modes to express or actualise modifications of God in a robust sense—for God to be 
an immanent cause—the essence of God must be a qualitative multiplicity, otherwise the 
distinctions amongst the attributes lose their reality. Finally, the commitment to a purely immanent 
ontology explains Deleuze’s criticism of Spinoza in Difference and Repetition. When Deleuze 
develops his categorical reversal of being and becoming, the reversal in which substance is made to 
turn around the modes, he is able to present the whole as determined by the affective differentiation 
of the flux of the movement-image into its three avatars. The relational degrees expressed by these 
differentiations constitute the whole in which they participate. This retains the significance of the 
theory of distinctions that is crucial to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza and gives us a context for 
rejecting the claim that the virtual is real and the actual is not. While the flow of moving-matter is 
real, its differentiations into the avatars of the movement-image—the lines drawn around particular 
bodies—are only modal; that is, numerical and “artificial.” However, the distinctions between the 
relational degrees expressed by these differentiations are real, and they are virtual to the extent that 
their reality can be distinguished from the actuality of their expressions.  
If I insist so persistently on the finer points of Deleuze’s discussion of the virtual and the 
actual and the ways in which this has been misrepresented in the work of commentators such as 
Hallward, it is precisely because this issue is so crucial to the primary concern of this thesis, which 
is to say the ethical significance of the reciprocity between an individual and her environment. In 
Expressionism, Deleuze suggests that the artificiality of the distinctions between modes means that 
“[e]very existing mode is … inevitably affected by modes external to it and undergoes changes that 
are not explained by its own nature alone. Its affections are at the outset, and tend to remain, 
passions.”519 This poses an immediate question, a question which, according to Deleuze, is the only 
real ethical question: under what conditions might an existing mode aspire to convert its passive 
                                                          
519
 Deleuze, Expressionism, 219. 
152 
 
affections into active affections? Or, to put it another way, an actual individual is necessarily 
relational, and the distinction between one actual individual and another is entirely a question of 
quantitative degrees of the constitution of the whole of which they are parts. That is, the real 
difference is in the relational degrees—the degrees of power—and how, expressed for themselves, 
they constitute a whole. The diversity between individuals is not real difference precisely because 
the reality of the actual is its continuity. In this sense, any actual individual is necessarily produced 
as a ratio of active and passive affects and, according to Deleuze, if ethics means anything, it is the 
possibility of modifying this ratio. According to Hallward’s account, however, Deleuze cannot 
respond meaningfully to this problem of transformation of passive affections into active ones: “[i]n 
the end, Deleuze offers few resources for thinking the consequences of what happens within the 
actually existing world as such … the adamantly virtual orientation of Deleuze’s ‘constructivism’ 
does not allow him to account for cumulative transformation or novelty in terms of actual materials 
and tendencies.”520 But the thesis that Deleuze has nothing meaningful to say about the ethics of the 
actual world would be valid only if Hallward were correct in saying that the actual world is only an 
epiphenomenal mirage that gestures towards a virtual creating that is characterised by its attempts to 
flee from the actual world. But if, as I contend, Deleuze argues that the actual and the virtual are 
reciprocal then we can find in Deleuze an answer to the very question that Hallward claims Deleuze 
cannot answer: under what conditions is the ratio of active and passive affections in an individual 
life modified? More broadly, how does Deleuze conceive the conditions of the empowerment and 
transformation of actual lives? Whilst there can be no general response to this question, I will 
suggest, in the following and final section, that something approaching an answer to this question 
can be found by modifying and qualifying Deleuze’s concept of counter-actualisation. This concept 
is, I argue, central to Deleuze’s understanding of the empowerment and creative transformation of 
life and I wish to situate the wound at the heart of this concept and claim that certain experiences—
experiences of the sublime—rupture the sensory motor schema and thus serve as the immanent 
conditions of creative transformation and empowerment. 
 
On Wounds and Counter-Actualisation. 
A wound is incarnated or actualized in a state of things or of life; but it is itself a pure virtuality 
on the plane of immanence that leads us into a life. My wound existed before me: not a 
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transcendence of the wound as higher actuality, but its immanence as a virtuality always within a 
milieu.
521
  
 
In chapter four I suggested that Deleuze’s description of affection owes a debt to both Spinoza and 
Bergson. Affection, stated simply, is a state of my body insofar as it entails another body. In his 
reading of Spinoza, Deleuze distinguishes between active and passive affections as, respectively, 
affections that can be explained in terms of the affected body relative to other bodies and the whole 
of which they are a part, and affections that involve a confused mixture of the affected body and 
external, affecting bodies. Finite existing modes will always undergo passions to some degree, and 
can never entirely eliminate them. Becoming more active involves the possibility that a mode can 
“at best bring it about that its passions occupy only a small part of itself.”522 Thus, the ethical 
problem concerns the extent to which the ratio of affections involved in my existence expresses my 
capacity to affect other bodies relative to their capacity to affect mine. That is, it concerns 
enhancements and diminutions to the degree of power which characterises my existence. 
Paradoxically, however, a condition of enhancing power is the realisation that I am not an 
arbiter for the situations in which I am involved. It is in recognition of this paradox that I have 
argued for a connection between Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza and the ontology of sense and affect 
that he presents in the two volumes of Cinema. Experimentation with novel modes of life only 
becomes possible when the clichés that determine action-images—the a priori assumptions that a 
character’s actions can disclose or modify a situation—are disrupted. The passage quoted above is 
from Deleuze’s final essay, the beautiful “Immanence: A Life,” and takes us to the heart of this 
thesis’ interest in the Cinema books: the possibility that ruptures to the sensory-motor schema 
might, as the concrete content of counter-actualisation, confront us with the new understanding of 
our relationality that would enhance our power. In chapter one, I suggested a definition of wounds 
that, given the discussions of chapter five, I can affirm and qualify: wounds are breakdowns of, and 
ruptures in, the laws of the sensory-motor schema to the extent that both are virtual events that 
subsist in our actual lives and undermine the belief that my actions have the power to disclose or 
modify the situations with which the world presents us. Like wounds, ruptures and breakdowns of 
the sensory-motor schema are not actual occurrences; they are virtual events which correspond to, 
which determine, actual occurrences.  
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There are always signs given in experience which determine these events, and signs which 
actualise and express these events. Deleuze argues that there are signs given in experience that 
constitute both the genesis and composition of time-images insofar as they present a situation as 
purely auditory and visual. That is, the flux of movement-matter is differentiated as this or that 
image in virtue of the semiotics of experience. The genesis and composition of a time-image, that 
is, a crystalline structure in which an actual image cannot be distinguished from its virtual image, is 
given in experience as a semiotic situation in which a character goes from being an actor to a seer: 
in other words, she loses the capacity to act and can only observe.
523
  
The genesis and composition of the time-image evokes the dialectic of problems that is at 
the heart of Deleuze’s ontology, but we must resist simply reverting to that discussion because it is 
simultaneously too simple and too abstract. It is too simple because it only implies the extent to 
which my experience of signs and my interpretation of their significance is grounded in memories. 
It is too abstract because naming the signs of the time-image tells us nothing about what they are, 
which is to say how they are given in experience. To give concrete meaning to the signs of the 
genesis of the time-image, we could turn to Deleuze’s reading of Kant: Kant would describe these 
signs as experiences which are beyond the capacity of the imagination to synthesise into a coherent 
image. And, of course, Deleuze would emphasise this description with the qualification that it is not 
the magnitude of the objects of our experience that defines the sign but, rather, the intensity of our 
experience of the sign that counts. Sublimity is not a quality of the object, it is a judgment made by 
the subject when an experience stretches her capacity for comprehension beyond its limits so that 
reason must intervene to relate the object to the category of the sublime.  
It is in this sense that I suggest that wounds be defined in terms of the breakdown of the 
sensory-motor schema. As Williams rightly points out, wounds should not be confused with 
injuries.
524
 As Deleuze suggests in the above passage from “Immanence,” a wound is not something 
that happens in the course of my actual life; it is a virtual event, an intensity, that subsists in actual 
occurrences and constitutes the problems that will determine my future. That is, a wound is not an 
occurrence experienced by individual, it is the sense which subsists in the content of experience. In 
this context, we can rephrase the ethical question about the conditions of transformation and make it 
much more specific: are there signs in experience through which the constitution of our actual lives 
would, through a counter-actualisation of the event, enhance our power by challenging us to 
conceive more adequately the wound which testifies to our embeddedness in a milieu? In The Logic 
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of Sense, Deleuze characterises counter-actualisation as an encounter with the sense of what 
happens that affirms the intensive degrees between the event which determines what happens to me 
and the individuals implied by the events connected to the initial event.
525
 To the extent that a 
wound is a virtual event, the ethical question is deceptively simple: is there an experiential sign 
which corresponds to my wound and which would enable the counter-actualisation through which I 
might engage with my wound? 
A potential answer to this question can be found in Difference and Repetition’s discussion 
of Stoicism. There he writes, “[a] scar is the sign not of a past wound but of ‘the present fact of 
having been wounded.’”526 This suggestion receives the barest of attention and practically no direct 
elaboration; indeed, aside from these few sentences in Difference and Repetition it appears to be 
mentioned only twice more, in The Logic of Sense in both cases—once as a parenthetical example 
of a Stoic paradox and once as a cryptic remark in the discussion of Joë Bousquet’s famous 
observation about the pre-existence of his wound.
527
 This scant reference does not, however, detract 
from its importance. The line in Difference and Repetition continues: a scar “is the contemplation of 
the wound … it contracts all the instants which separate us from it into a living present.” A scar, 
then, is the actual side of a wound. It is the sign of the event’s persistence in the present conditions 
of a life. In the context of the present thesis, Deleuze’s comments are then significant for two 
reasons. First, they respond to our concern about the possibility of over-simplifying the experience 
of signs, of overlooking the sense in which the determination of problems is temporal. A scar 
testifies to the persistence of the past as the condition of the present. Scars are not signs which 
express to an individual that she was, at some point in the past, wounded; rather, they affirm the 
extent to which her body is inescapably implicated in her milieu and thus affirm this milieu as 
implicated in the composition of her body. Second, I do not contemplate my scars—as though I am 
distinct from them and able to take them as objects of reflection. As I have argued throughout this 
thesis, contemplation is the passive process by which the past is contracted and synthesised as an 
idea constitutive of the problem which determines my thoughts and actions.
528
  
As the sign of the subsistence of a wound, a scar is thus the contraction of “the wound … 
[and] all the instants which separate us from it” into an idea, into a problem. However, because a 
wound is an event which disrupts this contraction—recall that contemplation is the process 
frustrated by experiences of the sublime—this contraction of the wound into present problems 
means that we find ourselves in the situation of a direct time-image where a circuit is established 
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between an actual image and its virtual image such that the two are indiscernible. As we have seen, 
it is the institution of this circuit which makes experimentation possible: “[e]verything happens as if 
the circuit served to try out roles, as if roles were being tried in it until the right one were found, the 
one with which we escape to enter a clarified reality.”529 This experimentation is not an individual 
literally, actually, trying out a plethora of roles; it is a counter-actualisation in which an individual 
confronts the multitude of other individuals implied by her own existence and transforms her actual 
mode of life in response to the virtual individuals that populate her milieux.  
In light of this discussion, I would suggest that Deleuze’s ethics is not a programme for 
ethical behaviour nor even the determination of ethical problems. It is the sense in which his 
ontology presents a challenge to the living individual. As he puts it in The Logic of Sense, if it has 
anything meaningful to offer, ethics offers only this one challenge: to be “worthy” of what happens 
to us, that is, to overcome our resentment of the event and affirm it. From an ontological point of 
view, the event constitutes our life and to see it as somehow unjust, unwarranted, or “repugnant” is 
nothing more than the absolute depth of ressentiment.
530
 In this sense I argue that, against the 
expectation of an ethical programme, Deleuze’s ethology issues an ethical challenge from the point 
of view of a pure ontology. Because of the way that the two volumes of Cinema’s ontology—in 
particular, the theme of the breakdown of the sensory-motor schema as a rupture in the series of 
clichés—implies this discussion of wounds and counter-actualisation, I contend that these books are 
more concerned with the development of the sense in which Deleuze’s project unites ontology and 
ethics in an ethological project than they are with philosophies of film and cinema. It is often 
claimed that the Cinema books recapitulate arguments that appear elsewhere in Deleuze’s œuvre. I 
am content to concede this point, at least to the extent that their philosophical sophistication is only 
appreciable in the context of Deleuze’s broader project; that is, this sophistication comes into view 
when they are situated in the context of the development of Deleuze’s ethology. While it is true that 
the two volumes of Cinema repeat many arguments that appear elsewhere, they develop a uniquely 
immanent point of view on Deleuze’s own metaphysics. His earlier works strike their reader as 
commentaries, sometimes on writers, sometimes on artists, frequently on other philosophers, and, in 
the masterpieces of 1968/69, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, they are 
commentaries on philosophical problems and Deleuze’s own responses to them. However, the 
Cinema books are primarily the work of a thinker deploying the tools he has available to conceive 
and describe life on the plane of immanence that he so long celebrated, while still articulating this 
point of view in an impersonal—that is, philosophical not autobiographical—voice. Perhaps this is 
not a particularly noteworthy achievement in itself; however, it does bring to light another, much 
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more salient achievement. The Cinema books demonstrate how intensely concrete Deleuze’s project 
is, how focussed it is on the conditions of the transformation of actual lives. Deleuze’s insistence on 
immanence, his self-description as an empiricist, and his notorious disdain for abstraction indicates 
the importance of concreteness to his philosophy, but, with the Cinema books, the style, object and 
content of his work are made concrete in a very different, unique and more direct way. I suggest 
that if we want to engage with Deleuze’s ethics, and the affective ontology implied by his ethics, 
the Cinema books are significant in ways that deserve more attention precisely because they offer a 
way to think concretely about the formulation of, and our responses to, ethical questions of 
empowerment and the transformation of everyday experience. 
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